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Abstract
How politicians attempt to control bureaucracies has been broadly discussed over the 
years in public administration and public choice studies. Seeking to maximize their 
political efficiency (their re-election), politicians rely on various monitoring 
mechanisms to overcome principal-agent problems. However, since monitoring 
methods are often limited and expensive, politicians turn their attention from 
supervision, to the attributes of supervisees. In an effort to increase compliance and 
conserve resources, politicians often replace career agents with political appointees. 
They view appointed agents as political allies who share their policy preferences and 
are therefore motivated to implement their policies.
Most scholars assert that political-ideological agreement between politicians 
and appointees increases agency responsiveness. The present thesis contends that, 
under certain conditions, it can decrease bureaucratic cooperation. While political 
agreement may reduce shifting - appointees pursuing different policies than those set 
by their principals - it does not address the problem of shirking - the reluctance of 
agents to invest the necessary resources to effect change. No matter how closely 
appointees’ views match those of their principals, political agents have strong 
incentives to shirk. On the other hand, policy agreement at the appointment stage 
encourages politicians to relax monitoring thereafter, as they assume that appointees 
are cooperating. Under these more relaxed conditions, appointees may choose to 
conserve their own resources and shirk.
In order to explore political appointments, an empirical study of Israeli cities 
was conducted, for the political term of 1993-1998. During these years, local
politicians were adopting New Public Management schemes (such as a contracting- 
out reform). In the process, mayors politically appointed to key executive roles 
associates whom they believed would forward the implementation o f the reform. 
However, empirical exploration of Tel-Aviv, Holon and Beer-Sheva, largely reveal a 
failure to create responsive agencies prepared to contract-out services when relying 
on political appointees.
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Chapter 1 
Bureaucracies’ Shirking and Shifting Policies
Introduction
This study explores the mechanism of political appointment, as it is used to 
overcome principal-agent problems. Most Public Policy and Administration literature 
portrays political appointment as a useful tool to control bureaucracies and create 
responsive agencies. Frequently, scholars assume that responsiveness is reached 
when politicians resolve conflicts of interest with bureaucratic agents by appointing 
political allies willing to cooperate and reveal information to their principals. This 
thesis shows why, under certain conditions, political appointments do not lead to the 
solution of agency problems and, in many cases, actually weaken the control over 
bureaucracies.
The current chapter explores the relationship between politicians and 
bureaucrats and defines types of non-compliant actions taken by agents against the 
wishes of their principals. The analysis of noncompliant actions includes an 
investigation of the difference between two acts - shifting and shirking - an important 
distinction that is not clearly made in the literature, but is essential, as it allows a 
better understanding of the problem of control that politicians face when interacting 
with bureaucracies. It is assumed that agents are inefficiently controlled because the 
preferences, characteristics, and institutional arrangements under which they operate, 
are misinterpreted. Shifting (often referred to as "policy drifts" in the literature), 
describes actions undertaken by agents, who, due to their own ideology, which may 
be in conflict with the views of their principals, seek to change a particular policy.
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Shirking describes an agent’s attempts to avoid the effort needed to implement an 
agreed policy, by maintaining the status quo.
The analysis of uncooperative behaviours presented in this chapter explores 
how shifting and shirking are facilitated and how agents' actions can be effected by 
various bureaucratic agencies. The following empirical chapters examine the 
attempts to privatize sanitation services in three Israeli cities, privatization is often 
mentioned in the present chapter, to explain how it is affected when shifting and 
shirking by agents occur.
Finally, this chapter provides an overview of the thesis. The distinction drawn 
between types of uncooperative behaviour in chapter 1 provides a useful analytical 
tool for investigating the political appointments mechanism, as introduced in Chapter
2. Chapter 2 examines why political leaders often replace career executives with 
political appointees and why, under certain conditions, political appointments are an 
inefficient mechanism of control. Chapter 3 presents the main characteristics of 
Israeli local governments. Chapters 4-6 test the theory of appointments in Israeli 
cities.
Shifting policy
Most political economy models analyzing politicians-bureaucratic relationships 
consider shifting as the process in which agents choose to implement their own 
preferred policies, and not the principal's choice of policies.1 Niskanen, for example, 
claims that administrative officials, acting as “Budget Maximizers,” may feel 
threatened by any policy, such as reforms leading to privatization, that can lead to 
budget cuts.2 According to him, an agency’s budget is the central focus of top 
officials. A large budget means prestige, power, reputation and income.
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Consequently, bureaucrats might shift policy when requested to privatize services, by 
hiring extra employees or initiating alternative projects. The empirical examination 
conducted in Israeli cities (chapters 4-6) shows how some bureaucrats, threatened by 
a reform, pose obstacles along the stages of implementation, by conducting poor 
inspection of contractors’ performance, shifting their agencies in order to reach 
inefficient privatization outcomes, to the disappointment of political leaders.
Over the years, scholars have offered alternative explanations for 
uncooperative bureaucratic behaviour, beyond Niskanen’s budget maximizing thesis. 
Dunleavy, for example, presents a Bureau-Shaping model, in which bureaucratic 
agents shift policies in a way that allows a bureau's program budget to be kept, while 
routine and non-core bureau functions are passed to closely supervised quasi­
government agencies (QGAs). Supplementary functions can be contracted out to 
private firms, or subjected to competitive tendering, producing radical reductions in 
the personnel engaged in routine functions. Core budgets drop, but the contracted 
services remain within the agency’s bureau budget.
Other scholars assume that bureaucrats are motivated by interests other than 
the agency's budget. While some of these interests conflict with those of their 
principals, thus motivating agents to shift policies, others lead to responsiveness. 
Downs “Pluralist Model” suggests that in their public, as well as private roles, 
bureaucrats are rational utility-maximisers, optimizing benefits net o f costs. Downs 
offers a variety of goals that bureaucrats seek to attain while in office. These include 
power (inside the bureau or outside it), income, prestige, convenience (i.e. 
minimizing personal effort), and security (i.e. low probability of future losses in all 
the elements stated above). Instrumental motivations cause bureaucrats to manipulate 
information provided to their superiors in a way that promotes the implementation of
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favourable policies, consistent with their self-interest. Downs also suggests broader 
motivations of bureaucrats, such as acting with loyalty towards their subordinates 
and to the public, in a desire to serve “the public interest” .4
Downs classifies five “bureaucratic personalities” that represent general types 
of executive officials who seek to maximize different interests through their 
bureaucratic role. (1) Climbers, who wish to maximize power, income and prestige. 
(2) Conservers, who want a quiet life and stable future. (3) Zealots, who are 
strongly committed to their own projects. (4) Advocates, who are ‘bureaucratic 
imperialists’- ideologically oriented, in the sense of seeking bureaucratic power in 
order better to serve client groups. Finally, (5) Statesmen, who are ‘Weberian’ 
bureaucrats, concerned with the general welfare of citizens and who seek power in 
order to fulfil this goal.5 In several of the appointment cases discussed in the 
empirical chapters, the examination of the 3 chosen cities includes reference to some 
of these types of bureaucrat. Classifying agents on the basis of Downs typology 
allows a better understanding of why agents act as they do, regarding the 
implementation of privatization programs. In addition, it elucidates what forms of 
incentive are required, in order to motivate agents to cooperate with the principals.
According to Downs, Climbers are likely to shift policy when they attempt to 
push for radical change, perhaps faster than their principals’ intentions. When 
principals request the adoption of extensive reforms, such as privatization, Climbers 
are apt to respond in order to earn management appreciation. Climbers reject 
privatization only if they assume that prestige and organizational power derive from 
services kept in-house. On the other hand, Conservers can be expected to reject any 
program that will disturb their comfortable, routine work. Seeking to prevent 
potential confrontations with subordinates, conservers will shift to policies they
4
believe can maintain a peaceful environment in their agency. However, as explained 
in the section on “shirking”, of all five Down's 'bureaucratic personalities', 
conservers are most likely to shirk.
Zealots, can be expected to shift policy, if management proposes projects 
with which they do not identify. Accordingly, Zealots will choose to comply with 
structural reforms, such as privatization, only if they fit well with their overall views 
and plans for their agencies. Advocates are the type of bureaucrat most closely 
matched with the Niskanen “budget maximizers”. Advocates, like imperialists, seek 
to expend their agencies, take on new projects and hire more employees. They tend 
to reject any reform that decreases bureaucratic resources and responsibilities. 
Advocates will therefore shift away from privatization processes that are meant to 
achieve opposite goals, such as reducing bureaucratic units. Finally, Statesmen, the 
altruistic civil servants, will shift policy only if they perceive the proposed action to 
be harmful to what they believe to be the general welfare of citizens. If Statesmen 
consider a policy, such as privatization, to be a process welcomed by the public, 
while creating efficient service delivery, they will embrace it.
Shirking
This section explores why agents choose to shirk. Public Administration literature 
describes shirking as attempts by agents to minimize any effort needed to implement 
changes and who therefore keep to existing policies.6 In other words, a shirking agent 
considers maintaining the status quo less costly or arduous than implementing policy 
change. The problem of shirking is most commonly referred to in the analysis of 
principal-agent models.7 James, Q. Wilson defines shirking as “doing too little” or 
“not working hard”. According to Wilson “When employees do not exert themselves
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to achieve the goals o f their organization, they are shirking” . In addition, shirking is 
most likely to occur “when a company president cannot watch what a plant manager 
is doing,” and thus, “the latter may not work as hard” . ..8
There are number of explanations for shirking, one key reason for this 
behaviour relating to “professional competence” or “skill” .9 Studies conducted to 
examine shirking of agents in police forces, have found that the most significant 
variable to explain shirking is level of professionalism.10 The more professional the 
agent, the less likely that he/she will shirk. Lack of skills may lead agents to consider 
implementing new policies as too demanding, given the amount of effort needed to 
develop technical expertise and managerial skills.
Another structural condition that can provide agents with the incentive to 
shirk is alternative non administrative tasks - such as personal or political activities 
- in which agents engage while serving in bureaucratic units. Agents might choose to 
participate in activities that promote their political rather than their administrative 
career. Public appearances and interaction with interest groups to strengthen their 
status within political parties are typical activities in which agents can be involved.11 
Thus, political activity can contribute to shirking, as it limits the time bureaucrats 
have available to devote to administrative tasks.
As mentioned earlier, Down's Conservers are also likely to shirk. 
Conservers, who seek a quiet, peaceful working environment, are likely to be less 
inclined to initiate or participate in any project that requires hard work or risks their 
current status in the organization. Conservers will reject any reform, such as 
privatization, that will “shake the ground” upon which they operate, e.g. change 
work schedules, create new tasks, or change budget allocations. There are several 
explanations for this. For example, Aberbach and Rockman claim that the greater
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and more controversial changes sought for by politicians, the less is the 
responsiveness that is likely to occur.12 Bureaucrats, such as Conservers, will feel 
much more comfortable continuing familiar programs, than implementing the 
unknown or new. Second, Conservers are reluctant to change existing networks in 
which they have developed over the years, in order to adopt and adapt to new 
arrangements. In the case of privatization, this means exchanging working 
relationships and procedures with familiar municipal personnel, for developing a new 
modus operandi with private market suppliers.
The presence of strong internal interests groups can provide agents, such as 
Conservers, with the incentive to shirk. Some bureaucratic agencies or units are 
known to have stronger cohesion between workers and stronger political influence 
within and outside the organization. For example, sanitation agencies in local 
governments are known to have strong and influential unions. In these cases, 
executive agents might shirk from implementing structural reforms, in order to avoid 
confrontations with unions that reject changes like privatization.
Motives for Shirking and Shifting
Scholars offer various motives for the uncooperative behaviour by administrative
agents that can lead them either to shirk, or to shift to alternative policies. These
1 ^include the sometimes unrealistic targets that are set by politicians. Bureaucrats 
may find that they cannot translate big and perhaps simplistic ideas, presented by 
politicians, into tangible programs. With every good intention to respond to 
politicians' requests, bureaucrats may be unable to find ways to obtain efficient 
results. For example, they may not be able to show savings created from 
privatization, when there is no real competition between external market suppliers of
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services. In another instance, they may be unable to monitor the performance of 
contractors closely, if politicians limit inspection units.
A distinction between shirking and shifting as it relates to the status quo
When analyzing the efficiency of political appointments, as presented in the 
following chapters, it is important first to discuss agents’ motives in maintaining 
their unit’s status quo (i.e., the agents continue to manage their agencies based on 
existing policies and programs). Both shirking and shifting can cause policy to 
remain unchanged. Shirking and maintaining the status quo is the tactic employed by 
agents who are disinclined to undergo the necessary effort needed for policy change. 
For instance, in the case of privatization, while agents may support it politically, they 
can discover that the process of contracting-out services is complex and costly in 
terms of personal effort. The choice of shifting is based on agents’ interests in 
maintaining the status quo, since, for example, it is their preferred policy and 
represents their political views. Thus, agents may prefer to keep in-house provision 
of services rather than contract-based mechanisms, due to their ideological beliefs.
On the other hand, agents may genuinely try to shift policies, but fail in their 
attempts to move the agency to a new status quo. In these scenarios, although both 
acts of shirking and shifting keep the status quo, it is still crucial to make a 
distinction between these acts, when politicians are trying to design rewards, or 
sanctions in the case of uncooperative behaviour. For instance, in order to avoid 
shifting, politicians may appoint agents who agree with their ideology, and who 
willingly change the status quo. However, when agents are shirking, because they 
cannot endure the struggle needed to implement new policies, agreements reached on 
policies will not lead to the desired change. Chapter 2 elaborates further the 
differences between shifting and shirking and their effect on efficient appointments.
Types of bureaucratic agencies
This section explores types o f administrative units that allow agents more discretion 
than others and therefore provide the opportunity to shift policy or shirk from their 
duties without the fear of sanction. Overall, the problem of shirking and shifting is 
even greater in government agencies than in private sector organizations, as the 
former are more complex to control.14 Government agencies involve many workers 
who are not under direct observation by their principals. These institutional 
arrangements grant agents more discretion without the fear of detection of their 
misconduct. Not only are governmental agencies more difficult to monitor, even with 
careful inspection by principals, but much of the public products and services cannot 
be easily measured in terms of costs and quality of service provision.
Wilson defines Outputs as the work an agency conducts. This includes 
planning of programs for the agency and of schedules for implementation. Outcomes 
are defined as the results an agency achieves, including the products and services it 
produces. The extent to which principals can monitor the activity of agencies is 
determined by their ability to measure outputs and the extent of visibility of 
outcomes. For instance, in sanitation agencies, schedules for cleaning units are 
regarded as outputs, while performance measurements to indicate whether the city is 
clean, after a schedule is implemented, are considered to be outcomes.
Wilson’s typology of bureaucratic agencies allows the degree to which some 
types of agency provide more discretion than others (in the avoidance of 
implementation of preferred policies) to be determined.15 By inspecting outputs and 
outcomes, Wilson distinguishes between four types of bureaucratic agencies. As
9
noted, some government agencies are more difficult to monitor than others. Clearly, 
as it becomes harder for principals to measure outputs and observe outcomes, the 
more discretion that agency enjoys and the easier it becomes for agents to shirk their 
responsibilities or shift to the promotion of policies other than those expected of 
them.16
In Production Agencies, both outputs and outcomes are observable. Hence, 
this type of agency is the easiest to control. The work of agents is transparent in 
terms of their efforts (outputs) and the services that the agency generates (outcomes). 
Production agencies usually include hard core services such as local sanitation, 
gardening and infrastructure. Agents working in this type of agency find it difficult 
to hide information as it is relatively easy to detect when they are shirking or shifting 
policies to promote their self-interest. Principals can monitor the amount of staff, 
machinery and work schedule that are used to maintain city gardens or build roads. 
They can also visibly determine if gardens are clean and blooming and whether 
streets comfortable for pedestrians.
In Procedural Agencies, outputs are seen, but the outcomes are not 
observable. Thus, to take a case in point, some of the treatments given by health care 
services are evaluated on the basis of outputs and not outcomes. For instance, it is 
often difficult to assess improvements in patients undergoing psychiatric treatments 
in the short term. It may take years for results to be estimated. It is, however, fairly 
easy to evaluate the outputs, i.e., the types of treatment applied, the number of 
patients treated, and so on. Therefore, principals monitoring procedural agencies tend 
to concentrate on outputs, such as how tasks are set, and less on outcomes achieved. 
In these types of agencies, shifting occurs when agents set out to maximize budget, 
as their principals are less acquainted with the requirements for efficient results.
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Shirking can occur when agents do not make strong efforts in planning, perhaps 
knowing that they cannot be criticized for long-term outcomes that are difficult to 
assess. In order for principals to manage this type of agency efficiently, they must 
ensure that they appoint professional and experienced managers that are able to set 
programs that increase the likelihood of achieving desired results.
In Craft Agencies, outputs are not observable but outcomes are detectable. 
This type of agency is exemplified by security forces e.g. police, army and fire 
prevention units, in times of emergency or war. Under conflict situations, confusion 
and unexpected events prevent monitoring units from clearly observing the actions 
(outputs) of personnel. Principals are therefore left to estimate the performance of 
craft agencies by observation and analysis of the outcomes achieved, which is 
through ex-post mechanisms of control, e.g., oversight committees. Of course, by 
then it may be too late to correct shirking or shifting policies, but at least oversight 
committees can point to lack of responsiveness and replace uncooperative agents. 
According to Wilson, difficulties in observing the actions of units lead principals to 
rely on the self-discipline and loyalty of agents to carry out orders and perform their 
duties according to their training.
In Coping Agencies, principals struggle most to evaluate the work of agents 
(outputs) and observe the outcomes that are achieved. This allows agents the 
discretion to act as they see fit, without the fear of sanction. For principals, this type 
of agency is therefore the hardest to control.17 In part, Education and Foreign affairs 
ministries can both be regarded as coping agencies. It is difficult to determine what 
diplomats will say in foreign meetings or to determine the outcomes achieved in 
negotiations. In the education system, teachers cannot be watched constantly in 
classrooms and a few visits by supervisors must suffice. It is also difficult to
11
determine what, exactly, students have learned, other than by means of their exam 
results, or how useful their knowledge is, once they graduate. Faced with this type of 
agency, principals need to rely on public or consumer opinion, academic research 
and other indirect means, in order to determine the efficiency of the agency’s work. 
Even then, such evaluation is very far from being an exact science, and equally 
professional researchers will often reach contradictory conclusions from the same 
data sets.
The empirical examination of appointments conducted in this thesis 
concentrates on Israeli municipal sanitation agencies. Sanitation agencies are 
regarded as production agencies, since both outputs and outcomes are observable. It 
is fairly easy to determine what sort of tasks agencies carry out to clean the cities, 
and to observe the agencies' achievements (e.g., if the city meets acceptable 
standards of cleanliness and if garbage collection is regular and efficient). As 
production agencies are considered more transparent than other types, we should 
expect that principal-agent problems are less likely to occur. However, measurement 
of privatization in 6 cities reveals inefficient privatization results, even with this type 
of agency. The relatively accurate empirical measurement in agencies, such as 
sanitation, allows the determination of the extent to which the performances of 
sanitation managers, career and political appointees influence achieved outcomes 
(whether desirable or not).
Thesis Overview
Chapter 1 has examined two kinds of uncooperative behaviour that politicians may 
encounter when interacting with career or politically appointed agents - acts of 
shifting and shirking. As mentioned earlier, although most Public Administration
12
literature does not distinguish between the motives that lead to shifting o f policies 
from the motives that lead to shirking, this study considers such a distinction as an 
essential component for evaluating the efficiency of appointment processes. Shirking 
and shifting policies by agents are based on different motivations and when agents' 
motivations are misinterpreted, it becomes difficult for principals to determine the 
sort of incentive schemes or sanctions that are required in order to facilitate 
responsiveness.
Chapter 2 presents a theoretical analysis of political appointment 
mechanisms. It criticizes the most commonly accepted perception offered in the 
public policy and administration literature, in which political appointees are adjudged 
to create responsive agencies. The chapter addresses the question o f why politicians 
fail to obtain the compliance of bureaucratic agencies, when they politically appoint 
managers to them. It is argued that politicians tend to misinterpret matching 
ideological-political viewpoints as leading to efficient cooperation. In addition, they 
fail to distinguish between shifting and shirking when appointing agents. While 
politicians try to solve the problem of shifting, they set up conditions that increase 
the opportunity to shirk. Furthermore, the chapter explores why political appointees 
are more likely to shirk, as they are too involved in political activities, or lack the 
experience needed to motivate the staffs of civil servants under their control to carry 
out complicated reforms.
Chapter 3 provides an introduction to the empirical study in the thesis. It 
reviews the main characteristics of Israeli local governments and explains why Israeli 
cities are helpful case studies for the analysis of political appointments. First, Israeli 
local governments have become highly politicized over the years, due to the informal 
local autonomy and the rules and procedures that guide the administration. Second,
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in the last decade, municipalities in Israel have attempted to privatize local services 
and, in the process, made political appointments of agents to advance the reform. 
Privatization attempts provide a fitting example to learn about the interaction 
between politicians and their appointees. They can be used mainly to address such 
question as to what extent politicians are able to reach cooperation with their agents, 
making efforts to privatize services.
Chapters 4-6 test the theory of political appointments in Israeli local 
governments, during the political term of 1993-1998. In 3 cities - Tel-Aviv, Holon 
and Beer-Sheva, we ask why the mayors were not happy with the achievements of 
their political allies, who had been put in charge of privatizing sanitation services. 
Chapter 4 examines the failing attempts of city management to reform sanitation 
services in the city of Tel-Aviv, despite political appointees in charge o f agencies. 
Interviews and data, collected in the city, reveal that political appointees chose to 
shirk their responsibilities. Shirking was possible when management relaxed the 
monitoring of its political appointees. In 1997, the management o f Tel-Aviv was 
finally able to reach compliance with the reform, when it promoted a more 
experienced, “climber” type of bureaucrat to manage the sanitation agency.
Chapter 5 explores why, until 1996, the management of the city of Holon was 
unable to advance its privatization plan for sanitation. The political appointee in 
charge of sanitation shirked and did not advance the reform in his first three years in 
office. Under the new organizational structure formed in 1994, the appointee's 
shirking became possible and continued undetected. In 1996, the appointee began to 
invest in his bureaucratic tasks and became a “zealot”, who was highly motivated to 
reform the sanitation services. In addition, institutional modification conducted by 
management, assisted the advance of the reform.
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Chapter 6 presents the case of the city of Beer-Sheva. In 1994, the Ministry 
of the Interior appointed an external comptroller to pull the city out of a severe 
financial crisis. The comptroller drew up a detailed privatization program for local 
services, including sanitation. However, two political appointees • in charge of 
sanitation refused to comply with the comptroller and city management and either 
shifted policy or shirked. In 1995 the mayor of Beer-Sheva requested that the 
comptroller implement the reform independently, bypassing the sanitation managers.
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Chapter 2 
Political Appointments; 
The Attempts to Control Bureaucratic Agencies
Introduction
This chapter presents a theoretical analysis of the mechanism of political 
appointment. It investigates why elected representatives, relying on political 
appointment to create responsive agencies, not only end up selecting agents that are 
more likely to shirk, but create conditions under which they facilitate shirking by 
their appointees. In order to analyze the inefficient outcomes reached with 
appointees, this chapter first examines the most common approaches to political 
appointments, mainly the British and US bureaucratic models. It also explores the 
way political appointments are made in Israel - concentrating on the gap that has 
developed over the years between formal and informal practices. The third section 
identifies the three main gains politicians seek to make by appointing their allies as 
discussed in the Public Policy and Administration literature. Finally, the chapter 
discusses why politicians assume that they can control bureaucracies by means of 
political appointments and why these appointments often fail to serve as an efficient 
control mechanism.
Approaches to Political Appointments
The existing literature offers a wide range of definitions and view points- often 
differing between countries and over time, as to what constitutes political 
appointment and what should be considered an efficient appointment.1 As this 
section elaborates, the criteria under which politicians consider political nominees for
17
executive roles are those that are intended to oblige appointees to comply with their 
appointers’ demands. As a result, politicians, searching for new administrators, 
preferably their political allies, often end up hiring nominees that are unsuitable for 
bureaucratic roles.
Weber's "ideal-type" bureaucracy provides the classic concept of the 
appointment process.2 Based on Weber’s ideas, the British Civil Service model 
broadly opposes political appointments, proclaiming that any nominee whose 
appointment is not solely based on considerations of merit is inadequate to serve in 
the public sector.3 A career bureaucracy is a system with "regularized promotion", an 
official can expect to make a career in the civil service with potentially reaching the 
highest position within it.4 However, the most widely accepted approach to political 
appointments is exhibited in the US system, where it is common for high ranked 
executives to be replaced when a new administration takes office.5 Under this 
system, political leaders not only make appointments based on the expertise of 
nominees, but also seek out responsive candidates, willing to comply with the 
leaders’ plans. For this purpose, they usually only consider candidates sharing their 
political views and ideology. Overall, the decision to appoint potential candidates, 
based on their responsiveness or competence, is dependent on where they are to be 
located in government and what goals the leaders seek to achieve by the 
appointments.6
Both the classical British and US approaches to political appointments have 
been applied in the last decades, if not rigidly so.7 Under the British system, both 
politicians and bureaucrats are involved in policymaking. Politicians, however, are 
reluctant to rely solely on their professional civil servants, since bureaucrats serving 
long terms in office are likely to become too powerful and unresponsive to elected
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representatives. Therefore, in an attempt to create responsive bureaucratic agencies, 
countries such as Belgium, Germany, France, and Japan, which have adopted forms 
closely related to the British model, tend to take not only the candidates’ expertise 
into account, when appointing top executives, but also their ideological-political 
outlook.8
In the US system, political leaders have learned to appreciate the experience 
and expertise that administrators acquire over several consecutive terms. Thus, in 
recent decades, newly elected US administrations have considerably increased the 
numbers of middle and low ranked bureaucrats they keep in office.9 Patricia 
Ingraham found that out of three million civilian employees in the executive branch, 
only 3000 may be termed political appointees. Over 500 appointees were in positions 
within the "Executive Schedule", these include cabinet secretaries and heads of major 
agencies, and just fewer than 700 were members of the Senior Executive Services 
(SES).10 In 1978 Civil Service Reform Act limited the number of presidential 
appointment within the SES to 10 percent.11
Scholars such as Aberbach and Rockman have found that American 
administrations have moved closer to the classical Weberian form, in which political 
and bureaucratic roles are more clearly defined and separated.12 Their findings 
suggest that, at the top level, administrators are increasingly kept out of powerful 
governmental circles and are restricted to engaging in the technical and legal 
elements of decision making. However, it is still evident that U.S. political leaders 
continue to place emphasis on ideology-partisanship considerations, when appointing
13top bureaucratic executives.
The Israeli government, when it was formally established in 1948, sought to 
adopt the British civil service model. To that end, members of the Knesset (the
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Israeli Parliament) passed “The Civil Service Act” in 1959. Prior to the legislation on 
appointments, the Supreme Court judge, Zvi Berenzon, chaired a government 
advisory committee to draw up a system of civil service appointments. In 1958, the 
committee submitted recommendations, precluding civil servants from participating 
in political activities while serving in public sector offices.14 According to the 
committee, this limitation was meant to prevent civil servants from placing the 
interests o f the party above the interests of the public. Despite the committee's 
proposal, the Civil Service Act of 1959 only restricted the involvement of 
administrators in managerial roles in political parties and service in high ranking 
party committees. Other party involvement, such as membership, was allowed, 
because the government claimed that civil servants, like any other citizen, cannot be 
completely excluded from political activities.
Under the current hiring legislation, Israeli governmental officials, wishing to 
employ new workers, are required to advertise public tenders for the requested 
roles.15 For most civil service positions, these tenders are meant to ensure a 
transparency that allows potentially qualified candidates to apply for public 
positions. With this act, the government sought to attract highly professional and 
experienced personnel. However, the act allowed the Knesset to exempt specific 
bureaucratic roles from the tendering process, naming these recruitments as “loyalty 
based appointments”.16 By this means, politicians were able to “tailor” roles for their 
trusted allies, without the need to specify job requirements, or to open each position 
to competition. A decade later, over 40 types of administrative position had become 
exempt, including those of political advisors, head administrators, the state legal
IVadvisor, the civil service commissioner, and directors in state-owned companies.
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In practice, the exemption of these roles from the tender process has moved 
the Israeli public sector away from the British model and into a more politicized 
system. Over the years, government audit and review bodies, such as the judicial 
system, state audit commission and public enquiry committees, have formally 
continued to fight to maintain the British approach to the civil service. In 1989, a 
public enquiry committee, set up by the civil service commissioner, repeated the 
Berenzon committee's recommendations of 1958, prohibiting civil servants from 
engaging in political activities while in office. Among the proposed restrictions, civil 
servants were to be forbidden to list themselves as members of political parties and 
were to be prevented from campaigning on behalf of political leaders, or voting for 
party lists. In 2001, the parliament partially accepted these recommendations in 
legislation that prevented top ranked civil servants from voting in any internal 
political party elections.18
Because, on the one hand, certain restrictions are placed on political 
involvement by civil servants, while, on the other, many types of bureaucratic roles 
are exempt from the tender process, judicial and audit bodies have had to decide 
what should be regarded as an “inadequate appointment” and how such appointments 
should be detected. A 1990 Supreme Court ruling stated that if an elected 
representative appoints nominees for public office, for mainly political-partisanship 
considerations, the appointment should be reversed, as it breaches public 
confidence.19
Yitchak Zamir, former state legal advisor and Israeli Supreme Court judge, 
argued that the concept of “political appointment” implies an appointment to a public 
position that would not occur if the person nominated were not a political figure.20 
On the other hand, such an appointment should not be overturned, simply because an
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appointee is a member of the same party as the political leader, but for the 
importance the latter places in such membership.21 In other words, politicians should, 
first and foremost, consider nominees based on their expertise and experience, but 
appropriate nominees should not be excluded from the appointment process just 
because they also happen to share the appointer’s political persuasion.
The definition of political appointments which Zamir offers, together with the 
recommendations of public committees over the years, allowing civil servants to 
engage in political activities, restrict the ability of the oversight bodies to detect such 
appointments empirically. As the law tolerates some degree of political involvement 
by civil servants, it is difficult to determine to what extent politicians regard political 
alliance with nominees as important at the appointment stage. In 1991, a committee, 
set up to examine the appointment process in the public sector, tried to simplify ways 
to detect political appointments and remove them from public institutions. The 
committee stated that if a nominee has a personal or political connection to the 
appointing body, such an appointment should be regarded as political. In order to 
dismiss such a claim, the appointing body needs to prove that their nominee is the 
most competent person for the role and better qualified than any other potential 
candidate.22
In sum, the Israeli government has officially tried to maintain the British 
structure of public sector, while allowing ministers and mayors the freedom to 
politically appoint key executives to various offices. As further explored in chapter 3, 
empirical measurement of political appointments is limited, due to the difficulties of 
detection, mentioned above. However, Audit Commission reports and some 
researches conducted over the years, give strong indications that political 
appointments are a common phenomenon in the Israeli public service. Furthermore,
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most political appointees continue to engage in political activities while serving in 
public office.23
Motives for Political Appointments
Before discussing the efficiency of the mechanism of political appointments, let us 
classify three main motives behind political appointment.24 The distinction illustrates 
what politicians seek to achieve with this mechanism and the potential constraints 
involved. In addition, it helps construct a method by which to identify political 
appointees and to explain whether the aims of the appointments are achieved.
The first type of motive for appointing political agents is Party-based 
appointment. Here, the mechanism serves two main goals: (1) it allows political 
candidates to reward supporters assisting in their election and, (2) it ensures future 
assistance at re-election time. In this case, rewards are mostly granted to party 
activists who actively help political candidates during campaigns. Once elected, 
politicians tend to award associates with roles in the public sector, such as 
directorships of public companies, or roles in foreign affairs offices abroad, such as 
consulates and embassies, the United Nations and so on. While in their new roles, 
appointees continue their political activities and support for their appointers.
The second type of motive is public representation. In this case, political 
appointments allow politicians to increase the representation of minority or special 
groups in key executive bureaucratic roles. With the promotion of such candidates, 
politicians keep their campaign promises to answer to the needs of these groups. 
Furthermore, minority representatives, serving in key roles, help politicians to 
become better informed on the preferences of various sectors in society, supporters 
and potential supporters.
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While these two reasons for appointment are important to recognize and 
research, this study mainly concentrates on a third type of motive for political 
appointment - policy control. With this type of appointment, elected representatives 
aim to create responsive bureaucratic agencies. To high ranking managerial positions 
in the public sector, politicians appoint allies whom they trust to carry out their 
requirements. Contrary to party-based appointments, politicians are very much 
concerned with the performance of their appointees. Such appointments do not 
merely serve to reward their allies, but are intended to ensure implementation of 
policies in which the political leaders are interested. This third motive is explored 
more fully in the next section.
Appointments for “policy control”
A key question in this thesis is how politicians use the mechanism of political 
appointment to create responsive bureaucratic agencies. The principal-agent model 
provides a useful theoretical tool to explain the interaction between politicians and 
bureaucrats, focusing on the problem of control that politicians face when dealing 
with bureaucratic agents. Public choice scholars argue that politicians appoint 
political figures to key bureaucratic roles in order to solve agency problems i.e., the 
principal-agent problem.25 Principal-agent models have two essential components: 
asymmetry of information and conflict of interests. Agents (i.e., bureaucrats) possess 
or acquire information that is either unavailable to principals (i.e., politicians) or 
costly for them to obtain. Agents have incentives to use this information 
strategically, or keep it hidden, in order to promote their self-interest. For instance, a 
conflict of interests between agent and principal is likely to occur when the former 
seeks to maximize his/her bureau’s budget, while the latter is trying to cut
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expenditures. Due to this conflict, agents are liable to conceal information regarding 
service delivery costs and to present inflated budget demands to their principals.26
Politicians usually anticipate manipulation by bureaucrats and rarely assume 
automatically that disinterested subordinates are advising them. A key question is 
whether they can create incentives to induce agents to act in their interest.27 In an 
attempt to resolve conflicts with agencies, politicians rely on a variety of ex-ante, 
ongoing control and ex-post mechanisms to motivate compliance by agents.28 They 
institute rules and procedures designed to limit uncooperative behaviour such as 
leading administrative units to compete for resources and approval of programs.29 
Making promises of promotions, increases in salary, and, on the other hand, 
sanctions such as delaying promotion. Forming oversight committees to examine an 
agency after the implementation of policy, as well as finding alternative information 
channels to better evaluate agencies’ outputs.30
Politicians hope that by making the activities of agencies more transparent, it 
will be more difficult for their heads to hide information. However, the monitoring 
procedures needed to control agencies are costly and often only partially successful 
in creating responsiveness.31 Therefore, politicians are left to decide whether to 
devote much of their attention to monitoring agencies, or to accept the risk of non- 
compliance, while concentrating on other tasks. Of course, the second alternative 
decreases a politician's ability to control agents.
Yet, politicians are keen to create responsive agencies to implement their 
policies, so instead of continually monitoring their agencies to ensure compliance, 
they search for nominees to replace those whom they consider untrustworthy career 
executives. Through the appointment process, they tend to select candidates who 
share their political views and ideology. Politicians often assume that agreement on
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policy preferences will provide enough incentive for political appointees to 
implement preferred policies.
Constraints of policy agreements
This study examines why, under certain conditions, the very policy agreements that 
are reached during the appointment process can hinder the implementation of these 
same policies. It is argued that politicians often do not consider the different 
motivations for agents’ uncooperative behaviour. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
politicians may encounter uncooperative behaviour, such as shifting of policies and 
shirking, when interacting with both career and politically appointed agents. To 
reiterate, Shifting describes actions undertaken by agents to change a policy, in order 
to fit their views, which conflict with those of their principals. Shirking describes an 
agent’s attempts to conserve the effort needed to implement an agreed policy by 
maintaining the status quo. In other words, preserving the status quo is considered by 
an agent to be less costly or arduous than the effort of making policy changes. It is 
assumed that structural conditions do make it possible to move from the status quo 
(e.g., conditions that allow contracting out services, competition between contractors, 
allocated budget, etc.).
Existing appointment studies seldom address the problem of shirking. Most 
formal models of the appointment process emphasize the importance of agreement 
between players on policy preferences as a main component leading to co­
operation.32 Scholars argue that the more politicians skilfully recognize the true 
policy preferences of nominees at the appointment stage, the more likely it is that 
they will increase the responsiveness of agencies, once the newly appointed agents 
are in office. In most studies, when researchers discuss the problem of
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responsiveness, they refer to the attempts of politicians to prevent shift of policies by 
appointing agents that share their political views. This, however, does not necessarily 
solve the problem of control.
In these studies, policy preferences are not defined and there is no 
examination of the motives of players when ranking their preferences. It is 
commonly assumed that the appointment process can create co-operative agencies, 
when politicians appoint agents that share their political views and ideology. Since 
the studies discuss how the matching of policy preferences leads agents to respond to 
political demands, we are left to assume that players’ choices o f policy are based on 
their political views and ideology. However, it is important to recognize that 
appointees’ choices of policy are not based solely on their political views. The effort 
to implement policies also imposes costs and therefore also affects their willingness 
to undertake these tasks. Therefore, appointed agents may not shift, but they may 
well shirk from implementing policies.
As discussed in Chapter 1, it is essential to understand the differences 
between the motives of agents who shift policies and those that lead to shirking, 
when politically appointing an agent to a key executive role. As shifting and shirking 
of agents result from different motivations, overcoming them requires different 
incentives. Both political and career agents can potentially shift or shirk from their 
implementation commitments. With career agents, politicians attempt to counter the 
possibility of conflicting interests by continually monitoring these agents, in order to 
ensure compliance. However, when they appoint associates who agree with their 
policies, politicians assume that most types of uncooperative behaviour can be 
resolved. Yet, agreement over policy is most likely to help in preventing shifting of 
policies only, not shirking. Unaware of additional motives for irresponsiveness and
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trusting in policy agreements at the appointment stage, politicians reduce monitoring 
costs, once their agents assume office. These relaxed conditions grant political agents 
higher discretion than career agents, increasing their freedom to reduce their own 
implementation costs and to shirk their duties.
Political appointees are more likely to shirk
Chapter 1 presents conditions that facilitate shirking behaviour by administrative 
agents, as discussed in Public Administration studies. In this chapter it is argued that 
in comparison to career agents, political appointees are more likely to encounter such 
conditions and are therefore more likely to shirk. Political nominees considered for 
executive roles are frequently unfamiliar with the designated administrative tasks, are 
more likely to encounter information problems (principal-agents problems) with their 
subordinates, and are less dedicated to their roles, as they devote considerable time to 
political activity. Furthermore, political executives who actively participate in unions 
are more often subject to pressure to avoid implementing policies that the union 
rejects hence, shirk from their obligations.
As a number of studies have found, lack o f  skills is a key element to explain 
bureaucratic agents’ shirking behaviour. Political appointment studies have found 
appointees lacking sufficient technical resources to implement policies, and who are 
thwarted by the civil servants within their agencies.34 Newly appointed, uninformed 
or inexperienced political executives, are most likely to face a principal-agent 
problem. Appointed executives, now themselves acting as principals, need to develop 
the skills that can prevent their subordinates from concealing information and can 
ensure efficient implementation of policies.
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Another crucial motive for shirking is non-administrative activities. Political 
appointees can be expected to engage in activities that promote their political, rather 
than their administrative, career. They will spend time interacting with interest 
groups and answering their demands, in order to strengthen their political power 
within and without their political parties. This political involvement may lead agents 
to shirk their administrative responsibilities, since the efforts that need to be invested 
in these responsibilities reduce their ability to devote time to alternative political 
activities.
Another structural condition that can provide agents with the incentive to 
shirk is strong internal interests groups, e.g., unions. Cronin suggested that 
appointees are often unsuccessful in carrying out political leaders’ preferred policies, 
because they are “captured” by their agencies or, they “go off and marry the 
natives”.35 Some bureaucratic agencies in local government, such as sanitation 
departments, are known to employ a considerable number of union members, who 
therefore wield political influence within the agency and the municipality. Political 
appointees who are concerned not to jeopardize their status are likely to shirk, by 
avoiding programs the union opposes. The case studies presented in this thesis 
demonstrate how appointees are strongly influenced by municipal unions.
Inefficient policy control
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate how politicians aim to advance their policies by 
appointing agents who share their views, but reach inefficient outcomes when their 
appointed agents shirk from their duty. Figure (2.1) presents an interaction between a 
politician and his/her political appointee, who is also a political activist. Figure (2.2) 
presents an interaction with a political appointee, who has neither the skills nor the
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experience required to implement complex privatization reform. Both interactions 
presented below are relevant to the cases in chapters 4, 5, and 6.
Figure 2.1: Appointed political activists, shirking from their administrative 
obligation
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Figure 2.1 presents the players’ views of ideology (e.g., the degree of privatization 
they are willing to adopt), and the costs of monitoring. The mayor’s curve (M), 
represents his/her preference- the mayor assumes that the more services are kept in- 
house, the more costly it becomes to ensure efficient service delivery, in terms of 
time needed to be spent on monitoring performance and outcomes. Curve (CA) 
represents the preferences of the incumbent career head of the agency. The career 
agent mostly opposes privatization. In other words, he/she considers privatization as
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damaging to the agency, in terms of potential decline in allocated budget, loss of 
prestige, a decrease of relative power in the organization, etc.
The curve ( P A i )  represents how the mayor perceives his/her political 
appointee’s views on privatization and the costs involved. The mayor correctly 
assumes that the appointee is a stronger supporter of privatization than the incumbent 
career agent. However, the mayor does not take into account the true efforts (costs) 
that the appointee will need to invest, in order to adopt such ideology. These include 
costs associated with time taken away from alternative political activities, or costs 
related to conflict with unions who reject privatization. The curve ( P A 2 )  represents 
the true efforts (costs) that the political appointee is willing to endure, when adopting 
the agreed upon ideology. Wrongly assuming at the appointment stage that the 
appointee is located on the curve ( P A i ) ,  the mayor reduces the monitoring costs from 
( M o )  to ( M i ) ,  hoping to move the agency from the present status quo ( S Q o )  to a more 
privatized agency at ( S Q i ) .  However, under the relaxed monitoring conditions 
provided by the mayor, the appointee ( P A 2 )  avoids implementation and maintains the 
initial status quo ( S Q o ) .
In order for the mayors to motivate the political appointees to make efforts to 
reach desired privatization outcomes of ( S Q i ) ,  they need to invest in the higher level 
of monitoring ( M 2 )  and not ( M i ) .  Notice that ( M 2 )  is still at a lower level of 
monitoring than that of ( M o ) ,  which is required to induce the careerist agent to 
privatize services. However, this thesis argues that the politician will most likely not 
choose the monitoring level of ( M 2 ) ,  when assuming that the appointee is at curve 
( P A i ) .  Furthermore, even if the politician chooses to invest ( M 2 ) ,  the savings in 
monitoring costs thus created should be compared with the costs entailed in the
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appointment process itself, when trying to estimate if political appointments are an 
efficient mechanism of control of the bureaucracy.
Figure 2.2: Unprofessional Political appointees, shirking from their
administrative obligation
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Figure 2.2 represents the interaction between politicians and their political 
appointees, when the latter shirk, due to lack of competence to implement a desired 
policy. As in Figure 2.1, the mayor's curve (M), represents his/her preferences 
regarding privatization and the cost of monitoring which it entails. The curve (CA) 
represents the preferences of the incumbent career head of the agency. The curve 
(PAi) represents how the mayor perceives his/her political appointee's views, as a 
supporter of privatization. The curve (PA2) represents the true efforts (costs) for the
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political appointee in adopting privatization. Here, adopting privatization is much 
more costly for the political appointee than in the first scenario (illustrated in Figure 
2.1). The appointee shirks when he/she does not have the skills, knowledge, or 
experience to implement such a complex reform. The mayor assumes interaction 
with (PAi) and relaxes monitoring to (Mi) and therefore obtains inefficient results. 
Most importantly, even if the mayor does not change the monitoring level ( M o ) ,  the 
appointee continues to maintain the status quo. The appointee avoids privatizing 
services, because of inability to do so, even at the risk of detection and possible 
replacement. Furthermore, if the politician chooses to increase monitoring (to move 
from M o  to M 2 )  he/she is likely to achieve better results with the career agent than 
with the political appointee. With the (M2 ) level of monitoring, it is most likely that 
the career agent, fearing sanctions, will move the agency away from the status quo 
(from S Q o  to S Q i )  whereas the political appointee, if he/she is capable at all, will 
move only slightly to the less desired outcome of ( S Q 2 ) .
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 demonstrate the conflict between politicians and political 
appointees. The case presented in Figure 2.1 supports the contention that, despite the 
fact that they agree on privatization, the political appointee is reluctant to invest time 
and effort privatizing services, preferring to concentrate on his/her political career. 
Unfortunately for the principal, the relaxed monitoring conditions allow the 
appointee to pursue this goal. In this scenario, monitoring, mainly ongoing controls 
that check agency actions on a regular basis, plays an important role in motivating 
the agent to comply. If lack of responsiveness is detected, the politician can request 
that the appointee focus on administrative instead of political tasks, assuming that the 
appointee has the expertise required to reform services. In the end, cooperation with
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politicians is dependent on the appointee’s willingness to reduce political obligations 
and invest in the administrative role.
However, the case presented in Figure 2.2 shows that creating a responsive 
agency is a much more complicated task. Here, lack of compliance by political 
agents results from an inability to reform services, not opposition to the plans or 
distractions due to political activities. In this case, politicians can benefit from 
monitoring, mostly to detect uncooperative behaviour and, if necessary, to replace 
the appointee. On its own, monitoring cannot make the appointee efficiently 
cooperative, given a low level of professionalism.
The interaction presented in Figure 2.2 is consistent with the argument of
Huber and McCarty, that low bureaucratic capacity diminishes the ability of
politicians to control bureaucracies. The more incompetent the bureaucrats, the lower 
their ability to comply with a politician’s demands. Therefore, a politician’s attempts 
to influence the performance of such bureaucrats via legislation, or any ex-post
mechanism, are often useless. They argue that politicians should not provide
autonomy to incompetent bureaucrats as it leads to inefficient results. This thesis 
argues further that politicians should not provide autonomy to competent agents 
simply because they are considered allies who share their policy preferences. 
Appointees have other incentives to shirk besides low capacity, such as political 
activities. Thus, more autonomy granted to competent agents means that they operate 
under conditions that allow shirking.
The case studies of three cities will demonstrate how in some of the 
appointments, such as in Holon and Tel-Aviv, city management was eventually able 
to detect shirking and motivated its allies to abandon their political activities. In other 
appointments, discussed mainly in the cases of Beer-Sheva and Tel-Aviv, “friendly”
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political appointees were forced to resign when city management discovered that 
they did not have the knowledge or ability to carry out their duties.
Summary
This chapter has analyzed the mechanism of political appointments that are supposed 
to solve the problem of control that politicians face with bureaucratic agencies. It is 
argued that, when considering political nominees to replace career bureaucrats, 
politicians inevitably choose appointees closely aligned with their ideological and 
political views. Politicians misconstrue matching positions regarding policies, 
membership in the same party, past or present friendship, as leading to 
responsiveness. However, while politicians are trying to stop the occurrence of 
shifting, they open up the door to the problem of shirking.
It has also been shown that shirking will most likely occur when appointed 
agents are unfamiliar with administrative tasks, or politically obligated to interests 
groups, some of which resent the reforms that the appointees are required to adopt, 
and pressure them to avoid implementation. Thus, politicians not only wind up with 
political agents who are more likely to shirk, but, in addition, the presumed trust in 
political allies leads to a relaxed monitoring environment that facilitates shirking.
Monitoring is meant to prevent appointees from pursuing their own political 
goals and ensure that they devote their time to solving administrative problems. Once 
shirking is detected, politicians can demand that their appointed agents amend their 
behaviour. However, this assumes that political activists have the expertise needed to 
increase efficiency, as well as the willingness to abandon, or at least reduce, the time 
they spend on political obligations. Here, monitoring is less effective when dealing 
with political appointees who do not have the knowledge and experience to reform
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services, and can only serve to detect non-compliance. Monitoring cannot make up 
for lack of skills.
The following chapters test the theoretical arguments presented in Chapters 1 
and 2. Chapter 3 provides an overview of Israeli local government, emphasizing 
basic structures and some major reforms adopted over the last decade. Chapters 4-6 
examine the relationships between politicians and bureaucrats in 3 Israeli cities. The 
discussion mainly focuses on the appointments that were made in sanitation, in an 
attempt to create responsive agencies implementing a reform program of 
privatization.
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Chapter 3 
Israeli Local Governments
Introduction
In this thesis, cities provide case studies for the exploration of the process of political 
appointment. In the last decade, Israeli local politicians have been trying to privatize 
services and politically appoint chief executives, in order to promote and achieve 
compliance with the proposed reforms. An empirical examination of cities in Israel, 
in the last decade, shows that, in the main, politicians have failed to motivate 
political agents to cooperate. Focusing on 3 Israeli cities, this thesis explores the 
process of appointment, the interaction of political and careerist bureaucrats with city 
management and evaluates the outcomes achieved. Overall, we examine why 
politicians have failed to create responsive agencies willing to reform services.
It is important to emphasize that the contracting-out reform, which politicians 
were seeking to adopt, is only used here to provide a useful example to examine the 
interaction between politicians and political appointees. This thesis does not claim 
that privatization reform is dependent on the efficiency of political appointment. It is 
assumed that reaching an efficient privatization outcome is dependent on many 
variables, in addition to the compliance of heads of agencies, whether they are 
political appointees, or long-term civil servants. For example, mayors and political 
agents might agree to privatize services and the latter might dedicate time to advance 
the reform, but the local council might then reject the process or place obstacles 
along the path of implementation. As a result, the city may reach inefficient 
privatization results, regardless of the appointees’ actions. Therefore, this study is 
only concerned with the question of whether politicians achieve compliance with
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their appointed agents, placed in charge of the privatization process, if such 
appointees skilfully manage their agencies, and if they make every possible effort to 
advance the reform.
This study conducts elite interviews with city management and heads of 
agencies, in order to investigate the relationship between players. Reliance on 
statistical privatization data alone limits the understanding of the nature and 
consequences of appointments. Interviews provide a useful tool to answer such 
questions as what politicians were hoping to gain from the appointment of their 
allies, what was agreed upon between players at the appointment stage, and how 
politicians interacted with their appointees once in office. Most importantly, 
interviews provide information on how politicians estimate the performance of their 
appointees, how satisfied they are with the level of professionalism, and the efforts 
made. Statistical data might give some indication of an efficient appointment 
process. For example, a high level of privatization might indicate that appointees had 
contributed to the process. It might, however, mean that city management had been 
able to bypass an appointee’s rejection of the process and carry out privatization 
without his or her support.
Nevertheless, as presented in this chapter, the measurement o f privatization 
outcomes is important to indicate the overall success or failure of politicians to 
reform services, as well as suggesting which cities should be explored further. 
Although it does not prove the efficiency of appointment, it does show a certain trend 
of achievement reached with political appointees. The contracting-out data of six 
major Israeli cities indicate that some cities were able to privatize services more 
successfully than others. Thus, Tel-Aviv is presented as an example of a city that 
failed to reform services, Holon as one that was most successful, and Beer-Sheva as
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an example of a medium level of privatization. Given that, to varying degrees, all the 
cities had a certain level of political appointment, the question that the case studies 
address is why and how politicians are able to motivate some agents to carry out 
reform, while they fail with others.
Even though several local services have been privatized over the years, the 
case studies concentrate on sanitation services. The examination of similar services 
in all 3 case studies permits a more accurate comparison between cities. Furthermore, 
as explained in chapter 1, in production agencies such as sanitation, both outputs and 
outcomes are relatively easy to measure, allowing a more precise evaluation of 
contracting-out achievements. In such agencies, it is easier to determine the different 
tasks needed for efficient privatization and to focus more clearly on what the 
appointees are expected to achieve in the process. We can thus better evaluate the 
extent to which appointees perform the assignments that are required, in order to 
reach successful privatization results.
Chapter 3 now presents an overview of Israeli local governments, explaining 
their roles, function and organizational structure. It highlights the characteristics that 
make cities in Israel useful case studies. First, we investigate how an electoral 
reform, carried out in 1978, made local authorities less dependent on national party- 
politics, leading mayors to focus more on local concerns, such as the quality of 
municipal services. Second, we review the formal and informal organizational 
structures, municipal executive roles, such as those of the mayor and council, and the 
role of municipal unions. Third, we analyze central/local government relationships 
and their effect on the outcomes achieved at the local level. Fourth, the chapter 
explores the characteristics of local Israeli administration, including how, over the 
years, informal practices and procedures have allowed mayors to turn local
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governments into highly politicized structures. Finally, we discuss certain major 
administrative reforms adopted in the last two decades, such as New Public 
Management schemes and present original contracting-out data for six major Israeli 
cities between 1990-1999.
Overview
Israel is a country of 6.6 million citizens and 264 local governments. There are three 
types of local government structure: 70 municipalities - urban communities with at 
least 20,000 residents; 54 regional councils - unified authorities for a few small 
villages or settlements located geographically closely to each other; and 140 local 
councils - towns with less than 20,000 residents, that are not under the jurisdiction of 
a regional council. Nearly 75% of all Israeli residents live in cities, 50% living under 
the authority o f 11 municipalities. Nine of these municipalities are located in central 
Israel, which, however, covers only 5% of the whole geographical area of the 
country. In 2003, the populations of the three biggest cities in Israel were: 669,986 
residents in Jerusalem, 358,837 residents in Tel-Aviv and 272,166 residents in 
Haifa.1 (For information on demographic growth, see appendices section A).
Political power in Israeli local government (For additional information see 
Appendices, section B)
In Israel, elections for local councils and mayors are held simultaneously throughout 
the country every five years. Local council elections are general, direct, equal, secret 
and proportional. In 1976, the Knesset (Israeli Parliament) legislated a law separating 
the voting for mayors from that for local parties. The first elections conducted under 
the new system took place in 1978.2 In the election process, voters have two ballots,
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one for electing the mayor and one for a party list contesting for seats on the council. 
In the mayoral elections, the winner is the candidate who receives most votes, as 
long as he or she gains at least 40% support. If none of the candidates reaches 40%, a 
second round, or run-off, is conducted between the two candidates who received 
most votes.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the central political parties thought it was important 
for local governments to give a high priority to advancing national issues, and 
implementing policies based on a national agenda. Therefore, the choice of 
candidates for local political lists, and for council and mayoral candidates, was 
mainly in the hands of central parties. There was also strict budget control at the state 
level over local governments, in order to ensure that policies were carried out 
according to national interests. Central political parties controlled local branches, by 
telling council members how to vote on local issues and by involvement in local 
coalition bargaining processes.3
Electoral reform in Israeli local governments, conducted in 1976, was 
intended to strengthen the power of mayors. In the past, voters had elected political 
parties that had a candidate for mayor at the head of their list. Under the new system, 
voters elect the mayor separately from their party. It was thought that, since voters 
directly selected the mayors, it would increase the candidates’ accountability towards 
their voters. The following section discusses some of the changes that followed the 
electoral reform. First, we have the power shift from party lists to mayoral 
candidates, that led to a change in the character of the elections from a party-based 
campaign to a personal, more presidential one. Second, there is the rise of local 
independent parties and the decline of national party politics at the local level. The 
direct link between voters and candidates has led to a stronger dependency of
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mayoral candidates on public support and a concomitant lesser dependency on 
political party activities. This has changed both the platforms of campaigns and the 
emphasis that voters place on the character of candidates.
According to Brichta, who studied the local political changes that have 
occurred in the last two decades, the separation of elections for mayoral candidates 
from party lists, together with a movement in Israeli political culture to a more civic 
society, have contributed to the rise of local independent lists, replacing, to some 
extent, national party-based lists. Between 1950 and 1998, local lists increased their 
power in comparison to party lists by eight times in the elections for council and by 
three times in the elections for mayors.4 The direct link between mayoral candidates 
and voters created new sets of expectations. Instead of focusing on the activities of 
political parties, voters turned their attention to evaluating the performance of 
individual mayoral candidates, with the main concerns being the personality and 
activities of candidates, their credibility and skills.
The cultural changes Israel was undergoing at the time also contributed to the 
rise of local independent lists, detached from national party politics. At the beginning 
of the 1990s, Israeli citizens, concerned with their everyday welfare, increased 
demands on local authorities for high quality services. Citizens learned to channel 
their concerns for national issues, such as security and the condition of the economy, 
towards central state offices, and to address their day to day requests towards the 
municipalities. With the increasing focus on local issues, it became less relevant for 
mayoral candidates to play an active role in national party politics. Running on a 
local ticket became an attractive option, as it freed candidates from national party 
obligations and pressures.5
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A democratization process in the 1970s and 1980s also contributed to the 
shift of power from central to local political branches. The need of parties to find 
acceptable candidates for local constituencies became much stronger. This led central 
parties to be dependent on popular candidates from local branches, who were active 
and well known locally. Candidates of national parties, who had participated little in 
communal activities, had little chance of winning an election at the time.6
Towards the end of the 1970s, there was a major power shift between the two 
biggest political parties. In 1977, Labour party domination of central and local 
politics came to an end when the right of centre “Likud” party won a national 
election for the first time since independence in 1948. Until this election, the Labour 
party had completely dominated state and local mayoral elections, although, at the 
council level, there had been mixed results. The strengthening of the electoral power 
of the Likud reached its peak in 1989, when Likud mayoral candidates won more
n
seats than their Labour adversaries.
The success of the Likud party in local elections can be partly attributed to 
the electoral reform. The Likud party was the first to recognize that, under the new 
electoral system, it should recruit popular candidates, especially high ranking army 
officers, who were considered to be experienced managers. The introduction of 
charismatic candidates helped the Likud to overcome their many years of defeat and 
increased their power in local politics. Soon after, all the political parties followed 
this trend and recruited their own charismatic candidates.
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Table 3.1: Local elections’ results according to political parties, between 1950- 
1993 (in percentages).8
Parties
Year
Labour
(Avoda) Likud Religious Local Others
1950* 39 35 13 4 9
1955 45 28 14 3 11
1959 49 24 16 4 7
1965 50 23 14 5 7
1969 41 25 15 7 12
1973 40 29 15 9 8
1978* Council 35 26 17 18 5
Mayor 39 31 12 16 2
1983 Council 37 24 20 17 4
Mayor 40 29 11 18 2
1989 Council 29 28 19 23 1
Mayor 30 40 7 23 -
1993 Council 29 20 17 35 1
Mayor 28 34 1 36 -
1998 Council 16 11 17 44 12**
Mayor 21 28 1 47 3
* From 1978, the local elections were conducted separately from national elections.
* * Includes the Russian Immigrants party (8%)
Table 3.1 demonstrates the increasing success of local lists from 1978 to 1998. The 
table shows the decline of power of the Labour party over the years. In 1989, as 
noted, the Likud mayoral candidates were able to win more seats than the Labour 
party (40% for Likud and only 30% for Labour). However, even though local lists 
increased their power over the years, up to 1993, mayoral candidates still increased 
their chances of winning by running on an established political party ticket.9 For 
incumbent mayors, 64% won after running for a second term, as representatives of 
political parties and only 36% won with local lists. For new mayoral candidates, 80% 
won for the first time as representatives of political parties, whereas, only 20% did so 
when competing as representatives of local lists.
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Yet, the greater likelihood of mayoral candidates to win elections when 
representing political parties was not based on the same ideological-political 
platform that had assisted candidates in the past. Rather, it was the financial and 
organizational support that established political parties were able to offer candidates, 
support which local independent parties were unable to provide. Political parties had 
already established their political and organizational networks in cities and it was 
therefore easier for their candidates to gain quick support and assistance in 
campaigns.10
In some cases, national parties preferred to hide behind the labels of local 
parties. In these cases, they hoped to increase the amount of potential voters when 
they supported local lists, whose candidates were not overtly associated with any 
specific ideology. For example, Jerusalem’s mayor, Teddy Kollek, was ostensibly 
running with an independent party when, in fact, he was provided with the support of 
the Labour party.11 So was the case with the last two mayors of Tel-Aviv (in the 
1993 and 1998 elections).
Since 1993, the dependency of mayoral candidates on political parties has 
declined. Although, in the 1998 elections, mayoral candidates from national political 
parties had a slightly greater chance of winning (52%), in small local councils this 
trend had already been reversed. In these cases, 54% of mayoral representatives won 
when leading an independent local party.12 The success of local lists and of their 
candidates, points to the importance which voters place on the local agenda and, to 
some degree, their weariness with national politics. Over the years, there has been a 
change in the preferences of citizens, who, in local elections, have become more 
concerned with local issues, such as quality of schools, appearance o f cities, and 
local culture, rather than the political-ideological matters for which they had voted in
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the past. Polls that were conducted prior to the 1993 elections show that the three 
services with which the voters were most unsatisfied were education, sanitation (and 
the appearance of cities) and infrastructure.13
The escalation of local independent parties and the increasing concerns of 
constituents for quality local services motivated most mayors in Israel in the early 
1990s to present plans to reform local services. Among such plans was a transfer of 
services from in-house to external market contractors, in an attempt to increase 
efficiency. The programs which mayors were seeking to adopt and the outcomes of 
privatization achieved are discussed later in this chapter.
Organizational structure
Diagrams 3.1 and 3.2 present the formal organizational structures of large Israeli 
cities with a population of at least 100,000, and medium sized cities with a 
population of between 30,000 and 100,000.14 The diagrams illustrate types of local 
services, including: construction and inspection of roads, sanitation (building 
drainage, waste collection), gardening, water supply, and maintenance of food 
markets. They also show inspection of institutions such as education, welfare, 
culture, and sanitation. Israeli municipalities are also in charge of preparing holiday 
and ceremonial events, providing security and safety services, and providing local 
religious services.15
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Diagram 3.1: Organizational structure of large cities (population of
100,000+).16
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Diagram 3.2: Organizational structure of medium sized cities (population of 
30,000-100,000).17
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Executive roles
The following section looks at the main functions of top executive positions in Israeli 
local government, including the mayor, deputies, council, and city manager (chief 
administrative officer). It examines the interactions between players and potential 
conflicts that arise, regardless of the formal organizational structure. This section 
also reviews the main local committees and the role of the municipal union.
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Mayor
In Israel, heads of local government, referred to as mayors, are the ceremonial and 
functional chairs of local councils. Mayors are responsible for carrying out the 
decisions made by the council. Over the years, mayors have increased their power 
over policy direction, as well as execution of the decisions made by the council. With 
the electoral reform of 1976, came new rules and procedures that increased the 
decision-making power of mayors, in comparison to the council and administration. 
This development was intended to allow mayors to freely answer voters’ demands, 
by minimizing potential pressure from their local party and council. According to 
these rules, there was a recognition that mayors are not only heads of councils, but 
also heads of the executive branch, with some veto powers over council decisions. In 
addition, mayors receive immunity against sanctions by their council. For instance, 
as mayors are elected directly by constituents, councils cannot impeach them or just 
vote them out of office, unless there is evidence of a physical or mental illness or of 
involvement in criminal acts. Mayors are responsible for approving contracts signed 
with municipal workers and external service suppliers, as well as the approval of 
commercial responses to publicly issued tenders.
Management by council and council members as executives (For additional 
information see Appendices, Section C)
Israel has adopted the British concept of local management by council (i.e., executive 
power is exercised by the council as a corporate body). Council members are unpaid 
local citizens. Formally, the council legislates, forms policy, and acts as a guiding 
and controlling authority. The main power of the council is in its budget approval 
function, both for the municipality’s ordinary budget and development
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(extraordinary) budgets. However, once the budget is approved, it is passed to the 
mayor and the council can no longer interfere with his or her decision making. The 
council therefore tries to negotiate budget proposals between its members and the 
mayor, in order to ensure representation of their interests, knowing that after 
approval it will be much more difficult to ensure responsiveness.18
Deputy mayors and executive board
Only very rarely in Israeli politics, does any one party achieve and absolute majority. 
Therefore, after local elections, the mayor forms a coalition in the council, which 
then chooses executives, or approves the choices of the mayor. These elected 
executives take responsibility over policy-making and management and their 
decisions are expected to reflect the policies of the mayor and the coalition. Mayors 
and their deputies act as the executive authority. There are no guidelines determining 
the scope of functions of deputy mayors. There are only statutory limitations 
concerning their number. The appointment of deputies is, in many cases, a way for 
mayors to promote allies by offering them roles that entail a salary, relative stability 
in the city, and pension rights. There are also some unpaid positions on the executive 
board for council members.
Council members who serve in executive roles are usually responsible for an 
administrative agency, or a few agencies (a portfolio), or units within agencies. It is 
evident that council members in charge of portfolios and deputy mayors, who keep 
their position for extended periods of time, often acquire a more bureaucratic attitude 
towards their role, than an ordinary council member.19 Council members in charge of 
portfolios are held accountable when performance of agencies is poor. As a result, 
they tend to become ’’budget maximizers”, as elaborated in chapter 1, competing for
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resources to promote their agencies. Rather than purely serving the general public, 
they begin to represent mostly interest groups and are driven to show improvements 
in the services of which they are in charge. The strong impulse to advance services 
also leads them to push for political appointments. Seeking to advance their plans, 
council members try to replace heads of agencies with confederates whom they 
assume will comply with their wishes.
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The interaction between city manager, council members and the mayor
Diagram 3.3: The power structure in local governments
Mayor Council
Agencies
City Manager Deputies and Council Members (in charge 
of services)
Diagram 3.3 shows the power structure that exists in practice between the mayor, 
council, representatives of the council, city manager and agencies. It illustrates how 
each player is able to monitor and shape the activities of agencies, as discussed 
further in this section.
Israeli cities have a city manager (chief administrative officer), who acts as 
head of the administration and is required to monitor its activities and performance. 
The city manager provides a link between the administration and elected
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representatives, including the mayor, deputy mayors and council. City managers 
often act as coordinators between the council and its committees, although they do 
not have the formal authority to fulfil such a role. As elaborated above, in most 
cities, deputy mayors and other council members are assigned to supervise the 
performance of agencies. As part of their monitoring role, they inform heads of 
agencies of the council’s preferred policies and ensure that they are carried out. The 
fact that both city managers and council members are assigned to monitor the 
activities of agencies often creates tension between them. This is especially common 
when city managers and council members do not agree on how agencies should 
operate. Sometimes, the clashes are difficult to resolve, because there are no statutory 
rules and neither any clear division of responsibilities nor defined hierarchies.
According to Elazar and Kalchheim, in smaller cities, the city manager and 
council find it much easier to be involved in the activities of agencies, since the 
organization is relatively small, information is accessible, and there is more time to 
spend on each activity. Therefore, the frequent involvement o f various principals 
causes clashes, due to conflicting interests. In bigger cities, since resources are 
limited, politicians cannot be involved in depth with the activities of agencies and all 
departments. This might prevent some potential conflict with city managers, as the 
latter can exert the main control over agencies. On the other hand, in bigger cities, 
some elected representatives may consider their role as a stepping-stone to national 
politics. They are therefore motivated to form policies and ensure implementation in 
a way that is acceptable to constituents and interest groups that, in return, will 
support them when campaigning for national seats. Under these circumstances, 
clashes will occur with those city managers who are careerist executives and tend to
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reject political interference in their professional work and the work of their
20agencies.
The struggle for control between council members and city managers over 
agencies is often resolved by the direct involvement of mayors. In many situations, 
the mayor is forced to act as a mediator, or to take sides in a dispute. Both the 
deputies and city manager turn to the mayor in order to receive support. Sometimes, 
even agencies themselves turn to the mayor, when they receive conflicting demands 
from their principals. In order to prevent conflicts, some mayors choose to determine 
clear hierarchies of roles and clarify the responsibilities of city manager and council 
members at the beginning of their term. For example, in Beer-Sheva, (the late) 
Mayor Izaac Rager used to support the city manager and grant him a high degree of 
decision-making authority over agencies. The mayor who replaced Rager, David 
Bonfeld, chose to support and rely more on his deputies.21 Another way to resolve 
this conflict, usually initiated by the council, is to discard the role of city manager 
and empower elected representatives to monitor the activities of agencies. This 
solution is used in small or medium-sized municipalities. Another solution, 
frequently chosen by council and mayors, is to politically appoint associates to the 
position of city manager and heads of agencies, in the hope of creating a responsive 
administration. The empirical chapters to follow will further discuss this solution.
Local committees
(For more information, see Appendices, Section D)
The council and mayor are responsible for forming local advisory committees. These 
committees are meant to advise the mayor on policy matters and consist mainly of 
elected officials, experts, sometimes central government representatives, and an
56
internal audit commissioner. The process of setting up committees involves political 
bargaining, in which it is decided who will be assigned to what role. Local 
committees include: bids (or tenders) committees, which have the task of examining 
responses made by private companies to local authority tenders; monetary 
committees that advise the mayor on financial and budgetary matters; security 
committees that discuss matters involving preparation for a state of emergency in 
cities and liaise with the police; internal audit commissions, and human resource 
committees. Often, committees overlap in their responsibilities or are not useful at 
all. For example, welfare and education agencies receive guidelines from central 
government, which leave local committees with little authority for independent 
decision-making.22
Unions
Labor relations in local governments are handled partly by local unions, but also by 
“the Histadrut” (The General Federation of Trade Unions), a central organization 
representing all workers in the public sector. This federation of unions coordinates 
between the majority of Israeli unions and, on their behalf, signs collective 
agreements with the central government. The unions of local authorities often act as 
mediators for the Histadrut. Local unions try to ensure that management keeps 
agreements signed with workers, with most negotiations focussing on working hours, 
benefits, redundancies, and promotions. In addition, the union provides workers with 
a representative body to solve conflicts that arise over contractual agreements and 
organize protests against programs the union may regard as harmful to workers, such 
as privatization. In order to solve disputes with workers on this issue and others, 
management tends to be flexible over retirement benefits and offers high salaries to
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senior employees who cooperate with reforms.23 Sometimes, management relies on 
the promotion of union leaders to executive roles, in order to encourage their 
compliance with its programs. The case studies presented in chapters 4-6 provide 
examples of such promotions.
Collective agreements for the municipal sector, that are signed by the head of 
the Histadrut and state treasurer, tend to be general and flexible, in order to allow 
local unions to negotiate conditions that meet the specific requirements of their 
workers. One of the results of the flexibility provided by the Histadrut to local unions 
is their ability to protest (mainly by strikes) against city managements. Even though 
the municipal sector has the lowest frequency of strikes in the public sector, it is still 
evident that local management settles workers disputes at high financial cost. While 
each local union has its own specific needs and concerns, the Histadrut, as well as 
local unions, tries to reach similar agreements with the managements of all local 
authorities, in order to maintain common grounds between workers, allowing them to 
join forces for organized protest, when it is deemed necessary.
Central/local relations
The following section discusses the extent to which Israeli local governments are 
dependent on central government. Most scholars who analyze the Israeli central/local 
interaction portray central government as highly controlling, since local bodies must 
operate on the basis of policies formed at national level and are almost completely
24dependent on governmental budgetary support and for help in implementation. 
Others claim that, in many respects, local governments in Israel are actually more 
independent than some researchers tend to think.25
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A close look at the various arguments reveals that the two groups of 
researchers do not have contradictory views, but rather examine different aspects of 
the same issue. Those claiming that local governments are tightly controlled consider 
the formal rules, laws, and procedures that central government has instituted, in order 
to restrict the actions of local authorities. These control mechanisms entitle central 
government to intervene in almost all aspects of local government and shape their 
activities according to state-level interests. The second group o f researchers does not 
dispute the existence of formal control mechanisms, but also considers the structures 
and procedures in practice. These scholars conclude that local authorities are much 
more independent than originally intended by central government, pursuing their 
own interests without detection, or, at least, with little interference.26
David Dery’s explanation of central-local relations demonstrates how the 
Israeli system is highly centralized. Dery claims that local governments operate as 
secondary contractors, without any authority to form their own policies. As a result, 
they face difficulties in meeting voters’ demands.27 Most of the restrictions applied 
to local authorities are budgetary. Central government sets up monitoring procedures 
that strongly limit any independent decision-making. In 1985, parliament legislated a 
law, which grants frequent intervention by the Ministry of the Interior in the 
activities o f local governments the law allows the Ministry to intervene in setting the 
rate of local property tax, approve loans, restrict local wages, and determine the 
number of local employees. In addition, the Ministry of the Interior can terminate 
local projects that had not been presented earlier with the annually budget proposal, 
and can limit financial support when local authorities overspend (For more 
information on the budgetary process see Appendices, section E). In her report of 
1992, the state audit commissioner claimed that central government had become
59
embroiled in so many local functions, that it was difficult to hold local governments 
accountable for what was being done within the organization.29
The case studies presented in this thesis demonstrate how, in 1993, central 
government tried to push cities to reform their services, even by threatening to 
withhold future financial support if improvements were not made. However, an 
examination of the performance of cities indicates that central government threats 
have not been credible as government officials can hardly monitor the activities of 
municipalities fully, or ensure compliance. Due to lack of resources and sufficient 
personnel, central authorities cannot supervise the extent of structured planning or 
efficient implementation on behalf of local authorities. Even though some mayors 
chose to reform services in 1993, the decision resulted from public pressure and less 
from the demands of central government.
As chapter 6 further elaborates, in the case of Beer-Sheva, the Treasury and 
Ministry of the Interior assigned an external comptroller to supervise the activities of 
the municipality. Under this close inspection, the mayor of Beer-Sheva was forced to 
follow the requests of the comptroller and make efforts to reform services, based on 
the comptroller plans, otherwise putting at risk future financial aid from central 
government. The case of Beer-Sheva demonstrates how central government was able 
to monitor closely the activity of local governments from 1995, but it is an 
exceptional case, as for most cities, it does not have the resources needed for such 
thorough control. Even in Beer-Sheva, Mayor Rager admitted, in 1993, that prior to 
the activity of the external comptroller, he had deliberately created a budget deficit of 
300 million shekels, in order to force central government to assist with future plans 
for the city.30
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Haim Kalchheims claims that central government is usually unsuccessful in 
its attempts to control the activities of local governments. The Ministry of Interior 
desires to monitor local authorities but can hardly cover all activities.31 With limited 
resources, most central inspection units end up dealing with only specific public 
complaints, rather than conducting extensive examination of local agencies.32 
Kalchheim concludes that, although the Ministry of Interior has formal authority to 
control local governments, it has always been weak in performing this task. Overall, 
the ministry does not conduct methodical monitoring procedures, does not gather 
data on the performance of local governments systematically, nor ensure and co­
ordinate reports of findings between governmental units.
While intended to create a highly centralized system, the inefficient structure 
leads local governments to ignore formal state procedures, which they consider 
unreasonable and do as they please, knowing that their conduct will either be 
undetected or, once revealed, go unpunished. Against the wishes of central 
government, local authorities are able to determine levels of expenditure and wages, 
design local projects as they see fit, and initiate local programs in services such as 
Education and Welfare.
In terms of budget planning and level of expenditures, mayors are required to 
present budget proposals to the Ministry of Interior, no later than two months before 
the beginning of the new budget year (1st of January), but in practice, most budget 
proposals are handed in late and often long after January. However, as a considerable 
proportion of local services is financed by central government, especially for social 
services such as Education and Welfare, the state treasury is forced into a situation in 
which it must continue to financially support local governments before the official 
approval of new budget plans. Therefore, the treasury continues to transfer money on
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the basis of budget plans that had been approved the previous year, until local 
governments hand in a new proposal. This situation, apparently repeating itself every 
year, decreases the ability of central government to evaluate new financial needs, 
approve in advance local government plans, or demand improvements.33
In regard to budget approval, Nahum Ben Elia claims that after the last local 
elections of 1998, there was some change with the interaction between central 
government and local authorities. Mayors were surprised to discover that central 
government was now determined not to approve their budget, or any additional 
financial support, unless municipalities presented clear organizational plans to 
increase efficiency. Central government showed such determination that some 
mayors were forced to resign, as they were unable to keep their promises to voters 
with such huge local deficits.34 However, in most cities, it still seems that central 
and local governments are playing “chicken game” where each is waiting to see who 
will “swerve” or “break” first and deal with the budget deficits.
Regarding local wages, in order for the Ministry of the Interior to monitor if 
local wages follow the formal public sector scale o f wages, it needs to receive from 
local governments detailed reports that outline the various jobs and how much is 
spent on each. However, over the years, the Minister of Interior tended to approve 
budgets on wages without receiving such reports. This is regardless of the fact that 
local governments spent almost 40% of the ordinary budget on wages.35
In addition to over-spending on wages, it seems that local governments have 
found many ways to bypass the restrictions of the Ministry of Interior on the number 
of workers they are permitted to employ. For example, they set up external 
committees and small public corporations that hire extra workers. The Ministry of 
the Interior does not count these workers as part of the local government. Local
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authorities therefore hire additional workers, often political appointees, without the
intervention o f central government.36
The process of approval of grants by the Ministry of the Interior provides an 
opportunity for an advanced examination of proposals of projects by local 
governments and for an estimation of the feasibility o f their planning and 
implementation. However, local governments often start projects before receiving the 
approval of the Minister and therefore, before receiving the grants supposed to fund 
them. In such cases, the Ministry of the Interior is placed in a situation in which it 
must provide funding in mid-project, as a result o f pressure from local authorities 
and the public. Otherwise, local governments will fail to finish the projects and
37increase their debts.
Frequently, the Ministry of the Interior tends to approve budgets that are 
meant to finance the provision of local Education and Welfare services, without 
inspecting the programs, or progress, made by local authorities on these services.38 
Even though central government almost fully finances them, it does not assign 
enough workers to inspect implementation. The State Audit Commission, which 
often examines these services, finds that there are insufficient reports from regional 
inspectors on the quality of local provision of Education and Welfare services. The 
few reports that the inspectors do hand in are incomplete and unclear in evaluating 
the performance of local authorities.39 In addition, until 1992, local budgets were 
approved by the Ministry of the Interior, without any prior consultation with the 
central Education and Welfare ministries. The ministries received little or no 
professional advice on the budget proposals, from Education and Welfare officials, 
before approving them.40
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In its attempts to monitor the activities of local government, an additional 
problem the Ministry of the Interior faces is that o f ’’Multiple Principals” . In central 
government and especially in the Ministry of the Interior, there are various offices 
that are responsible for monitoring the same local matters. The existence o f multiple 
principals allows local governments more room to maneuver and act according to 
their own interests. This is especially easier, when different ministerial agencies have 
conflicting interests. In such situations, local governments find which office matches 
their interests most closely and recruit its support. Moreover, local governments ask 
these “allied offices” to assist in negotiations with other central offices.
At the end of 1993, a new Audit Agency was created in the Ministry of the 
Interior, with a mandate to prevent the redundancy inherent in this inefficient 
organizational structure. The role of the new agency is to minimize the problem of 
multiple principals, by becoming the main agency in charge of monitoring the 
activities of local governments. It is doubtful whether this audit agency will be able 
to increase the control over local authorities, especially with a staff of only six, 
assigned to monitor a total of 264 local governmental bodies.41
Since the major local electoral reform in 1978, local politicians are much 
keener to improve services, as part of their attempts to meet voters’ demands. This 
has provided an incentive to disregard the demands of central government and 
initiate more local projects that will increase their political support. Over the years, 
mayors have chosen to allocate budget (e.g., from property tax) to improve the 
provision of some services, while central government has been pushing for 
improvements in others. This friction occurs when central government does not 
receive reports of local plans and only realizes what has been done when they are
42already being implemented.
64
Local administration
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the first structure of bureaucracy that was adopted in 
Israel in 1948, was the British model of the neutral civil service. However, soon 
after, modifications were made to meet what were perceived to be Israeli needs. 
From 1948, the bureaucracy did not conform to a formal, well-structured 
organization, but was subjected to bargaining between political parties, that 
negotiated who should be placed in executive roles, and quickly politicized the 
Israeli bureaucracy. Elected representatives frequently appointed agents based on 
political considerations and personal connections.
It is still unclear whether the administration should follow the British system 
of civil servants, or the U.S. institutionalized form of political appointments. Since 
the beginning of the 1980s, judicial and political systems have been trying to 
establish laws and procedures that would direct the public sector and shape its 
character to fit the British model. However, the guidelines have been very confusing 
and open to interpretation. For example, politicians and chief administrators need to 
interpret what sort of incentives may be provided to motivate their subordinates, 
without breaching public ethical standards (e.g. unacceptably high salaries or 
inappropriate promotions). In addition, they had to interpret which types of 
appointment are and are not ethical.43
Consequently, political appointments reached high levels in the 1980s and 
1990s. A contributing factor was the first government turnover in 1977, when the 
domination of the Labour party in central and local governments ended, and a 
Rightist party (Likud) won the national elections. The Likud party was keen to insert 
its political allies into the public administration, after many years in which it
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operated according to left wing doctrines and most appointees had left-wing party 
affiliation. The appointments continued to increase in the period of the unification 
between the two big political parties in all administration bodies, both central and 
local. The politicization of the bureaucracy occurred mainly in top administrative 
roles, although it is commonly thought that it exists in all ranks of the public sector.
Empirical examination of political appointments
Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 present level of political appointments in governmental 
offices for the years 1988 and 1990, and recruitments of appointees to local 
governments for the years 1993-1995 and 1998-2000, based on reports of the State 
Audit Commission. The data on central government offices, from 1990, are in the 
last report to be published, as the audit commission has decided not to repeat this 
extensive study. There are some other indications that high degrees of political 
appointments continue, based on complaints that reach the state civil service 
commission, judicial courts, and the state legal advisor, voicing suspicions of 
unethical appointments.
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Table 3.2: Political appointees in central government offices (1988, 1990)44
Office
Total 
number 
of 
workers 
in each 
office
Non Party 
members Likud Avoda Religious
Total 
number of 
Political 
Appointees
Percentages 
of political 
appointees
Industry and 
Commerce
100 27 66 7 0 73 73%
Construction 
and Housing
70 22 43 5 0 48 69%
Transportation 37 7 30 0 0 30 81%
Infrastructure 88 22 15 50 1 66 75%
Treasury 53 25 16 11 1 28 53%
Tourism 36 4 29 3 0 32 89%
Defence 59 21 14 24 0 38 64%
Others 96 58 15 21 2 38 36%
Total
15.12.1988
573 221 279 73 0 352 61%
Total
1.11.1990
539 186 228 121 4 353 65%
The Audit Commission refers to 61% of all workers in government offices (in 1988) 
as political appointees, known to be involved in party partisanship. In 1990, 65% of 
workers are considered political appointments. The relatively high percentage of 
political executives from the Likud party is explained by the fact that the Likud party 
was in government at the time. The low percentage of religious members is due to 
their relatively small percentage in government during those years. This situation 
changed in 1995, when “Shas” (a religious party representing Sephardim- oriental 
Jews) became the third biggest party in Israel. With this development, the reports by 
judicial courts began to indicate a growth in political appointments of religious 
representatives.
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Table 3.3: Recruitments of executives (that require to pass tender process) in 6
local governments (1993-1995)45
Cities Total Recruits (1993-1995)
Recruits 
by tender
Without tender 
(low-medium 
level 
administrators)
Without tender 
(top ranked 
administrators)
Total
recruits
without
tender
Percent of 
recruits 
without 
tender
Tel-Aviv - 
Jaffa
409 54 140 215 355 87%
Bat-Yam 50 16 19 15 34 68%
Givatayim 47 9 27 11 38 81%
Holon 63 19 36 8 44 70%
Ness-Ziona 62 8 39 15 54 87%
Kiryat-Ono 58 6 32 20 52 90%
Total 689 112 293 284 577 84%
The report shows very high percentages of personnel recruitments that did not pass 
formal tender processes. Overall 84% of all recruitments did not pass through the 
required tender committee processes.
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Table 3.4: Recruitments of executives (that require to pass tender process) in 11
local governments (1998-2000)46
Local
Governments
Recruitments
(1998-2000)
Recruitment 
by tender
Without
tender
Political allies 
(from all types 
of recruitments)
Percent of 
political 
allies
Municipalities
Beer-Sheva 59 9 50 25* 42%
Herzelya 43 17 26 - 0%
Tira 7 2 5 4 57%
Lod 19 14 5 5 26%
Natanya 22 14 8 17 77%
Petach-Tikva 19 10 9 7 37%
Kiryat
Malhachi
10 2 8 9 90%
Tel Aviv- 
Jaffa
31 19 12 5 16%
Local Councils
Beit-Dagan 1 0 1 1 100%
Modyeen 55 5 50 10** 18%
Ramat
HaSharon
39 6 33 3 8%
Total 305 98 207 86 28%
* 21 executives were appointed to work in the municipality and 4 in external
municipal corporations 
** 9 executives were appointed to work in the municipality and 1 in an external
municipal corporation
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 exhibit the recruitments of employees that did not go through 
official appointment processes, such as tender committees, hence indicating political 
considerations in the appointment process. In the examination of 1993-1995, the 
audit commission closely traced a small fraction of employees, in order to
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demonstrate political considerations in the appointment process, but could not 
examine thoroughly, each and every employee recruited during those years. The 
examination of 1998-2000 gives more information on the actual political activities of 
nominees, who had assisted politicians prior to their appointment to local executive 
roles.
It is important to regard the figures for state and local political appointments 
as only suggesting appointments based on political considerations, but not 
necessarily proving them to be as such. As elaborated in Chapter 2, the fact that 
appointees are political allies of the appointers is not sufficient indication of political 
appointment, since it does not directly determine to what extent the relevant 
politicians had placed emphasis on this association, or if they had considered other 
variables, such as the professional expertise of nominees, at the appointment stage. 
The audit commission reports do not thoroughly inspect the appointment process of 
each public employee, due to lack of resources to conduct interviews and to trace 
past career records. The audit commission examines only a few executives and can 
only infer the existence of a problem with the rest. However, it is most likely that the 
data presented on appointments for state and local executives do indicate that 
politicians made political considerations during the appointment process. One 
obvious clue is that so many appointments bypassed the formal tender processes, 
meant to allow potential qualified nominees to apply for public offices, thus allowing 
politicians to secure the jobs for their preferred candidates.
As explained in the introduction, the empirical study of three cities (Chapters 
4-6) attempts to examine more thoroughly every appointment conducted in three 
typical sanitation agencies between 1993-1998, in order to determine their true 
nature. Discovering whether nominees passed the tender processes or not, does not
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provide sufficient information. The most useful method of analysis in this case 
turned out to be interviews, mainly elite interviews with those involved in the 
appointment process and with players who had interacted over the years with 
appointees.
Reforms of the civil service
The decision to reform services in Israel followed similar experiences that occurred 
at the time in democracies such as the U.S., U.K, other European countries, and New 
Zealand.47 As part of the New Public Management doctrine at the beginning of the 
1990s, the Israeli government reformed the administration in state and local 
authorities. Mostly, the decision to reform services came as a result of the findings 
presented by the “Kuberski Committee”, which investigated the Israeli 
administration over a period of 2 years. Overall, the committee found the 
administration was unprofessional, highly politicized, and had no adequate minority 
representation. The committee concluded that there was a strong need to revise the 
rules, procedures and entire form of the public administration.48 Chaired by the 
former chief executive of the Interior ministry, Haim Kuberski, the committee’s 
report is considered one of the most thorough and extensive examinations of the 
public administration ever conducted in Israel. However, only some of its 
recommendations were implemented as part of the 1994-1996 reform conducted by 
the State Civil Service Commissioner.
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Reform of 1994-1996 
Aims of the reform:
In 1994, the Ministry of the Interior decided to adopt a reform designed by the State 
Civil Service Commissioner, Professor Itzhak Galnoor, and his team. The first aim of 
the reform was to make the Israeli administration more professional and less 
political. The team offered two main approaches to meet this aim. First, to ban 
political appointments below the rank of chief administrator officer (CAO). This 
meant that mayors would be unable to appoint any administrators below that of city 
manager. In addition, the reform forbade politicians from interfering with the work 
of administrators in lower ranks. In other words, the reform formalized the role of 
chief executive as the sole link between the executive administration and political 
representatives. Second, all nominees for administrative roles had to appear in front 
of independent appointment committees that would examine their skills and 
experience.49
A second aim of the reform was to adopt New Public Management 
schemes, by reducing the role of government service provision and increasing the 
involvement of private market suppliers.50 The committee recommended that some 
of the state and local services be provided to the citizens by external contractors (i.e., 
contracting-out services) while the public sector continued to monitor the quality of 
provision. In addition, the reform sought to develop a customer-oriented 
approach.51 For example, by adopting the British concept of “The Citizens’ 
Charter”, in which the existence of the public sector is justified by the quality of 
services that it provides and by its ability to serve citizens as customers. Furthermore, 
a “Freedom of Information Act” was passed, to provide citizens with easier access to 
official documents. It was hoped that the act would increase the accountability of the
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administration, when its actions become more transparent. Third, the committee 
pushed to decentralize government. The committee sought to grant chief executives 
the discretionary power to delegate responsibilities to lower officials. To balance 
accountability and efficiency, the committee recommended instituting strict 
monitoring procedures and strengthening the role and authority of the internal audit 
commission.52
Finally, the committee recommended that new equal opportunity and 
affirmative action measures be adopted, in order to promote women and increase 
the representation of minority groups in the public sector, especially in high ranked 
managerial positions. In 1994, while no less than 60% of all bureaucratic roles were 
held by women, only four percent o f them were in senior managerial positions. The 
state civil service commissioner made one of his main goals the promotion of 
women, Arab-Israelis and Druze, to executive roles. With the assistance of the State 
Legal advisor, he tried to legislate a law of public sector appointments, to allow 
greater representation of minority groups in the public sector.53
Outcomes of the reform:
An ambitious schedule of reforms, Galnoor’s plan was partly implemented and it can 
be considered neither a huge success nor a complete failure. Galnoor’s main 
achievement was to increase minority group representation in executive roles, up to 
40% for Arab-Israeli and Druze and 15% for women promoted to managerial roles.54 
The promotion of minority groups was achieved due to Knesset approval in 1995, 
amending the law of equal representation in the public sector. In addition, Galnoor 
was able to facilitate the legislation of the Freedom of Information Act, allowing 
citizens easier access to public reports, documents and publications. In terms of
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privatization, some state and local agencies responded to the reform and contracted- 
out services, while others chose not to comply and were able to block attempts by 
government to push the reform forward.
Galnoor provides three main explanations as to why the reforms he and his 
team introduced were not adopted fully by the government. First, there was the 
reluctance of government to reduce political appointments. Politicians were strongly 
against the replacement of administrators whom they had already appointed and 
considered as political allies. In 1994, the then Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, 
believed that Israel should adopt the U.S. administrative structure, by formalizing the 
process of political appointments. Rabin’s concept completely contradicted what the 
state civil service commissioner was seeking to achieve, to make the bureaucratic 
system less politicized. The government of Benjamin Netanyahu (1996) continued 
the same line of thought as Rabin. Netanyahu’s administration continued to 
politically appoint chief executives and tried to appoint a Likud member as the State 
Legal Advisor. Since the nominee was widely considered to be unsuited to the role 
on professional grounds, the strong protest of the media, the bar and distinguished 
members of the bench eventually prevented the appointment.55
The second explanation as to why the reforms were only partially 
implemented was a lack of public support. While the public showed concern over 
inefficient service provision and politicized administration, Galnoor suggested that 
the public was nonetheless indifferent to the committee’s recommendations. When 
the report first appeared, it did not receive the attention for which he was hoping 
from the media and the public. This indifferent public reception led to an indifferent 
government that refrained from fully adopting the reform.56
74
A third obstacle was posed by the unions. The Histadrut and municipal 
unions were against the reform, mainly because they perceived it as harmful to the 
social rights of employees in the public sector. For example, the reform was intended 
to reduce "internal tenders", in which agencies promote workers from within a 
specific unit, instead of advertising job offers across all public sector units. The 
purpose of "open tenders" is to increase the mobility of workers between various 
bureaucratic units. However, union protests against the reduction of internal tenders, 
led the government to abandon the proposal.57
Contracting-out of local services
This section explores the attempts of local governments from the early 1990s to the 
beginning of 2000, to increase the efficiency of service provision by adopting New 
Public Management programs. These ranged from new contract-based employment 
arrangements for city managers, to decentralizing service provision systems- most 
commonly known as the “contracting-out reform” (i.e., moving services from in- 
house to externally contracted market suppliers). Overall, politicians sought to offer 
voters service provision with what they believed to be of higher quality at lower 
cost.58
In the early 1990s, mayors in Israel publicized their intentions to privatize 
local services. The decision to turn to market solutions was a pragmatic decision to 
deal with financial difficulties. Local governments were making attempts to recover 
from an economic crisis that had occurred in Israel at the beginning of the 1980s, that 
had highly eroded their financial stability. Other structural conditions that motivated 
mayors to privatize services included central government pressure to reduce budget
75
deficits, demographic growth due to massive immigration during those years, and 
increasing demands by voters for higher quality of services.59
Central government pressure on local representatives was exhibited by 
restricting employees quotas, limiting levels of salaries and most importantly, 
threatening to delay transfers of national grants that were meant to assist in financing 
local projects. Grants were conditioned on a demonstration of efficient performance 
by municipalities. This led mayors to realize that central government would not 
always act as a safety net and in order to survive financially, they would need to find 
alternative ways to balance their budgets.
Demographic growth at the beginning of the 1990s was due to the massive 
immigration to Israel from the former Soviet Union. For the sake of convenience, 
we shall here designate them as “Russian”, although they originate in several of the 
states, such as Georgia, the Ukraine, etc. Nearly 750,000 Russian immigrants arrived 
in Israel and now constitute 12.5% of the entire population. Immigration dramatically 
increased the demands for local services. However, central government has not 
provided sufficient increase of funding for this purpose. Most immigrants arrived 
individually or with small families, which decreased their dependency on welfare 
services. Most were educated, easily adopted to modern economic and political 
systems and were highly motivated to learn new professions, if necessary.60
The Israeli public sector seemed to be more responsive to the needs of the 
Russian immigrants than had been seen in the past with other immigrant 
communities. One possible explanation is the organizational skills o f these 
immigrants, who quickly formed their own social, cultural and political circles, and 
eventually their own local and national parties.61 Mayors were especially responsive 
to the need of many of the immigrants to preserve their secular Jewish culture. As
76
central government restricted local authorities’ ability to recruit more employees, 
mayors thought that a privatization process of services would answer the immigrants’ 
needs. In addition, privatization assisted immigrants, especially the entrepreneurs 
among them, to blend into new professions and businesses.62
An increased demand for services was also part of the cultural change Israeli 
cities were experiencing at the time. As elaborated earlier in this chapter, Israel was 
gradually transforming into a civic society with growing demands for a better life 
style. This caused voters to increasingly protest against inefficient service provision 
and insufficient attention devoted by local governments to cultural and leisure 
activities. Mayors seeking re-election needed to respond to these demands and 
privatization of services seemed an efficient way to improve service provision.63 
Overall, the various needs of constituents and pressure by central government forced 
local politicians to search for ways to improve services, while being acutely aware of 
the constraints of limited resources.
Thus, Israeli local governments have adopted four main types of market 
mechanism to deliver services.64 The most common of these is the contracting-out 
reform, in which services are provided by private contractors, while local
governments continue to monitor performance to ensure high quality service. The 
second most common mechanism is the use of quasi-contracts, an ongoing 
agreement between local governments and semi-voluntary local associations, set up
as strategic partnerships between local authorities and national ministries, to be
found mainly in Education, Welfare, and Health services. For example, hostels for 
juvenile delinquent or mentally challenged children, are managed by local
associations, mainly financed by donations and monitored by local governments. 
Contracting-out and quasi-contracts are by far the most commonly used mechanisms
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and account for 95% of external-based service delivery.65 Other mechanisms include 
franchises, used to maintain public facilities (e.g., beach facilities) and rarely adopted 
vouchers, that assist with such services as children’s transportation to school.
As noted above, the most commonly adopted contracting-out form in Israel is 
the coordinated type between contractors and citizens.66 Under this arrangement, 
private contractors provide services to residents but receive payment for their 
services from local governments. This structure differs from a direct link scheme, in 
which citizens pay contractors in a form of vouchers or franchise arrangements, in 
order to receive services. Under the coordinated contracting-out arrangement, most 
mayors choose to conduct tenders that promote local businesses, as it helps local 
companies to prosper and improve the regional economy. In addition, mayors 
demand support of private companies during elections and in return, block national
sn
competition, in order to offer local companies an advantage to win tenders.
Even though mayors chose to contract out services, most did not immediately 
form structured contracting-out programs.68 Central and local Israeli governments 
were following a trend of privatization, especially along U.S.A and U.K lines, but 
not as a systematic reform.69 The most commonly contracted-out services were in: 
Sanitation, Construction, Engineering, Legal Advice, Maintenance of institutions and 
vehicles, Housing, Elderly Care and Information Technology functions.70 Local 
governments in Israel chose to follow this trend, including privatization of 
Transportation and Security services. The empirical cases of Tel-Aviv, Holon and 
Beer-Sheva, explore the stages o f implementation of the contracting-out reform, 
including the consequences of delaying formal planning of the reform.
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Analysis of outcomes
This following section presents an empirical examination of privatization in six 
major Israeli cities (1990-1999) that show full or partial failure to implement this 
type of reform. The empirical measurement of privatization repeats an earlier study 
conducted by Nahum Ben Elia, who investigated 28 municipalities between 1989 
and 1990. A further comparative analysis of six cities explains why the cities failed to 
fully advance their reform plans. A core variable that contributed to the privatization 
outcomes achieved, is the interaction between politicians and their chief executives 
in charge of services. This is discussed more fully in Chapters 4-6.
Ben Elia compared levels of privatization between cities in 1989-1990 (see 
Table 3.11 in Appendices, section F). He calculated the total expenditures that were 
spent on contractors from the ordinary budget, for each type of service. The data 
demonstrate a wide variation in expenditures between municipalities for contracted 
services. It shows an incomplete adaptation of the contracting-out mechanism in the 
early 1990s; a continued reliance on previous structures for some services i.e., in- 
house delivery of services, while introducing private contractors for others. Ben Elia 
concludes that the extent of contracting-out reached only 13% percent o f the ordinary 
budget, but 100% of the budget allocated for development projects. His calculation 
did not include state-funded services, such as Education and Welfare. In all of the 
local governments that were examined (28) in 1990, there was a clear bias toward the 
implementation of contracting-out for hard services, such as infrastructure 
maintenance (streets, water pipes) and solid-waste collection.
In 1990, contracting-out had only a marginal effect on personnel quotas. 
Contractors were hired mainly to provide additional services, rather than to replace 
in-house services. This was a result of population growth, due to the Russian
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immigration and therefore of an increase in service demands. Second, workers who 
had previously worked on in-house services that were now contracted-out, remained 
working in local government, but were allocated to alternative bureaucratic units.
Ben Elia found a direct correlation between levels of contracted services to 
types of local governments related to the social-economic status of cities (see Table 
3.12 and Figure 3.17 in Appendices, Section F). Local governments operating in 
financially stable communities tended to conduct more privatization than in 
financially constrained cities.71 One possible explanation is the high percentages of 
unemployment in such a city. Municipalities try to avoid an additional increase of 
unemployment, which results from a contracting-out process that leads to 
redundancies of municipal employees. Another explanation that Ben Elia proposes is 
that financially distressed cities are unable to determine true costs of services and 
thus offer prices to contractors higher than the cost of continuing to deliver services 
with municipal employees. On the other hand, financially stable cities tend to operate 
in a more organized way, which allows them to estimate the costs of service more 
accurately and make precise demands from contractors, eventually leading to greater 
savings.
Overall, it is difficult to estimate if contracting-out of services led to a 
reduction of costs of service provision, since most cities are unorganized it is hard to 
assess the costs of in-house services and compare them to those of private 
companies. According to Ben Elia, it is evident, however, that contracting-out 
increased the efficiency of the overall service provision (i.e., o f both the services that 
were contracted-out and some of those that continued to be provided by in-house 
employees). This was mainly due to increased managerial awareness of, and skill in 
delivering, services. Over the years, contractual agreements forced local government
80
to  examine services thoroughly, in order to determine the set o f  requirem ents from 
private companies. Furthermore, the introduction o f contracting-out, as a feasible 
option o f  service delivery, m otivated bureaucrats to  improve performance, since they 
otherwise risked management shifting services to  the private m arket.72
Empirical findings on contracting-out (1990-1999)
Figures 3.1-3.12 present an original measurement o f  privatization in six major Israeli 
cities for nearly a decade. The study repeats the same technique o f  measurement as 
conducted in the past by Ben Elia, in order to allow a consistent look at privatization 
achievements. Percentages o f  contracted services are measured as the amount o f 
expenditure spent on contractors, for a specific service, as a percentage o f  the total 
expenditures o f  the agency. (For expenditure o f contracted services in six cities, in 
percentages and new Israeli shekels, see Tables 3.13-3.23 in the Appendices, section 
F).
Figure 3.1: Percentage of contracted services in Holon (1992-1999)
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Figure 3.2: Percentage of contracted sanitation services in Holon (1994-1999)
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Figure 3.3: Percentage of contracted services in Tel-Aviv (1990-1999)
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Figure 3.4: Percentage of contracted sanitation services in Tel-Aviv (1990-1999)
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Figure 3.5: Percentage of contracted services in Rishon-Le-Zion (1989-1999)
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Figure 3.6: Percentage of contracted sanitation services in Rishon-Le-Zion
(1989-1999)
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Figure 3.7: Percentage of contracted services in Ramat-Gan (1992-1999)
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Figure 3.8: Percentage of contracted sanitation services in Ram at-G an (1992-
1999)
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Figure 3.9: Percentage of contracted services in Petach-Tikva (1991-1999)
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Figure 3.10: Percentage of contracted sanitation services in Petach-Tikva (1991-
1999)
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Figure 3.11: Percentage of contracted sanitation services in Beer-Sheva (1991 
1998)
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Figure 3.12: Percentage of contracted sanitation services in 6 cities (1989-1999)
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Table3.5: Percentage of contracted sanitation services in 6 Cities (1989-1999)
Year
Rishon
Lezion
Holon Tel Aviv Ramat
Petach
Tikva
Beer-
Sheva
1989 23%
1990 23% 8%
1991 23% 11% 13% 20%
1992 19% 10% 13% 13% 21%
1993 18% 12% 17% 18% 25%
1994 24% 29% 13% 20% 28% 25%
1995 22% 32% 13% 20% 23% 26%
1996 29% 35% 12% 21% 22% 29%
1997 15% 38% 13% 21% 21% 34%
1998 23% 44% 15% 22% 23% 35%
1999 24% 44% 14% 21% 22%
Rishon Lezion 
Holon 
T el-Aviv 
Ramat-Gan  
Petach Tikva 
Beer-Sheva
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A comparison of contracted sanitation services in 6 cities show that, by 1998, Holon 
had achieved the highest level of privatization, with 44% and Tel-Aviv, the lowest, 
with only 15%. Other cities, Rishon LeZion, Ramat Gan and Petach Tikva all had 
achieved similar levels of 22-23%. In the case of Beer-Sheva, the relatively high 
percentage of contracted sanitation services achieved (34%-35%) is misleading and 
might indicate malfeasance, as explored further in chapter 6.
Summary
As elaborated in this chapter, local governments in Israel are useful as case study, 
due to several factors. First, over the last 25 years, they have become less and less 
tied to national political struggles, focusing rather on local issues, such as the quality 
o f service delivery. This has allowed reforms to be adopted, mostly in the form of 
contracting-out services. Politicians adopting privatization plans were not basing 
their decision on ideology alone. Mayors of all political spectra considered 
privatization as a pragmatic solution to the financial crisis they were facing in the 
early 1990s.
Second, the Israeli local administration is built on a mixture of civil service 
careerists and politically appointees. In the early days o f independence, as noted in 
previous chapters, the Israeli government had tried to adopt the British neutral civil 
servant model, but it is evident that local public administration has become highly 
politicized over the years. Politicians tend to sidestep tendering processes and 
consider political alliances at the appointment process assuming that such 
appointments will lead to responsive agencies. An administration that employs both 
careerists and politically appointed agents will allow a comparison to be made o f the 
performance and outcomes achieved with each type of agent.
Among political appointments are those of city managers. Under the formal 
organizational structure of local governments, a city manager is supposed to provide 
a link between the administration and city management. However, in most cities, 
council members become directly involved in the activities of bureaucratic agencies, 
bypassing, in the process, the authority of the city manager. The attempts by council 
members to determine policies for agencies and monitor their implementation, often 
causes clashes with city managers. For example, city managers opposing 
privatization will find it difficult to block such reform, when council members give 
direct orders to agencies and closely monitor their performance. Frequently, council 
members and mayors try to resolve conflicts with city managers in two ways: (1) by 
choosing not to appoint a city manager at all, as is common in small municipalities; 
or (2) by appointing a city manager whom they consider a political ally, willing to 
cooperate. This is what usually happens in larger municipalities.
Third, even though local governments are formally restricted in their actions 
by laws and procedures set by central government, in practice, municipalities have 
greater autonomy to form and implement policies as they see fit. Overall, a principal- 
agent problem exist whenever central and local governments are in a conflict of 
interests, at which time, local authorities may successfully manage to hide 
information, in an attempt to promote their interests. However, this informal 
discretion does not seem to provide sufficient conditions for local politicians to carry 
out important plans successfully.
The following empirical chapters (4-6) analyze the attempts of local 
politicians to contract-out services in 3 Israeli cities, Tel-Aviv, Holon and Beer- 
Sheva. The chapters explore the privatization outcomes achieved, when implemented
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by political agents. The structural conditions presented here provide an explanation 
for the procedures, and in some cases, for the poor contracting-out results.
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Appendices
Section A
Table 3.6: Demographic growth in Israel (1990-2003)73
Year
population
Size
(thousands)
Percent of 
population 
growth
Year
population
Size
(thousands)
Percent of 
population 
growth
1990 4,821.7 1997 5,900.0 2.5%
1991 5,058.8 4.9% 1998 6,041.4 2.4%
1992 5,195.9 2.7% 1999 6,209.1 2.8%
1993 5,327.6 2.5% 2000 6,369.3 2.6%
1994 5,471.5 2.7% 2001 6,508.8 2.2%
1995 5,619.0 2.7% 2002 6,631.1 1.9%
1996 5,757.9 2.5% 2003 6,748.4 1.8%
Table 3.7: Demographic growth in Holon, Beer-Sheva and Tel-Aviv74
Year
City 1983 1995 2000 2002
Holon 133,460 163,082 165,669 165,768
Beer-Sheva 110,813 149,404 172,860 181,463
Tel-Aviv 327,265 348,245 354,428 360,405
Figure 3.13: Demographic growth in 3 cities7'
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Section B
Local Elections in Israel
Table 3.8: Percentages of voter turnout for local and national elections (1950- 
1998)76
Year
eligible to 
vote
actual local 
voters
% of voters 
(local 
elections)
% of voters 
(national 
elections)
1950* 421,334 355,287 84% 87%**
1955 833,800 655.227 79% 83%
1959 1,038,976 833,352 80% 82%
1965 1.280,091 1,058,041 83% 83%
1969 1,573,353 1,242,265 79% 82%
1973 1,927,234 1,410,681 73% 79%
1978* 2.235.703 1.280.521 57% 79%**
1983* 2,478,120 1,469,253 59% 79%***
1989* 2.722.077 1,621,274 60% 80%**
1993* 3,329,413 1.873,591 56% 77%**
1998* 3,838,476 2,202,123 57% 79%**
* Local and national elections were on separate dates.
** National elections were held in 1949, 1977,1988,1992,1996.
*** In comparison to the national elections, conducted in 1984.
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Table 3.9: Ranking of 25 local governments by population, socio-economic level, 
and local voter turnout in 1993 and 1998.7
Municipality Population
Socio-Economic 
index 
(range: 1-10)
%  Voter 
Turnout 
02.11.1993
%  Voter 
T urnout 
10.11.1998
Jerusalem 617.042 5 43.42 42.32
Tel Aviv-Jaffa 348.245 8 43.12 42.18
Haifa 255,914 7 43.95 43.87
Rishon Le Zion 163,245 8 46.91 51.11
Holon 163,082 7 47.48 48.22
Petach-Tikva 149,471 7 56.03 56.32
Beer-Sheva 149,404 5 49.57 60.28
Natania 143,446 6 51.35 48.03
Rechovot 84.143 7 56.12 56.23
Herzelia 82,759 9 50.59 52.45
Ashkelon 80,938 4 58.87 53.83
Kfar Saba 68.246 8 55.09 57.85
Hedera 60,445 6 64.38 61.94
Ramleh 57,356 4 62.43 59.94
Raananah 56,848 9 56.4 60.76
Lod 51,319 4 61.2 61.58
Aako 44,240 3 65.74 64.4
Kiriat Gat 43.809 'I 63.43 68.08
Naharia 36,341 6 64.11 60.95
Tiberia 35,291 4 68.36 72.82
Yavne 23,445 6 73.81 72.38
Or Yehuda 23,132 4 66.7 66.54
Migdal Ha Emek 21,778 4 73.33 72.02
Tsfat 21,480 4 72.13 70.98
Kiriat Shmona 19.280 5 72.5
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Table 3.9 and Figure 3.14 show a strong correlation between the size o f  a 
municipality and voter turnout. The larger the population, the lower voter turnout.
Figure 3.14: Population size and percent of voter turnout in the 1993 and 1998
78local elections (in 25 cities).
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Socio-Econom ic Index79
1) Variables chosen to compute the socio-economic index:
1.1) Demography
1.1.1) Dependency ratio: the ratio between those aged 0-19 (young 
population) and 65+ (mature population), to those aged 20-64 
(working-age population). To obtain the final variable, the quotient 
was multiplied by 100.
1.1.2) M edian age: the median age o f  the local-authority population, 
computed on the basis o f  individual ages.
1.1.3) Average number o f  persons per households: the total population 
living in households, divided by the number o f  households.
1.2) Standard of living
1.2.1) Housing density (defined as: no. of rooms per person): the total number of 
rooms used for residential purposes by all households, divided by the total 
population of persons in households (excluding institutions).
1.2.2) Proportion o f  personal-computer-owning households: the total 
number o f households that own a personal computer, divided by the 
total number o f  households.
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1.2.3) Average motor vehicles per households: total number of motor 
vehicles at the disposal of the households, divided by the total 
number of households.
1.2.4) Average income per capita.
A: average monthly wage per employee, expressed in annual terms, for 1995;
B : number of employees in the locality;
C: income of the self-employed: locality-level average on the basis of tax
collection per year, divided by 12-for 1995;
D: number of self employed in the locality;
G1: total income from child allowances in the locality;
G2: total income from old age pensions in the locality;
G3: total income from income-maintenance benefits in the locality;
G4: total income from unemployment compensation in the locality;
G5: total income from disability benefits in the locality;
P: total population of the locality.
Then the variable value is determined by:
(A*B)+(C *D)+G 1+G2+G3+G4+G5 
P
1.3) Schooling and Education
1.3.1) Percent of households with (at least one) holder o f an academic 
degree: the number of households in which at least one person holds 
an academic degree (B.A, M.A or Ph.D.), as a share of the total 
number of households.
1.3.2) Average years of schooling (of persons aged 26-50): the average 
years of schooling of persons aged 26-50, who attended schools in 
Israel or abroad, computed on the basis of individual years.
1.3.3) Percent of persons holding matriculation certificates (in the 17-20 age 
group): the number of persons aged 17-20 who hold matriculation 
certificates, as a share of the total aged 17-20.
1.4) Employment and Unemployment:
1.4.1) Percent of unemployment (of civilian labour force): the percent of 
people aged 15+ in the annual civilian labour force, who are not 
employed.
1.4.2) Percent of women not in the civilian labour force: the percent of 
women aged 20-60 who do not belong to the annual civilian labour 
force, as a share of all women aged 20-60. (Source of data: 1995 
census of Housing and Population)
1.4.3) Percent of workers in prestigious occupation (of total workers): the 
percent of persons engaged in academic or managerial occupations in 
the annual civilian labour force. (Source of data: 1995 census of 
Housing and Population)
1.4.4) Percent of sub minimum-wage earners (of total wage earners): the 
percent of wage-earners earning up to the minimum wage relevant to 
the period at issue, as a share of total wage earners.
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1.5) Benefits
1.5.1) Percent of persons receiving unemployment 
compensation (share o f total population).
1.5.2) Percent of recipients of income-maintenance benefits 
(share of total population).
Section C 
Council Members
Table 3.10 shows the number of council members who are allocated to local 
authorities. The number of council members is determined by the size of the local 
authority, based on its population.
Table 3.10: Number of council members (in local authorities)80
Population of Local Authority No. of council members
Up to 5000 9
5001-25,000 9-15
25,001-100,000 15-21
More then 100,000 21-31
Section D
81Types of Local Authority Committees
Management Committee
Functions: to advise the mayor on any issue regarding his/her role and to discuss 
any issue which other committees do not have the authority to handle. 
Participants: the mayor, deputy mayors, and council members chosen by the 
council.
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Public Tenders Committee
Functions: to examine offers made by private companies to the local authority and 
to advise the mayor on the most suitable candidate to win the bid. It is 
then the responsibility of the mayor to approve the recommendation of 
the committee.
Participants: council members and legal advisor. The mayor is forbidden to 
participate in this committee.
It is also considered acceptable that the mayor suggests a candidate to 
sit on the committee without a discussion by the bids committee 
regarding that candidate. However, any candidate chosen by the mayor 
must be approved by the council.
Monetary Committee
Functions: to advise the mayor on financial issues and to examine the mayor’s 
budget proposal before passing it to the council for approval.
Participants: council members.
Security Committees (Emergencies , citizens’ patrols and guards)
Functions: to discuss matters that involve preparation for states of emergency in 
cities, to co-ordinate activities with the security and military bodies that 
take part in civil defense and the provision of security at public events 
and for everyday life in cities.
Participants: council members, security experts.
Internal Audit Commission
Functions: to discuss the internal audit commission reports, citizens’ complaints, 
and any reports of the Ministry of the Interior that evaluate local 
performance. The committee is in charge of instituting and monitoring 
the corrections that need to be made, based on the reports and 
complaints. It is obligated to inform the council of the findings and of 
its recommendations as to how to deal with the issues raised and how to 
correct mistakes.
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Participants: up to 7 council members, who reflect the party structure in the 
council. The mayor and deputies can attend this committee. The chair of 
this committee should be from any party other than that of the mayor, 
unless there is only one party in the council.
Personnel Committee ('Human Resources committee)
Functions: to decide on matters related to human resources, such as the hiring and 
firing of workers, evaluating the quality of work by employees, 
transferring workers between units, deciding on promotions and tenure, 
dealing with discipline problems, and organizing professional training. 
In addition, it is the committee’s responsibility to follow contracting-out 
procedures that have direct consequences on workers’ status or quotas. 
For example, if there is a need to reduce the number of employees as 
part of a reform, the committee tries to offer solutions to workers who 
are to be replaced or fired.
Participants: chair- a council member responsible for human resource policies, a 
human resource manager (who is the organizer of the committee), 
mayor, council members, public representatives, union representative, 
chief executive, treasurer.
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Section E 
Municipal Budget
Figures 3.15 and 3.16 demonstrate local government expenditure and income during 
2001 .
Figure 3.15: Ordinary budget expenditure of local authorities 2001.82
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Figure 3.16: Ordinary budget income of local authorities 2001.83
Government
participation
40%
Municipal 
- collection 
35%
Totla 30.4 NIS 
billion
Other self  
income 
24%
Transfers and 
non-recurrent 
income 
1%
99
84Budget approval procedure
Mayor -> Finance Committee -> Council -> Ministry of The Interior.
The procedure of budget approval includes a preparation of a budget proposal by the 
mayor and his/her assistants. The mayor then passes the proposal to the city’s finance 
committee (that includes council members), to examine the proposal and make 
suggestions if needed, before presenting it to the council for approval. Once 
approved by the council, the budget proposal is passed on for the approval of the 
Ministry of the Interior that, in return, gives the final approval of the budget for that 
year.
In all stages, there is a bargaining process between the mayor and council, 
among council members themselves, and with the Ministry of the Interior. This 
process is often lengthy and exceeds the formal deadline set for the final budget 
approval. The delay of approval causes municipalities to continue to function on the 
basis of the previous year’s budget. The Ministry of the Interior is also forced to 
continue its financial support to cities, based on the previous year’s figures. Once the 
budget is approved, mayors are required to request the approval of the Ministry of 
the Interior for any modifications to the budget that are needed during the year. There 
is some flexibility however, for cities to shift resources from one project to another 
within the limits of the budget.
1 0 0
Budgetary Structure
1) Local Government Income:
64% self finance, 33% central government support and state grants, 3% loans.
1.1) Ordinary budget:
1.1.1) Local self-finance: from local taxes, mainly from property tax, which
is the biggest source of self-finance (an average of 60%). There are
also service charges, taxes on the sale of property, and fines.
1.1.2) Central government financial support:
For the provision of Education and Welfare services, close to 80% of 
the budget is state funded.
1.2) Externalized (Special) Budget:
1.2.1) State Grants: the grants provided by central government are 
supplementary to local incomes. In Israel, there are no clear criteria 
for determining the size of grants and they are adjusted to the specific 
needs of each local government. This leads to an uneven distribution 
of grants to local governments. According to Dery, over the last 20 
years, the central government’s financial support has ceased to be 
“special” and become routine. Israeli local governments have turned 
the creation of deficits into their main source of income: they tend to 
spend more than their budget allows and rely on central government 
to bail them out of deficits with the various grants that it provides. 
Types of state grants:
1.2.1.1) Balancing Grants: these are grants that cover the gap 
between local income and actual local expenditures. Self- 
sufficient local governments are not entitled to this type of grant. 
In recent years local authorities reached financial difficulties 
partly as a result of a drastic cut in balancing grants by the 
Treasury. The Treasury attempts to force local authorities to adopt 
rehabilitation programs, involving staff reductions, cancellation of 
unauthorized projects, and more efficient and complete local tax 
gathering.
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1.2.1.2) Destined grants: these are meant to assist local governments 
with the finance o f specific projects. The Ministry o f the Interior 
examines the plans o f the intended projects and decides whether 
or not to provide assistance.
1.2.1.3) Special Grants: these grants are given to specific cities that 
fall into the category of “lower socio-economic status”, in order to 
assist with financial difficulties and facilitate the cities’ 
development. The Ministry determines annually or every few 
years, which cities are of need of assistance. Based mainly on the 
socio-economic ranking of the Central Bureau of Statistics, the 
minister chooses the cities that are to receive “Status A” which 
allows the special grant. Every year, there is political bargaining 
between the minister and the mayors of cities who wish to be 
ranked as “Status A”, in order to receive such special grants.
2) Local Expenditures
The expenditures of local governments are mainly on the provision of services: State 
Services (Welfare and Education) and Local Services ( e.g. Sanitation, Maintenance, 
Engineering, Construction, Gardening, Infrastructure, Culture, Security). Other main 
components are Management and General expenditures (e.g., Office Supplies, 
Vehicles).
3) The Fundamental Budget Law of 1985
3.1) Employee Quota and Wages: The Minister of the Interior can set personnel 
quotas in local governments and require a reduction in the budget allocated 
to wages, when a local authority exceeds its quota. The minister can also 
require local authorities to reduce the amount of their employees, when it is 
estimated that they are redundant.
3.2) Grants: the Minister of the Interior can reduce the grants to which local 
governments are entitled, to stop local projects, or request local authorities 
to reduce their expenditures, if one of the following occurs:
1 0 2
3.2.1) A local government implements a project that its current budget 
cannot finance and central government is not interested in providing 
budgetary assistance for such a project.
3.2.2) A local government implements a project that was not approved by 
central government.
3.2.3) A local government over-employs workers, beyond the capabilities of 
its current budget.
3.2.4) A local government takes out types of loans that require the approval 
of central government, but neither reports its action, nor waits for the 
approval of state officials.
103
Section F
Local Privatization
Table 3.11: Percentage of contracting-out spent from the ordinary budget in 28
local authorities (1989-1990)*
Municipality
Percentage of 
Contracting-Out
Municipality
Percentage of 
Contracting-Out
Or Yehuda 21.8 Ramat Gan 11.9
Raananah 19.4 Ashdod 11.7
Kiriat Motskin 18.3 Ramleh 11.3
Holon 17.3 tiberia 11.0
Herzelia 17.2 Bnei Berak 10.7
Givatayim 16.0 Tsfat 9.7
Hedera 15.9 Um El Phachem 9.5
Beer Sheva 15.4 Bat Yam 9.1
Karmiel 15.2 Aako 8.6
Kiriat Bialik 14.4 Kiriat Shmona 8.6
Ashkelon 13.7 Rechovot 8.2
Kfar Saba 13.5 Lod 8.0
Rishon Le Zion 13.4 Migdal Ha Emek 7.6
Kiriat Gat 12.1 Dimona 4.8
* Does not include Education and Welfare services.
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Table 3.12: The socio-economic ranking of 14 cities and percent of contracting- 
out (1989-1990)
Municipality
Socio-Economic 
index 
(range: 1-10)
Percentage of Contracting- 
Out Spent from the Ordinary 
Budget*
Raananah 9 19.4
Kiriat Motskin 7 18.3
Holon 7 17.3
Hedera 6 15.9
Beer-Sheva 5 15.4
Karmiel 6 15.2
Ashdod 5 11.7
Ramleh 4 11.3
Tiberia 4 11
Bnei Berak 3 10.7
Tsfat 4 9.7
Um El Phachem 3 9.5
Aako 5 8.6
Dimona n3 4.8
* Does not include Education and Welfare services.
Figure 3.17: Socio-economic ranking of cities and percent of contracting-out 
(1989-1990)
mw/M  % of Contracting-Out from 
Ordinary Budget *
■ Socio-Econom ic index
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Table 3.13: Total expenditures (NIS) / percentage of contracted services in
Holon (1992-1999)
Year
Total Contracted 
Services 
(Expenditures)
Total Local 
Expenditures 
(Ordinary Budget)
% Total 
Expenditures 
Contracted 
(Ordinary 
Budget)
1992 17,160,439 72,673,890 24%
1993 17,654,101 78,453,083 23%
1994 20,166,518 90,173,356 22%
1995 24,651,291 106,754,469 23%
1996 29,497,048 126,117,881 23%
1997 35,130,998 141,179,697 25%
1998 38,273,001 135,245,708 28%
1999 40,604,761 140,846,304 29%
Table 3.14: Total expenditures (NIS) / percentage of contracted sanitation 
services in Holon (1994-1999)
Year
Total Sanitation 
Expenditure
Total Contracted 
Sanitation 
Expenditure
% Contracted 
Sanitation 
Expenditure
1994 54,949,386 16,182,594 29.45%
1995 57,578,073 18,632,265 32.36%
1996 59,774,199 21,081,935 35.27%
1997 65,352,890 24,646,903 37.71%
1998 61,250,733 26,788,390 43.74%
1999 64,623,702 28,430,945 43.99%
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Table 3.15: Total expenditures (NIS) of contracted services in Tel-Aviv (1990-
1999)
Year Contracted Local Assets
Local Assets 
Expenditures
Contracted
Sanitation
Services
Sanitation
Services
Expenditures
Total
Contracted
Services
(Expenditures)
Total Local 
Expenditures
1990 16,846,318 89,425,821 8,413,125 99,059,502 32,215,223 316,332,187
1991 17,373,667 82,725,861 10,358,644 93,267,240 34,462,099 324,020,250
1992 26,025,624 103,901,390 11,901,440 119,963,335 44,892,920 354,991,522
1993 29,108,305 115,718,683 16,583,855 133,161,166 63,769,106 405,800,124
1994 36,333,001 136,614,364 22,426,373 172,139,687 80,886,068 492,530,595
1995 47,741,801 157,091,752 26,610,484 206,364,129 96,267,108 609,592,692
1996 48,631,309 167,561,173 30,269,505 244,522,930 100,272,232 678,741,676
1997 54,305,602 195,373,634 34,849,706 270,193,082 113,875,233 770,524,473
1998 44,404,304 156,069,599 46,630,193 306,284,630 115,553,505 798,795,836
1999 40,737,246 174,386,943 44,639,883 319,845,258 110,925,574 827,428,572
Table 3.16: Percentage of contracted services (assets, sanitation) in Tel Aviv 
(1990-1999)
Year
% Local 
Assets 
Contracted
% Sanitation 
Services 
Contracted
% Total Local 
Services Contracted
1990 19% 8% 10%
1991 21% 11% 11%
1992 25% 10% 13%
1993 25% 12% 16%
1994 27% 13% 16%
1995 30% 13% 16%
1996 29% 12% 15%
1997 28% 13% 15%
1998 28% 15% 14%
1999 23% 14% 13%
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Table 3.17: Total expenditures (NIS) of contracted services in Rishon-Le-Zion
(1989-1999)
Year
Contracted
City
Inspection
City
Inspection
Exp.
Contracted
Local
Assets
Local 
Assets Exp.
Contracted
Sanitation
Services
Sanitation
Exp.
Total
Contracted
Services
Exp.
Total Local 
Exp. 
(Ordinary 
Budget)
1989 93,740 1,606,103 2,408,450 24,859,803 4,100,726 17,743,777 6,754,288 50,112,102
1990 124,274 1,975,226 1,202,196 26,841,643 6,432,825 28,054,941 8,084,516 65,438,125
1991 217,318 1,833,563 2,395,720 23,440,709 5,310,985 22,646,750 8,176,375 56,410,872
1992 242,186 3,095,744 3,244,188 39,504,083 7,130,020 36,663,200 10,995,807 94,541,539
1993 315,824 3,605,830 3,113,918 37,130,045 7,521,638 41,694,688 11,662,308 99,697,562
1994 581,498 4,849,295 5,110,419 45,610,277 8,220,829 34,276,139 14,534,185 104,344,388
1995 723,314 5,844,086 6,184,508 56,800,542 9,298,966 41,444,073 17,025,215 127,651,101
1996 778,438 6,962,009 8,529,801 70,761,919 14,976,448 52,362,149 24,683,682 159,027,560
1997 1,063,665 8,171,270 4,762,942 84,430,729 7,242,564 48,575,111 13,514,430 170,249,710
1998 911,034 9,197,441 20,396,011 89,298,994 11,830,690 50,652,328 33,853,297 182,046,895
1999 1,076,765 11,480,567 26,880,023 117,647,896 14,057,163 57,509,106 42,726,681 222,077,721
Table 3.18: Percentage of contracted services in Rishon-Le-Zion (1989-1999)
Year
% City 
Inspection 
Contracted
% Local 
Assets 
Contracted
%
Sanitation
Contracted
% Total 
Expenditures 
Contracted 
(Ordinary 
Budget)
1989 6% 10% 23% 13%
1990 6% 4% 23% 12%
1991 12% 10% 23% 14%
1992 8% 8% 19% 12%
1993 9% 8% 18% 12%
1994 12% 11% 24% 14%
1995 12% 11% 22% 13%
1996 11% 12% 29% 16%
1997 13% 6% 15% 8%
1998 10% 23% 23% 19%
1999 9% 23% 24% 19%
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Table 3.19: Total expenditures (NIS) of contracted services in Ramat-Gan
(1992-1999)
Year Contracted Local Assets
Local Assets 
Exp.
Contracted
Sanitation
Services
Sanitation
Exp.
Total
Contracted
Services
(Exp.)
Total Local 
Exp.
1992 1,845,358 14,866,957 4,990,624 37,425,083 7,021,977 74,409,488
1993 1,547,239 12,283,538 7,138,360 42,961,854 9,101,848 80,974,356
1994 2,617,699 16,361,928 9,177,857 46,790,413 12,262,450 85,519,369
1995 2,941,377 19,205,322 10,877,081 53,510,741 14,398,293 97,034,776
1996 2,468,162 19,877,942 13,054,901 61,278,466 16,377,192 112,884,344
1997 5,644,254 20,814,718 14,297,041 68,337,420 21,194,160 126,587,201
1998 6,464,649 22,403,425 16,001,749 74,096,228 23,766,702 133,790,322
1999 6,742,964 22,926,073 17,114,899 81,007,924 25,334,144 143,678,250
Table 3.20: Percentage of contracted services in Ramat-Gan (1992-1999)
Year %Local Assets Contracted
% Sanitation 
Contracted
% Total Local 
Expenditures 
Contracted
1992 12% 13% 9%
1993 13% 17% 11%
1994 16% 20% 14%
1995 15% 20% 15%
1996 12% 21% 15%
1997 27% 21% 17%
1998 29% 22% 18%
1999 29% 21% 18%
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Table 3.21: Total expenditures (NIS) of contracted services in Petach-Tikva
(1991-1999)
Year
Contracted - 
Immigration 
Services, 
Environment
Immigration,
Environment
Exp.
Contracted
Local
Assets
Local 
Assets Exp.
Contracted
Sanitation
Services
Sanitation
Services
Exp.
Total
Contracted
Services
(Exp.)
Total Local 
Exp.
1991 0.00 1,442,128 1,686,164 11,462,237 4,169,583 32,195,339 6,914,096 53,373,327
1992 0.00 2,501,937 3,394,454 20,535,880 6,368,341 48,301,581 10,977,912 85,033,542
1993 0.00 3,404,985 3,533,716 32,732,183 7,009,127 38,919,802 11,785,242 90,860,526
1994 559,629 6,317,345 4,470,434 18,108,805 13,808,178 49,395,599 20,023,576 93,458,978
1995 616,528 6,693,247 6,030,827 22,329,746 13,312,616 56,701,064 20,897,768 107,796,344
1996 691,713 8,010,547 8,204,715 26,621,280 14,594,115 66,539,997 24,545,970 127,023,396
1997 919,004 7,650,936 7,402,874 27,336,678 15,996,153 75,293,476 25,577,039 139,004,624
1998 656,351 6,814,085 5,358,862 28,942,131 19,256,612 82,076,084 26,592,225 145,758,745
1999 2,901,160 9,513,340 8,959,179 35,381,079 18,634,446 84,730,935 31,826,123 161,256,838
Table 3.22: Percentage of contracted services in Petach-Tikva (1991-1999)
Year
% Immigration, 
Environment 
Services 
Contracted
% Local 
Assets 
Contracted
% Sanitation 
Services 
Contracted
% Total Local 
Expenditures 
Contracted
1991 0% 15% 13% 13%
1992 0% 17% 13% 13%
1993 0% 11% 18% 13%
1994 9% 25% 28% 21%
1995 9% 27% 23% 19%
1996 9% 31% 22% 19%
1997 12% 27% 21% 18%
1998 10% 19% 23% 18%
1999 30% 25% 22% 20%
1 1 0
Table 3.23: Total sanitation expenditures (NIS), total contracted sanitation 
(NIS), percentages of contracted sanitation services in Beer-Sheva (1991-1998).
year
Total
Sanitaton
Expenditures
Total 
Expenditures on 
Contracted 
Sanitation 
Services
Percentages of 
Contracted 
Sanitation 
Services
1991 21,349,677 4,279,364 20.04%
1992 28,866,717 6,015,136 20.84%
1993 30,981,412 7,809,290 25.21%
1994 35,111,404 8,706,931 24.80%
1995 38,258,635 9,813,390 25.65%
1996 43,579,273 12,803,202 29.38%
1997 46,152,164 15,881,000 34.41%
1998 61,530,500 21,269,900 34.57%
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Chapter 4 
The Case of Tel-Aviv
Introduction
Tel-Aviv is the second largest city in Israel, with 348,245 residents.1 Between 1993- 
1998, the mayor of Tel-Aviv, like most local politicians in Israel, appointed political 
allies to key executive roles, in order to increase the responsiveness of certain 
agencies. Political appointees replaced those whom he saw as uncooperative 
bureaucrats, who were refusing to carry out structural changes and institute job cuts.
Based on interviews with key officials, municipal documents and contracting- 
out data, this chapter explores whether politicians, such as the mayor, were 
successful in their attempts to motivate the sanitation agency to contract-out services. 
The chapter examines: (1) the structural conditions that led the mayor of Tel-Aviv to 
initiate a reform of the sanitation services; (2) political and career appointments 
intended to transform the sanitation agency; (3) contracting-out achievements; and, 
(4) personnel and monitoring changes that occurred in 1997.
As revealed in this chapter, the politicians failed to reform services despite 
political allies being placed in charge of the sanitation agency. This failure was partly 
due to shirking by the mayor’s appointees. Shirking behaviour was facilitated by two 
main components: first, political appointees received greater discretion and leeway 
than career bureaucrats in managing their agencies. Second, some of the political 
agents found it extremely difficult to carry out such a complex process as they 
neither had the expertise needed to privatize services nor did they possess the 
knowledge of how to negotiate with unionized workers. Others shirked because they 
were preoccupied with political activities rather than their bureaucratic tasks.
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After four years of unsuccessful attempts by city management to create a 
responsive agency willing to contract-out sanitation services, partial implementation 
was finally achieved in 1997. The mayor replaced political appointees with an 
experienced sanitation worker, who was promoted to manage the agency. In addition, 
the mayor appointed a privatization expert as deputy city manager, to closely monitor 
the sanitation agency’s performance. Following these appointments, privatization 
negotiations begin with city employees and external sanitation contractors.
Structural conditions
The following section discusses the structural conditions that motivated mayor Milo 
to declare a privatization reform of sanitation services. These include Milo’s stated 
intention to reform services, promoted during his mayoral campaign. Other structural 
conditions include Milo’s plans to advance his future career in national level politics, 
residents’ complaints about the poor sanitation services, and central government 
pressure to reform them. The examination of the constraints under which Milo was 
operating allows an understanding of why he chose to politically appoint chief 
executives to manage sanitation services and how he chose to interact with his 
appointees during his years in office.
Local elections:
In the local elections of 1993, there was strong competition between the Labour 
(Avoda) candidate, Avigdor Kahalani and Roni Milo, representing an independent 
local party list. Milo won the election with 47.15% (62,553) of votes - only 6,170 
votes ahead of Kahalani (56,383). For many years, Milo had been a member of the 
Likud party. He had served both as a Knesset member and a minister in previous
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governments. However, the majority of Tel-Aviv residents are known to be loyal 
supporters of the left wing Avoda party. Therefore, Milo assumed that he would 
improve his chances of winning by disassociating himself from the Likud party.2 In 
order to do so, Milo formed an independent party that was not obligated to adhere to 
the central party’s political platform.
Although Milo chose to campaign with an independent party, the Likud party 
decided to support him as a candidate for mayor and did not run a candidate of its 
own. Milo welcomed the organizational and financial assistance o f the Likud party, 
but emphasized in public appearances that, as an independent candidate, he was not 
obligated to follow the Likud’s ideology and policies. Since most voters in Tel-Aviv 
are Labour supporters and at the time of the local elections (1993), the Labour party 
was in government, Kahalani, the Labour representative and a former army officer, 
tried to increase electoral support by convincing voters that a vote for him was also a 
vote for the central government. In other words, when supporting Kahalani, residents 
were supposedly being given an opportunity to show their support for central 
government performance. Therefore, Kahalani presented a platform that was 
concerned, not only with local issues, but with national politics as well.
Milo, on the other hand, tried to refrain from addressing national issues in his 
public interviews and speeches. In an attempt to reach broader electoral support of 
residents who were not Likud voters, he steered the debate to local concerns, by 
stating his intention of reforming the city’s transportation system and improving the 
appearance and cleanliness of the city. In addition, Milo emphasized his experience 
in ministerial roles and his ability to conduct such needed reform.3 Milo’s frequent 
declarations of his intention to reform services, in his public appearances, subjected 
him to pressure from the public and local media, urging him to keep his promises.
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Once in office, he set, as his first priority, the solution of the city transportation 
problems and the improvement of the cleanliness of the city. In order to meet his 
objectives, he asked the city management to come up with a plan to reform both 
services.
Political career in central government
While serving as mayor, Milo made strong efforts to fulfil the promises that he had 
made during his campaign, including the privatization of some services. He did so in 
order to be considered a competent, trustworthy leader, not only in the eyes of the 
voters of Tel-Aviv, but in the eyes of voters nation-wide, to pave his way back 
towards central government.4 Subsequently, in 1997, a year prior to the local 
elections, Milo claimed that he had no plans to compete again for mayor. Surveys at 
the time showed that his popularity had fallen and his chances of re-election were 
slight. In 1998, he moved on to join a newly formed independent national party 
(called the “Central Party”) and, in the 1999 elections, won a Knesset seat and 
became the Minister of Health.
Pressure by residents and central government to privatize services 
In a Tel-Aviv council meeting, council member Admon, in charge of oversight of 
sanitation services, claimed that management should hasten its plans to privatize the 
sanitation agency, in order to respond to complaints of constituents about the poor 
quality of the sanitation services they were receiving from the municipality.5 It was 
thought that replacing municipal sanitation workers with external contractors would 
improve the agency’s performance.
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Admon went on to inform the council that the Ministry of the Interior, which 
approves the city budget and provides financial support for new equipment and 
repairs to old sanitation vehicles, was reluctant to continue to do so, unless the 
agency could present a long-term plan to improve the performance of the agency. 
The Ministry of the Interior recommended that the sanitation agency undergo a 
privatization reform, in order to reduce the size of the municipality and reduce 
overall spending. The delay by the Ministry of the Interior in providing the needed 
financial support restricted the agency’s activities: e.g., sanitation vehicles that broke 
down could not be fixed and failed to carry out their shifts.
Sequence of events (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2 in Appendix)
The attempts to contract out sanitation services
From 1993 to 1998, city management (i.e. mayor, deputies, city manager) tried to 
amend service provision, while reducing municipal budget deficits. City management 
directed its efforts at reorganizing sanitation services, reconstructing local assets 
(e.g., gardens, roads and municipal buildings), as well as trying to solve 
transportation problems. With the limited resources available, it was hoped to 
accomplish such goals by changing the “working culture” in which employees 
attended the municipality for only a few hours a day (e.g., an average of 4 hours a 
day for sanitation workers) even though they were receiving high wages and benefits.
The following section presents the attempts of city management to reform 
sanitation services in the years 1993-1998. A number of key players were involved in 
the process: (1) Mr. Roni Milo - the mayor, who was elected in 1993; (2) Mr. Meir 
Doron - city manager, in charge of the administration; (3) Mr. Avi Steinmitch - 
deputy city manager (1993-1994); (4) Mr. Samuel Shachar - deputy city manager in
1 2 0
charge of sanitation (1996-1997); (5) Heads of the sanitation agency: Mr. Moshe 
Paz (1987- 1995); Mr. Avi Steinmitch (1995-1996); Mr. Anatol Shpiegel (mid 
1996-1997); Mr. Amit Yefet (1997-2001).
In 1993, as mentioned earlier, when Milo took up his mayoral post, he was 
seeking to fulfil the promises he had made to his constituents to reform sanitation 
services. At the time, he welcomed any suggestions from city management as to how 
to achieve such goal - privatization was just one option among many that were 
considered. Milo was hoping that, with sanitation workers and union, he would be 
able to negotiate an improvement in their performance and that he would be able to 
encourage sanitation managers to be responsive to his demands.
However, Milo was unsuccessful in his attempts to revise sanitation services. 
Workers in the agency, as well as the sanitation union, did not welcome any 
reorganization that aimed at setting up new working habits, or would decrease their 
wages and benefits.6 In a council meeting (December 1996), Milo complained that, 
for three years, he had been trying to negotiate changes in the sanitation agency, but 
that the workers had refused to accept even minor changes. The agency’s workers, 
with the support of the union, would not allow management either to allocate
n
workers to alternative municipal projects, or to fire them.
Until the end of 1996, not only were sanitation employees unwilling to
change their work patterns in the agency, but, with the assistance o f the municipal
union, tried to prevent Milo from turning the provision of services over to private 
8 •contractors. For the sanitation workers and their representatives, the head of the 
municipal union, Arnon Bar David, and the sanitation union representative, Amit 
Yefet, the contracting-out of services was considered non-negotiable, a line which 
sanitation workers were not willing to cross.9 Furthermore, in his attempts to reform
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services, Milo encountered unresponsive sanitation managers. In 1993, the 
incumbent head of the sanitation agency was Moshe Paz, who closely conformed to 
one of Down’s types of bureaucrat - a “conserver”, close to retirement.10 When Milo 
approached Paz with a request to improve the performance of his agency, Paz chose 
to ignore his demands and shifted policy, by recruiting new workers and purchasing 
new vehicles. As a conserver, he was not willing to engage in potential conflict with 
workers over wages or work schedules.11 An alternative, privatization solution, was 
unacceptable to Paz as well. At this stage of his career, he was not willing to dedicate 
his time to such a complicated project. The deputy city manager at the time, Samuel 
Shachar, claims:
Moshe Paz had a problem, because he was stubbornly against
contracting- out. He tried to expend the sanitation agency as much
as possible, especially during his years as head of the agency -
more workers, equipment, budgets. The only reason that he
accepted a bit of a shift o f services to contractors, was in order to
comply with the mayor’s demands, but even then, he kept asking
1 ^
for more trucks and other equipment.
Due to the sanitation manager’s uncooperative behaviour, Milo decided, in 
1995, to grant Paz early retirement, so a new executive could be hired to manage the 
sanitation agency. In 1995, Milo transferred his friend and associate, Avi Steinmitch,
13from deputy city manager, to sanitation agency manager. At the appointment stage, 
Milo asked Steinmitch to make strong efforts to reform the agency. A year later, 
Milo realized that his political agent was not meeting his demands. In fact, 
Steinmitch had chosen to shirk neither by making any attempt to revise services, nor 
to sign contracts with external services suppliers. The head of the sanitation agency 
between 1997-2002, Amit Yefet, claims that:
1 2 2
In the period o f time in which Steinmitch was the head of the 
agency, nothing happened... Steinmitch only wanted quiet, 
“industrial tranquillity” ... nothing changed in the management of 
the agency, the field workers regained their power to control the 
agency, and the city became dirtier.14
By 1996, sanitation workers still remained on a four-hour a day schedule and 
citizens continued to receive poor quality services.15 Instead of enacting the reform, 
Steinmitch spent most of his time promoting his own political career. According to 
Samuel Shachar:
He (Steinmitch) is a political man, without any managerial 
background, other than some public relation skills and he knows 
how to be nice to people. He entered the sanitation agency and 
created tension between workers...all sorts of give and take 
methods, including political promises, in order to control the 
agency. He was able to behave this way because he received 
political support (from management)... Steinmitch was not 
professional, whatever he touched he ruined, caused managers to 
fight and overall, was not able to make the progress expected 
from him.16
In the same year, Milo asked Steinmitch to return to his previous role as 
deputy city manager, politically appointing Mr. Anatol Shpiegel as the new 
sanitation manager. Shpiegel, a former army officer, was appointed partly on the 
basis of his acquaintance with city manager, Meir Doron, and with deputy city 
manager, Steinmitch.17 In addition, Milo hoped that his past experience in the army 
would help Shpiegel to solve discipline problems in the sanitation agency.
It took only nine months for city management to realize that Shpiegel was 
unfit to manage the sanitation agency. His attempts to apply military style
123
management created a hostile environment in the agency, which prevented any
improvement in workers’ performance. Shpiegel was considered patronizing and
detached, with no real understanding of how to deliver public services. Former city
manager, Meir Doron, shares his impression of Shpiegel:
His analytical abilities were fine, but the way he talked... 
patronizing, dismissing workers, dismissing the management. We 
(management) knew how to handle him but with the workers, 
there was a big crisis... after close to a year, we realized it was 
not going to work out.18
Amit Yefet recalls how Shpiegel treated the workers of the agency when
serving as head of sanitation:
Shpiegel is best remembered by workers for his utterance, “Don’t 
you dare call me here about garbage, I don’t deal with garbage”.19
Shpiegel dismissed the idea of contracting-out services, stubbornly asserting
that reorganizing the agency and disciplining workers would lead to better results.20
Eventually, the workers choose to completely ignore his requests, leading him to
abandon his plans and maintain the status quo. Steinmitch claims:
In the period of time that Shpiegel was the head of the sanitation 
agency, nothing was done; he did not make any changes in the 
agency.21
In 1997, following the lack of cooperation by the heads of sanitation (Paz, 
Shpiegel, Steinmitch) and their workers, Milo decided to take certain major steps.
First, he replaced his deputy city manager, Steinmitch, with Samuel Shachar, who
22was to act as operational manager in charge of sanitation. Shachar was expected to 
take the initial steps needed to reform services and, once they were contracted-out, to
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monitor the performance of the agency.23 Milo’s choice of Shachar was based on his 
20 years experience in the municipality, as chief engineering administrator, and due 
to his reputation as a “reformer”. Over the years, Shachar had reformed the City 
Appearance agency, including reducing the work force by 450 municipal workers.24
Since sanitation manager Shpiegel was unwilling to comply with city 
management to contract out services, Milo and Shachar called on Shpiegel to resign. 
In his place, they promoted Amit Yefet to manage the agency, hoping that his 15 
years experience of delivering sanitation services and his activities in the municipal 
union, would serve to improve the agency.25 However, city management was hesitant 
to support Milo’s decision, considering Yefet untrustworthy, as he had been part of 
the negotiation team that had prevented the privatization o f the agency over the 
years. However, Shachar and Milo were confident that they could persuade Yefet to 
reform services.
At the time, Milo organized a press conference, at which he presented 
agreements signed with contractors. On November 24, 1997, Mayor Milo decided to 
contract-out the sanitation services, over the protests of the agency workers against 
the reform. That same day, the sanitation workers began a strike with the support of 
their fellow municipal workers. The protest reached a high level of violence, when 
workers tried to destroy contracted sanitation vehicles, to block access to street 
cleaners and to harass workers who cooperated with contractors.
Regardless of the violent protest, soon after his appointment, Yefet prevailed 
and, with the assistance of Shachar, began to work with contractors to provide 
sanitation services in some of the neighbourhoods in the city.26 Yefet was also able 
to negotiate an end to the strike, with the assistance of Shachar. He was placed in 
charge of the contracting-out process and negotiated new working terms with
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municipal workers. Sanitation workers welcomed Yefet’s promotion, since they
considered him a trustworthy colleague, with their best interests in mind. Steinmitch
recalls how Yefet treated workers:
Yefet was incredible with the workers, he had very good relations 
with them... for the workers, it was easy to accept the authority of 
Yefet as he was “one of them”.27
In his first years as head of agency, he reduced the size of the sanitation 
28agency by 400 workers.
Contracting-out achievements
Tel-Aviv mainly contracted-out services, such as Local Assets, Security and
9QSanitation. In sanitation, although city management had set high targets for 
privatization, by 1999-2000, the budget reports were still showing inefficient results 
o f only 14%-15% contracted services. However, this does not necessarily mean that 
the agency had not advanced its privatization plans. An examination of the budget 
books for 1999-2001, reveals that the agency considerably increased its expenditures 
for compensation fees paid to those sanitation personnel who were offered an early 
retirement scheme. Furthermore, by 2000, the agency began to rely much more 
heavily on daily workers from external human resource companies, instead of tenure 
track workers. Consequently, in the short-term, the expenditures on contracted 
services continue to remain low, in comparison to the overall budget spent in the
30agency; thus, percentages of privatization seem low. Amit Yefet recalls:
My plan for the agency was approved by Milo (but at the end of 
his political term), so it was introduced again and carried out in 
1999- the plan led to a reduction of 330 workers...Street
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sweeping was contracted-out, not to the extent that I wished it to 
be, but this is just the beginning ...In 1998, I stopped new 
recruitment o f (tenure track) workers to the agency.
Discussion
The political appointment of sanitation managers undertaken by the mayor of Tel- 
Aviv failed to achieve its goals. At the appointment stage, both Anatol Shpiegel and 
Avi Steinmitch had agreed to take the steps needed to revise services.31 This policy 
agreement and past acquaintance with both agents led Milo to trust his appointees to 
comply with his requests. As a result, Milo did not specify methods of reform, such 
as privatization, but relied on his political agents to choose efficient mechanisms.32
It took a while before city management detected the lack of responsiveness 
by its political agents. Relaxed monitoring conditions over appointees’ activities, 
especially those of Steinmitch, limited the mayor's ability to spot uncooperative 
behaviour. Interaction with Steinmitch consisted mainly of a few monthly informal 
meetings, in which the mayor expressed his hopes of achieving sanitation 
improvements, but did not request any detailed plans from Steinmitch. Eventually, 
Milo and the city management realized that Steinmitch had not invested even a 
minimum effort in transforming the sanitation services.
On the other hand, Shpiegel who replaced Steinmitch in 1996, seemed 
motivated to improve the performance of the agency. While city management was 
monitoring the sanitation agency more closely than in the past, it still did not insist 
that the agency come up with a constructive plan to privatize services. City 
management allowed Shpiegel to find ways to improve the performance of workers, 
based on his military experience. However, shortly after his appointment,
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management realized that Shpiegel did not have the managerial skills needed to 
reform services and that his attempts to discipline sanitation workers were a failure.
In 1996, after realizing that sanitation workers and their appointed managers 
were either unwilling or incapable of managing the agency, city management began 
to pressure it to contract-out services. However, for deputy city manager Stienmitch, 
and sanitation manager Shpiegel, the contracting-out process seemed to be too
33difficult to implement, and they rejected the process.
In 1997, mayor Milo made some major personnel changes. He appointed
Amit Yefet and Samuel Shachar to reform the sanitation services. Yefet was
appointed to the executive role of the agency, not only due to his agreement to
contract-out services, but also because he had the knowledge and experience
necessary to successfully implement the reform. His qualifications differed
dramatically then those of the previous political appointees. Amit Yefet seemed to
skilfully solve the principal-agent problem that the previous sanitation managers had
difficulty overcoming. Yefet had the inside knowledge, as a past union leader, a
better understanding of the agency activities as an experienced worker in the agency
and, most important, the trust of the agency’s workers. Yefet can be considered a
“climber”, highly motivated to reform services and advance his career on the basis of
his success in the sanitation agency. In addition, Yefet was able to receive full
cooperation from workers to improve service provision, when he introduced the
term: “gradual privatization”. Samual Shachar recalls:
I think he (Yefet) considered the sanitation agency a stepping 
stone for his career, even though he had been the head of the 
union, he thought that with the managerial role in the sanitation 
agency, he could advance his career.34
128
An additional change that Mayor Milo made was to monitor closely the
activities of the sanitation agency. Monitoring was achieved by a number of
methods: (1) Milo offered Yefet an “open door” to his office with any requests or
assistance;35 (2) Milo appointed a deputy city manager, Samuel Shachar, to assist
Yefet with the privatization plan and closely monitor Yefet’s performance. With
Shachar’s appointment, management sought to ensure that Yefet did not shift
policies or shirk from his responsibilities; (3) Together with Yefet and Shachar, city
management formed a structured, detailed contracting-out program for sanitation
services.36 Shachar notes:
Milo was hoping that I would be the one to privatize the agency.
He knew that I am stubborn and not afraid of the workers... I 
worked alone for a month, without involving Shpiegel, then Yefet 
replaced him as head of agency and we worked together... Yefet 
and I got along very well - together we hoped to privatize at least 
30% of the agency as a starting point.37
Summary
The case of Tel-Aviv demonstrates the theoretical arguments presented in chapter 2. 
Policy agreement at the appointment stage, to reform services, between the mayor 
and his political appointees is not a sufficient mechanism for creating responsive 
agencies. In the case of Tel-Aviv it is clear that for the political appointees the 
contracting-out process was more difficult to implement than for the career agent 
who followed them. The appointees lacked the skills and experience required to carry 
out such a reform or were otherwise engaged in political activities. Overall, the 
shirking behaviour demonstrated in this case is consistent with the argument that 
political appointees are likely to shirk, when they lack the expertise needed to 
manage such complicated reorganization procedures for public services.
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Another variable that hinders the implementation of reforms by political 
agents is the interaction with management. In this instance, city management relied 
on its political appointees to fulfil its wishes and relaxed the monitoring of the 
agency in the process- an approach that was not applied by management towards its 
career agents, due to lack of trust. As a result, not only were the political appointees 
reluctant to revise services, they were able to work under conditions in which they 
freely pursued alternative political goals, while still serving as heads of the agency. 
This behaviour continued undetected for a while, during which the appointees were 
not required to answer for their actions.
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Appendix
Table 4.1: Timetable of events and outcomes in the sanitation agency in Tel-
Aviv (1993-1998)
Appointments Events and Outcomes
1993 Roni Milo is elected as mayor of 
Tel-Aviv
Mayor Milo appoints:
Meir Doron as City Manager and Avi 
Steinmitch as Deputy City Manager.
Milo declares a reform for the sanitation 
agency.
Moses Paz: the head of the sanitation 
agency refuses to adopt the reform.
End of 1994 Moses Paz is fired, 
Steinmitch (Deputy City Manager) is 
appointed as the temporary head of the 
sanitation agency.
Status quo remains: Steinmitch does not 
contract out services.
1996 Anatol Shpiegel is appointed as 
head of agency.
After 9 months in office, Shpiegel is 
fired.
Milo appoints Samuel Shachar as a 
Deputy City Manager in charge of 
sanitation services (Steinmitch remains 
Deputy City Manager, but he is no 
longer in charge of sanitation services)
Shpiegel tries to make changes in the 
agency but cannot deal with the protests 
of workers.
Shachar bypass Shpiegel and makes the 
first steps of contracting-out- signs 
contracts with sanitation companies.
Workers protest against the attempts made 
by Shachar to contract-out services, by 
starting a strike.
Shachar and Milo negotiate with Amit 
Yefet, the head of the union, to stop the 
strikes.
1997 Amit Yefet is appointed as head 
of the sanitation agency
End of the workers’ strike.
Yefet continues Shachar’s program and 
contracts-out services.
Table 4.2: Profiles of sanitation managers in Tel-Aviv (1993-1998)
City Agents Type of appoint.1
Skills and 
experience'
Policy 
agreement 
reached at the 
appointment 
stage
Level of 
monitoring1" Outcomes
Tel-
Aviv
M. Paz C.E. high no medium shifting
A. Steinmitch P.A. low yes low shirking
A. Shpiegel P.A. medium yes medium 0 shifting,v
A. Yefet C.E. high yes high cooperate
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i. C.E - Career Executive, P. A- Political Appointee.
ii. Levels of skills and experience were mainly determined on the basis of 
interviews with key players, who provided information regarding the players’ 
professional and managerial skills, and their experience in the municipality or in 
the public, and private sectors.
iii. Level of monitoring is determined as follow:
High level: frequent meetings with management and council members - at least 
twice a week and often even daily. Frequent review of reports and plans of the 
agency.
Medium level: meetings are less frequent - once or twice a week, a few requests 
for reports (annual report, quarterly report). Reports and plans are usually 
presented to management when/if the head of the agency initiates their 
presentation.
Low level: rare meetings, no demands of reports, management does not include 
the head of the agency in meetings. A few unofficial, general talks, instead of 
formal operational planning. For example: a verbal request from the mayor to “do 
something to clean the city” .
iv. “0” (zero) shifting means that the policy remains at the status quo, because the 
agent is unsuccessful in forwarding his plans for the agency. It does not mean 
that he is shirking.
Lists of interviews conducted in the city of Tel-Aviv:
• Mr. Meir Doron, City Manager, (09/07/01)
• Mr. Avi Steinmitch, Deputy city manager in charge of Infrastructure 
(and Sanitation),
• Head of Sanitation (1995-1996), (15/05/01)
• Mr. Samuel Shachar, Deputy City Manager, Operational Executive in 
charge of Sanitation, (14/05/01)
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• Mr. Moshe Paz, Head of Sanitation, (1987-1995), (08/05/01)
• Mr. Amit Yefet, Head of Sanitation, (1997-2002), (17/05/01)
• Mr. Arnon Bar David- Chairman of the municipal union (17/03/98)
• Mr. Gershon Gelman- Chairman, Tel-Aviv branch o f the "Histadrut" 
(17/03/98).
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Notes
1. Central Bureau of Statistics, 1999.
2. Barzilai, 1997:157.
3. Barzilai, 1997:157-159.
4 In interviews with local newspapers at the time, workers in the sanitation agency 
claimed that Milo’s insistence on privatizing services demonstrated his attempts to 
increase electoral support in the coming election, by showing that, as promised, he was 
making strong attempts to clean up the city, despite the resistance of municipal workers 
to his efforts. The workers claimed, “If Milo would invest in sanitation services half the 
time he spent on running for government, Tel-Aviv would be sparkling clean” (5.12.97 
Hadashot Newspaper).
5. Council meeting no.70 26.01.97 pg.36-37.
6. The union of the sanitation agency is the strongest union in the municipality. “The
workers refused changes and in order to deal with their protest, they were ‘bought off
by signing new agreements with the workers” (Moshe Paz interview).
1. Council meeting no.68/ 29.12.96 pg. 136-138.
8. According to the workers involved in the negotiation process, the union offered Milo 17 
bargaining terms, in which they were willing to accept some organizational changes, 
including: more control by city management over the activities of the agency, stronger
monitoring procedures, e.g., introducing time clocks to monitor the hours that each
worker spent in the work place. Section 18 in the negotiation terms proposed a partial 
contracting-out of sanitation services. Milo and the CEO (Doron) insisted that at least 
partial privatization had to be accepted by the workers. The workers however, were 
determined not to accept any deal that included privatization of services.
9. 5.12.97 Hadashot Newspaper.
10. Paz worked in the municipality from 1964 until 1995. In 1969, he entered the sanitation
agency as a maintenance (technical) manager. Later on, he was promoted to deputy
chief executive of the sanitation agency and in 1987, to the head of the agency, until his 
retirement in 1995.
“Paz was a technician, a technocrat, he climbed from the bottom and knew the job” 
(Meir Doron).
u . “Paz had a very bad relationship with the agency’s workers, he was patronizing...when 
I arrived to the municipality the first thing that I tried to do was to replace Paz ... I had 
a few meetings with him in order to guide him how to function in the agency, but he
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would not listen - he said, “that’s the way I am, take it or leave it.” (Interview with Avi 
Steinmitch).
“His level of professionalism was very high. Before he became the head of the 
sanitation agency, there was no discipline, managers did not manage, drivers did what 
ever they wished to do... Paz concentrated on increasing discipline in the agency ...The 
attempts to discipline the agency caused much friction between Paz and the workers. 
Another problem was that Paz concentrated only on discipline and not on outputs (Amit 
Yefet).
“ ... Management supported Paz... when Paz was the head of the agency the 
management of the agency was able to do its job, but after the elections of 1993 things 
started to change - field workers regained their power. This was possible because it was 
clear to all that it is just a matter of time before Paz would be replaced by city 
management. ” (Interview with Amit Yefet).
12. Interview with Samuel Shachar.
13. Main role: Operational Deputy CEO in charge of city inspection, sanitation, 
immigration, and business licenses. In addition, Steinmitch replaced the head of the 
sanitation agency, Moses Paz, from 1995 until 1996.
14 Interview with Amit Yefet
“Steinmitch was not professional, a political figure, a Likud member...in my opinion he 
was incompetent, unreliable, he was a friend of the drivers of the agency, did not show 
up at the municipality in order to work, but rather to have fun...” (Interview with Meir 
Doron).
15. “Some of the municipal workers refer to Steinmitch as the “town sheriff’, sitting in 
coffee houses with influential businessmen and politicians. “He (Steinmitch) wanted to 
be respected in the eyes of the mayor, he wanted to clean up the city, but had absolutely 
no plan, nothing”... “he only used his role to be the 'town sheriff” (Interview with 
Samuel Shachar).
16. Interview with Samuel Shachar.
17. “Shpiegel was an army man, external to the system, his connections were helpful to 
gain him entry to the municipality.” (Interview with Moses Paz).
“He (Shpiegel) was a professional man from the army.” (Interview with Samuel 
Shachar).
“I accepted Shpiegel, I knew him from the army”. (Interview with Meir Doron).
“Shpiegel was my army officer, I interviewed him, I was a bit concerned about his 
social skills, but in the end, we decided to accept him for the agency.” (Interview with 
Avi Steinmitch).
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1S. Interview with Meir Doron
19. Interview with Amit Yefet.
“His bad human relations did not allow him to succeed, to be part of the agency like the 
rest. ...He continued with the same concepts as Paz and therefore did not receive 
professional and financial support from management. Eventually, Milo was 
disappointed.” (Interview with Samuel Shachar).
20. Shpiegel’s preferences on contracting out:
Q: Did Shpiegel support privatization?
A: “No, he was not supportive of privatization, because he was from the army and 
wished to conduct an army system in the municipality.” (Interview with Samuel 
Shachar)
21. Interview with Avi Steinmitch.
“Shpiegel had no clue what went on in the agency. Uncooperative personnel came to the 
agency with a concept of “justice from home” of right and wrong. The discussions in 
his office were not conducted as “brain storming”, because we were not allowed to say
anything, even though most of us knew that his ideas made no sense. Most of his
decisions had no connection to reality, they were not operational, he set unrealistic
targets...” (Interview with Amit Yefet).
22. Samuel Shachar's 25 years professional experience in Tel-Aviv municipality: Head of 
city Appearance agency (1988); Head of construction and infrastructure administration 
(a role that is equivalent to city engineer) (1994); Deputy city manager in charge of 
sanitation services (1996).
23. “When I started to work as the deputy city manager for sanitation services, Milo said he 
was unhappy about the fact that the city was not clean and wished to privatize the 
agency. He said, “I want contractors... ” (Samuel Shachar interview).
24. “When the big strike started, we brought Shachar in to help, he was not afraid, he was
familiar with the city, ready to work day and night, a “Class A” operational man.”
(Interview with Meir Doron).
Preferences on contracting-out:
“When I was in charge of the City Appearance agency, you can say that I contracted-out 
a considerable amount of the services, I reduced the size of the agency by 450 workers.” 
(Interview with Samuel Shachar).
25. Previous work in the municipality: driver in the sanitation agency, head of the union.
“Milo called me and asked if I could take the role of head of the agency... he knew me 
from a year earlier, at the time of the strike, when we had round-the-clock discussions, 
as I was the head of the union.” (Interview with Amit Yefet)
136
“ ...Yefet was a driver, a simple worker with lots of experience and very good
relationships with other workers. As head of the agency, he knew how to be responsive
to workers.” (Interview with Avi Steinmitch).
26. “...Sanitation personnel, who had always been against contractors, finally understood 
that it is much easier to work with contractors... my workers started to use freely the 
term that I introduced of “gradual privatization”. (Amit Yefet Interview).
27. Interview with Avi Steinmitch.
“Workers trusted Yefet, because he had worked with them in the past, but they also
assumed that they could control him. On the other hand, he knew the workers, so he had
good ability to control t h e m . . .” (Interview with Samuel Shachar).
28. “...Yefet and I worked together... we got along very well...we wanted to make a change 
even if it was only 30%, the city was in a bad shape, very dirty, we were able to buy 
new equipment and push privatization further.” (Interview with Samuel Shachar).
29. See Figures 3.3 and 3.4 and Tables 3.15 and 3.16 of percentage of contracted services in 
Tel-Aviv, in chapter 3.
30. Tel-Aviv Ordinary Budget Proposal, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002.
31. “It is very difficult to know what his (Steinmitch) preferences were... he gave out all 
possible messages - support of contracting-out in one place, against contractors in 
another - it always dependent on who participated in the meeting. Avi (Steinmitch) used 
the tactic of “everybody is right”. He would agree with who ever he spoke to last.” 
(Interview with Amit Yefet).
32. Q: “Before you took on the role of the head of the sanitation agency, did Milo try to 
convince you to contract out services?”
A: “No, he just said that he wanted me to prove my claims that I could clean the city 
with the same workers... ” (Avi Steinmitch interview).
Q: “Did Milo try to convince you to contract-out services?”
A: “Milo did not try to convince me to contract-out services... I made it clear to 
management that when I’d be alone (as the head of the agency) there would be no 
discussions about contractors, I had to learn the subject (sanitation agency) and I would 
make sure that the agency did a good job. (Avi Steinmitch interview).
33. “I was against hiring contractors, because I assumed that the existing personnel of the 
agency needed to prove that they were capable of cleaning the city and there was no 
need for contractors.”(Avi Steinmitch interview).
“ ... Later on, Milo insisted on implementing the contracting-out reform and I resisted, 
so I asked Milo to replace me.”
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“Milo thought that he could convince me to contract-out services, Milo and I have been 
friends for more than 30 years and he thought that the friendship, dinners,...that he 
would be able to make me surrender to the demands of contracting-out, but I was very 
stubborn.” (Avi Steinmitch interview).
34 Interview with Samuel Shachar
“ ...Politicians think of the city for as long as their political term, whereas, I visualize 10 
years ahead-I always plan as far as I can.” (Amit Yefet interview)
35. Interaction with management and agency workers:
Interview with Amit Yefet:
“I asked for one thing before taking the role of head of agency, I wanted an open door to 
the mayor’s office, because I thought that high ranked executives in the municipality 
might try to stop my projects. Milo agreed and he allowed me free access to his office 
until the end of his term... ”
“I had problems with the perception of management (city manager and his deputies). I 
knew that if I wanted to work in a professional way, I’d have to bypass the professional 
ranks above me. For example: the sanitation agency is very involved politically in the 
municipality and city. I knew that if I demanded that managers in the agency take 
responsibility for their actions, they would turn to their political connections; council 
members, executives, and try to stop me. Milo said “no politics in the agency, what ever 
Yefet decides to do, I’ll support him. And he kept his promise throughout the year until 
he left... ” (Amit Yefet interview).
“There was a stage when management noticed that I was receiving support from the 
mayor and started to support me as well. I reached a stage that any decision I made was 
accepted. I made it clear that any decision regarding the sanitation agency must involve 
me, nobody in the municipality could make a decision without consulting me, so in 
away, I made life easier for management. Whenever they were politically pressured on 
issues of the agency, they said “Sorry, talk to Yefet, he makes the decisions now” (Amit 
Yefet interview).
36. In a council meeting on 12.01.97, council members were discussing the need to re­
organize the sanitation services and increase monitoring procedures of the work of the 
agency. The discussion of the city council led to the decision that the management of 
the city (mayor, deputies, city manager) had to come up with a re-organizational plan 
for the sanitation agency and bring the program to the council for approval. (Council 
meeting no.69 12.01.97 pg.23-25).
In the council meeting that was held on 26.01.97, the council asked Admon (council 
member in charge of sanitation) why the agency had not improved its performance since
138
the beginning of Milo’s political term in 1993. Admon explained that city management 
had not come up with a clear, well-organized plan for the sanitation agency. However, 
after 4 years in office, Milo was finally taking charge and trying to solve the problem, 
by taking more vigorous steps to contract-out sanitation services (Council meeting 
no.81 23.11.97 pg.35).
37. Samuel Shachar interview.
139
Chapter 5 
The Case of Holon
Introduction
Holon is a city located in central Israel, close to Tel-Aviv. It is one of the 10 largest 
cities in Israel, with 185,000 residents.1 Between 1993 and 1998, the city 
management of Holon tried to direct the administration towards privatizing local 
services. In this process, the mayor of Holon replaced the non-compliant head of the 
sanitation agency with a political appointee. However, in his first three years in 
office, the new politically appointed agent did not respond to the demands of 
management to advance the reform. He chose to shirk and avoid confrontations with 
the municipal union. In 1994, Holon instituted an organisational reform that hindered 
the cooperation of agencies over the policy of contracting-out services. Under the 
new structure, the appointee’s shirking behaviour continued, undetected. In 1996, 
both institutional modifications by management and adjustments to key players’ 
interests, motivated the sanitation manager to reform the services.
The discussion on the city of Holon, presented in this chapter, is based on 
interviews with key officials and municipal data. The chapter examines the city 
management’s attempts to create responsive administration in contracting-out 
services. These include: (1) careerist and political appointments that were made 
during the reform years of 1993-1998 in the sanitation agency; (2) the privatization 
outcomes that were achieved in the sanitation services; (3) the organizational reform 
of 1994; and, (4) the institutional modifications made by the city management in 
1996.
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Sequence of events (See Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 in Appendix)
In 1994, Holon underwent organizational reforms aimed at redistributing power 
between administrative executives and political officials, to improve service 
provision in the city. The first reform initiated by elected representatives aimed at 
decreasing the control of bureaucratic agencies over service provision, by moving 
services from in-house to contract-based mechanisms. The second organizational 
reform initiated by administrative executives, with the support o f the mayor, was 
designed to decrease the ongoing involvement of council members in the work of 
bureaucratic agencies. As the next sections reveal, understanding the stages of 
contracting-out implementation and the change in organizational structure, and 
assessing the achievements of the reform, enable us to explore the reasons for the 
failure of management to motivate its agents to reform services.
The contracting-out reform
In 1994, city management decided to contract-out most of its services, including 
sanitation. Management set two objectives for the reform: (1) reducing the cost of 
service provision; and, (2) improving the quality of service. In order to cut down 
expenses, management planned to reduce the municipal work force, stop the 
purchase o f new machinery, and move the responsibility for updating of machinery 
to the contractors. To improve the quality of services, monitoring was increased, to 
closely supervise the performance of contractors.
A number of key players were involved with the attempts to privatize 
sanitation services between 1993-1998: (1) Mayor Moti Sasson, the incumbent 
Mayor of Holon, elected in 1993; (2) Mrs. Hanna Hertzman, the incumbent city 
manager, serving as the head of administration, who was appointed in 1993; (3) Mr.
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Meir Lavi, the deputy city manager, in charge of infrastructure (including the 
sanitation agency), appointed in 1994; (4) Mr. Arnon Shaul, the incumbent head of 
the sanitation agency, who was appointed in 1994.
In 1993, the new mayor o f Holon, Moti Sasson, expressed his intention to 
contract-out municipal services.2 In the process of monitoring the sanitation agency, 
Mayor Sasson had detected shifts of policy by the incumbent manager o f sanitation, 
who was not complying with the requests of management to privatize services. After 
a year of failing to secure cooperation with the incumbent manager, Mayor Sasson 
decided that personnel changes had to be made in the agency.
Attempting to proceed with his privatization plans, Sasson replaced the
manager in 1994, with a new political appointee, Mr. Arnon Shaul. At the time of
the appointment, Shaul was still serving as a leader o f the municipal union. However,
interviews conducted with officials in the city suggest that, despite Shaul’s
involvement in the union, the Mayor considered him a trusted political ally and
friend. Prior to the election of 1993, as a mayoral candidate, Sasson had received
assistance from Shaul, who was able to convince municipal workers to support him
for mayor. Arnon Shaul recalls:
He (the mayor) ran for office and I supported him. We have an 
informal relationship based on our acquaintance...when he was 
still deputy mayor, there was chemistry and we became friends, I 
was his protege... As the head of the union, I politically 
supported Sasson (the mayor)... I was in the city for many years, 
a close friend of the mayor, until his election... I followed him for 
many years, even when he was still a deputy mayor.
In the same year, city management appointed a construction engineer, Mr. 
Meir Lavi, as Deputy City Manager in charge o f infrastructure. Mr. Lavi’s
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responsibilities included monitoring the performance of the sanitation agency. The 
appointment of Lavi was based on merit, as he was considered a qualified candidate 
for the job, in terms of skill and experience, with no political connections to the 
appointment committee.4
From 1995 to 1996, the sanitation agency policy remained at the status quo, 
because Shaul was shirking and did not undertake the necessary steps to contract-out 
services. He continued to work on the basis of existing programs and with existing 
personnel. However, in 1996, management decided to form its own contracting-out 
plan for the sanitation agency. A joint team of city management and sanitation 
executives met to construct a detailed step-by-step program for privatization. The 
team put Shaul and deputy city manager, Lavi, in charge of implementing the 
program.5
The detailed program for the sanitation agency was designed to move 
services over to a contract-based mechanism. Private contractors were to deliver 
services to the public, under the inspection of the municipality. Overall, it was hoped 
that the city would work with external contractors and with fewer municipal 
personnel. In order to achieve this goal, city management began negotiating the 
terms of privatization with the union. Management realized the importance of 
reaching an agreement regarding the plans with the union, in order to avoid potential 
protest of workers to the implementation steps. Negotiations opened with a set of 
meetings, with Shaul acting as an informal arbitrator. Management promised to make 
all possible efforts to allocate sanitation personnel to alternative jobs, once the 
privatization reform had been carried out.6
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Contracting-out achievements
As a result of the program that was set up in 1996, city management succeeded in 
motivating its agents to make efforts to reform services. The city achieved partial 
contracting-out results by 1997, continuing in 1998, including the “Gardening” and 
“City Appearance” agencies and nearly 45% of the sanitation services.7 Overall, 
Holon cut the number of permanent municipal workers by two-thirds, from 1800 to 
600. At the same time, the city hired 1,000 temporary staff, employed by external 
human resource companies and by the contractors themselves.8
Organizational reform
To go back to 1994, in that year, the Mayor and city manager of Holon decided to 
restructure the roles and responsibilities of chief executives in the municipality. The 
reform aimed at returning to the formal decision-making process of the 1950s and 
focused on three main bodies: (1) City Management: consisting of the mayor, three 
deputy-mayors and the city manager; (2) The Council: with twenty-seven members, 
working in committees advising the city management; and: (3) an Administrative 
Unit, including the city manager with 7 deputy managers.
Contrary to most local governments in Israel (including those o f Tel-Aviv 
and Beer-Sheva), Holon has thus formalized ,an organizational structure, restricting 
the involvement of council members in the operational stage of service provision. In 
most cities, council members are not only in charge o f forming policy, but also take 
an active part in implementation stages. Some of the members are assigned to a 
service portfolio, making them responsible for monitoring the performance of 
agencies and ensuring efficient implementation.
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As elaborated in Chapter 3, both administrators and council members often 
complain of too much interference in each other’s work. Administrators claim that 
council members tend to deviate from their formal monitoring responsibility and 
pressure agencies to implement policies that serve the interests of specific groups 
represented by council members. These new demands do not allow agencies to carry 
out former long-term plans, as set by city management. On the other hand, council 
members complain that administrative units fail to implement the policies decided 
upon and, therefore, closer inspection of their work is required. The on-going 
involvement of council members in the work of bureaucratic agencies creates tension 
between council members and the mayor. While the mayor instructs the 
administration to implement certain programs, council members might push for 
different programs. In Holon, this frequent interference eventually led the mayor and 
administrators to join hands in 1994, and form a structure to block the access of 
council members to agencies. Council members were no longer assigned to service 
portfolios and their involvement was restricted to participation in the advisory policy 
committees. Participation in committees allowed the politicians to advise and even 
influence city management on matters regarding services, but not to formally 
demand changes.
145
Diagram 5.1: Old organizational structure of Holon
Mayor Council
Agencies
City Manager Deputies and Council Members (in charge 
of services)
Diagram 5.1 illustrates the old form of interaction between key players in the city of 
Holon, prior to the organizational reform of 1994. The diagram shows how the 
mayor, city manager and council members in charge of a “portfolio” of services, 
were all able to approach agencies directly with requests and criticism.
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D iagram  5.2: New organizational structure of Holon
Advise on 
PolicyGty
Managment
Administrative
Uhit
Mayor Council
Deputies
Deputies
City Manager
Workers of 
Agencies
Managers of 
Agencies
Advisory
Committees
Diagram 5.2 Illustrates the interaction between the council, city management and 
agencies, following the organizational reform conducted in 1994 by the mayor and 
city manager. Under this process, constituents address their requests to their elected 
representatives, i.e., mayor and council members, who discuss the requests in their 
monthly assembly and/or later in advisory committees. Requests are then channelled 
to city management for setting priorities of action. City management then turns to the 
administrative units and together they form implementation plans. Administration is 
then expected to implement the programs. Under this new formal structure, council 
members no longer have a “portfolio” and can only approach agencies with their
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requests via city management. The incumbent city manager of Holon, at time of 
writing, claims that the mayor instructs elected officials to consider the city manager 
as the link to administrative agencies and to address any requests or complaints to the 
city manager and not directly to the agencies. An alternative communication channel 
is to discuss matters with the mayor, who passes requests to the city manager.9 The 
following sections in this chapter address the changes instituted in the organizational 
structure of Holon and how they affected the actions o f players.
Discussion
The discussion below analyses why, in the years 1994-1996, the sanitation manager, 
Arnon Shaul, shirked from contracting-out services and the conditions that allowed 
shirking to occur. These include monitoring levels, Shaul’s managerial skills, and his 
interaction with key players, such as the mayor and sanitation workers. The second 
part examines the changes that were instituted in the sanitation agency in 1996, when 
the sanitation manager developed new career interests and the structural conditions 
set by management then motivated him to take action to contract-out services.
The appointment stage
Political appointment studies claim that an efficient appointment mechanism is 
dependent on the ability o f politicians and their appointees to reach policy agreement 
at the appointment stage.10 By so doing, politicians seek to ensure responsiveness of 
bureaucratic agencies, when their appointed allies assume office as heads of agencies 
and carry out their requests. In the case of Holon, Mayor Sasson and Mr. Shaul 
reached an agreement at the appointment stage to contract-out services. Prior to his
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appointment, Shaul had recognized that the mayor preferred to privatize sanitation
services. Shaul claims:
Overall, the idea of the mayor, when he entered office, was to 
privatize municipal services; he understood that privatization 
should be first and foremost in the sanitation agency, because 
here there were severe problems with wages and work norms.... 
these were the first issues that he detected when he came in, and 
he was searching for a person capable of leading (the privatization 
reform).11
At the appointment stage, Mayor Sasson believed that Shaul would cooperate 
in revising the sanitation services, despite Shaul’s hesitancy to openly declare his 
support for privatization. Still serving as union leader, Shaul was unwilling to 
weaken his political power by adopting procedures involving job cuts. However, 
when asked about privatization in his interview, Arnon Shaul expressed his support 
by saying that:
It is clear as black and white-privatization is efficient, better, 
cheaper. Residents receive better value for their taxes in terms of 
public services.12
Deputy city manager, Meir Lavi, explained that not only did Shaul 
acknowledged the fact that the sanitation agency was not performing efficiently and 
changes had to be made, but that Shaul had also claimed that any reform, other than 
privatization, intended to improve the performance of unionized workers, would be
13inefficient.
Overall, it seems that, at the appointment stage, Mayor Sasson and Shaul 
were able to agree on the reform of sanitation services. Shaul recognized how 
important such a reform was to the mayor and the latter trusted Shaul to carry out his
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requests. However, agreement on policy alone did not provide sufficient conditions 
for practical cooperation. As discussed below, while management was not 
monitoring his activities, in order to ensure implementation, Shaul was shirking, due 
to his political obligations and pressure from interest groups.
Monitoring
As discussed earlier, politicians tend to relax monitoring procedures, when an agency 
is being run by a political appointee. Politicians assume that their appointees act as 
their allies and therefore comply with their requests. Assuming cooperation by 
appointees, they focus their attention on the performance of careerist executives, 
while giving their appointed agents the discretion to manage their administrative 
unit. By this means, politicians seek to reduce the overall costs of monitoring 
bureaucratic agencies.
In the case of Holon, Shaul, as a political appointee o f the mayor, was granted
discretion to manage the agency. Not only did Shaul receive full support and enjoy a
lack o f monitoring by the mayor; the latter also informed management, council
members and executives, that they must cooperate with the head of the sanitation
agency. Furthermore, the mayor chose to support Shaul, when he was in conflict with
council members overseeing sanitation, prior to the organizational reform. Arnon
Shaul refers to his interaction with city management:
They let me understand that I would get a plenty of room to 
maneuver and when I arrived (1994), there was a council member 
monitoring this agency and we did not get along, so I made it 
clear that we could not work together - there would be problems. 
Nevertheless, I started work as the head of the agency and about a 
month later, he (council member) stopped working there... 
Management did not tell him, as deputy mayor, that he was no
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longer responsible for monitoring the performance of the 
sanitation agency; they let him understand that everything was as 
usual (following my appointment), but I gathered all the workers 
of the agency and told them that, from that day onward, they only 
answer to me.14
In 1994, once the organizational changes were instituted, it became even 
easier to grant Shaul discretion. Under the new structure, oversight of service 
implementation moved to city management. The organizational reform separated 
elected officials from the administrative executives and created conditions under 
which, less political officials were monitoring administrative units.15 Under these 
conditions, if the mayor decided to allow the head of the sanitation agency more 
discretion, the new organizational structure provided an efficient way for the mayor 
to also block the interference of elected representatives in the work of the sanitation 
agency. Since these council members were not able to monitor agencies, it became 
more difficult to detect shirking or shifting of policies by agencies. Under these 
reduced monitoring conditions, Shaul was able to avoid implementing the reform 
without detection.
Political activities
Chapter 2 discusses how appointees, as political figures, tend to divide their attention 
between administrative duties and activities that promote their political career. Public 
appearances and interaction with interest groups are among the various activities that 
appointees will conduct, to strengthen their status within their political parties.16 
Given the effort that needs to be invested in political activities, appointees may shirk 
their administrative responsibilities, especially if they are too complex for them to 
carry out. In the case of Arnon Shaul, as a union leader, he was required to devote his
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time to representing municipal workers. This, in turn, reduced the time available to 
him, time needed to implement a complicated, long-term reform such as contracting- 
out o f services.
Strong interests groups
Strong internal interests groups, such as unions, can also provide agents with an 
incentive to shirk. In local government, sanitation agencies are known to have strong 
influential unions. In these cases, executive agents, trying to avoid conflict with 
workers, may shirk from implementing structural reforms that their unionized 
workers reject. Furthermore, political appointees who manage bureaucratic agencies 
are more likely to be influenced by interests groups than are career civil servants. As 
political figures, trying to increase their power, they are dependent on the support of 
these groups. This dependency subjects them to more pressure to avoid 
implementation of any program that the interest group rejects, than careerists. In the 
case of Arnon Shaul, it seems that the fact that a considerable number of union 
members were working in his agency prevented him from contracting-out sanitation 
services. Shaul was concerned not to advance any program that would lead to 
conflict with his union supporters and weaken his overall political power as head of 
the union.
Skills
Another variable that facilitates shirking is lack of the skills needed to carry out 
complicated changes.17 In the case of Holon, Shaul lacked the experience needed in 
sanitation, but in his previous roles, he had acquired managerial skills and, as head of 
the union, had learned to lead a large organization of workers.18 In 1996, when Shaul
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began to cooperate with management, he was able to skilfully negotiate the terms of 
the contracting-out reform between the city management and the sanitation workers, 
reaching an agreement that both sides accepted as reasonable. Arnon managed to find 
solutions for both sides that, in the end, made the contracting-out reform possible. By 
this means, he was able to resolve the most difficult constraints that management 
faces when contracting-out services: the protest of chief bureaucratic executives in 
charge of services and the protest of workers against job loss.
Shaul was able to reduce the principal-agent problem that most executives 
face when managing agencies. His many years of interaction with workers allowed 
him to better understand the terms and conditions required in order for them to 
cooperate with structural reforms that threatened to weaken their power within the 
city. In addition, in their negotiations with management, the workers found Shaul an 
acceptable representative, as he had been their ally in the past. It was perceived by 
the workers that any agreement reached with management was most likely to be the 
outcome of fair negotiation, if conducted by Arnon, safeguarding their interests.19
Shaul did have the managerial skills needed to privatize services. Therefore, 
his political activities and pressure from interests groups provide the main 
explanation for his uncooperative behaviour in the first couple of years. In addition, 
as noted, his interaction with the mayor allowed him discretion during that period 
and blocked any involvement of council members in the work of the agency. Overall, 
Shaul was capable o f carrying-out the reform, but worked under conditions that 
allowed him to continue, both as union leader and as head of agency, shirking his 
bureaucratic responsibilities.
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Years 1996-1998
Mayor Sasson made changes in the second half of his term. After three years in 
office, city management realized that the sanitation agency had not made any 
satisfying progress in reforming its services. This led to a decision to form a 
structured contracting-out plan for sanitation and to closely monitor the activities of 
the agency. In addition, Shaul began to view his role as head of agency differently 
and resigned from the union management.
Monitoring levels
In 1996, monitoring procedures changed, when city management, together with the 
head of the agency, formed a structured plan for sanitation and decided to increase
0C\monitoring. In addition, the mayor decided to adopt a more formal approach
9  1towards Shaul, despite their friendship. Arnon Shaul reports:
Following an examination of the management reform plan for the
sanitation agency, by the head of the sanitation agency, it was
claimed that implementation of the reform would be met with
rejection by the workers and in order to direct a successful
program, the head of the agency would need much more financial
support. The head of the agency made an operational plan for the
agency. The plan was presented to a forum of the mayor and
management and, following discussions and endless debates,
management gave its blessing to continue with the
implementation. In addition, management notified all executives
about the changes that were about to take place in the sanitation
agency. The administrative executives were given a direct and
22strict order from the mayor to cooperate.
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Career preferences changes
In 1996, Shaul started to invest more time and effort in his managerial post and made
some headway with the contracting-out reform. As a former head of the union, Shaul
was able to minimize principal-agent problems within his agency. In the previous
year, Shaul had resigned from his union role, when he realized that he could not fulfil
both obligations. Shaul claims:
Look, at the time, in the beginning of my work here, I had to wear 
two hats- head of agency and union leader... I understood very 
fast that I would need to give up one of the hats, because it creates 
a conflict of interests. There is no middle ground, one role or the 
other. I woke up one morning, phoned my deputy in the union and 
said, “you are in charge now”. I was no longer able to be the
9^“defendant” and “executioner” at the same time.
In order to reduce conflict with the workers, Shaul convinced them that
privatization was inevitable, since management was determined to push forward the
reform. Second, he let sanitation workers understand that he still planned to represent
their interests, by negotiating with management the terms and conditions of the
privatization in a way that would minimize the damage to their status.24 Meir Lavi
compliments Shaul on his achievements:
In terms of the contracting-out reform, he was probably the most 
influential person when it came to implementing the reform 
successfully.25
In terms of Anthony Downs “Types of Bureaucrats”, it is assumed that Shaul
Ofadopted the character of a “Climber” or “Zealot” over the years. Climbers will 
embrace any program that maximizes their power, income and prestige, within their 
organization. Shaul, as a climber, first attempted to increase his power as a union
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leader, but later moved on, to earn prestige as head of the agency. In order to do so, 
he chose to adopt the contracting-out reform, assuming that it would improve his 
reputation as a manager and he would also gain the plaudits of the city management. 
Zealots, according to Downs, are strongly committed to projects in which they are 
involved. Like climbers, they will adopt any program that increases their 
responsibility or resources. However, contrary to climbers, zealots actively identify 
with the projects they are pursuing. As a zealot, once Shaul embraced privatization as 
an efficient mechanism to improve the performance of his agency, he began to 
contract-out services more vigorously than any other agent.
Summary
The examination of the sanitation agency in Holon, between 1993 and 1998, 
demonstrates why political appointments frequently cannot serve as an efficient 
mechanism to control agencies. Privatization data and interviews, conducted with 
key players, show that the sanitation agency did not reform its services in the first 
years when the appointee was in office, despite the wishes of city management. The 
expectations of newly elected mayor of Holon, in 1993, that he had found a political 
appointee who would comply with the need to contract-out sanitation services, 
independently, with relaxed monitoring procedures, were not met. Even though the 
mayor’s political appointee did not shift policy, as often occurs with career agents, 
neither did he implement the expected policy. Only under new structural conditions, 
and the newly recognized interests of the agent, did the city advance its plans. 
Management began to monitor the performance of the sanitation agency closely and 
the politically appointed head of agency decided to pursue a bureaucratic career. 
Under these conditions, the contracting-out reform progressed.
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Appendix
Table 5.1 presents the sequence of events that occurred in the sanitation agency of 
Holon, between 1993-1997. The left column lists the events that took place in the 
municipality, including the appointments that were made. The right column lists the 
policy that was implemented during those years.
Table 5.1: Timetable of events and outcomes in the sanitation agency of Holon 
(1993-1997)
Year Events Outcomes
1993 Moti Sasson is elected mayor Sasson declares intention to contract- 
out municipal services (including 
sanitation services)
The incumbent manager of the 
sanitation aeencv shifts policv bv 
recruiting more workers and 
purchasing new equipment.
1994 Appointment o f Arnon Shaul.
Municipal union leader, Amon Shaul, is 
appointed as sanitation head of agency. 
Appointment o f Meir Lavi:
Management appoints a Deputy City 
Manager in charge of infrastructure 
(including the sanitation agency)
City Manager (with the support of the 
mayor) conducts an organizational 
refomi in the municipality.
Policv remains at status quo in the 
sanitation agency.
1995 Arnon Shaul resigns from his job as the 
head of the municipal union
Policv still remains at status quo 
(contracting-out reform in not 
implemented) in the sanitation agency.
1996-
1997
Shaul promote workers with in the 
sanitation agency to managerial roles
City management forms a structured 
contracting out plan for most 
municipal services with emphasis on 
sanitation services.
Amon Shaul implements the 
contracting out refomi.
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Table 5.2: Profiles of sanitation managers in Holon (1993-1998)
city Agents Type of appoint.'
Skills and 
experience"
Policy 
agreement 
reached at 
the
appointment
stage
Level of 
monitoring1" Outcomes
Holon N.Peled C.E. low no high shifting
A. Shaul P.A. medium yes low shirking
A. Shaul 
1996-
(incumbent)
C.E.iv high Vyes high cooperation
i. C.E - Career Executive, P. A- Political Appointee
ii. Levels of skills and experience were mainly determined mainly on the basis of 
interviews with key players, who provided information regarding players’ 
professional and managerial skills, and experience in the municipality, or in the 
public, or private sector.
iii. Level of monitoring is determined as follows:
High level: frequent meetings with management and council members - at least 
twice a week and often even daily. Frequent review of reports and plans of the 
agency.
Medium level: meetings are less frequent - once or twice a week, a few requests 
for reports (annual report, quarterly report). Reports and plans are usually 
presented to management when/if the head of the agency initiates their 
presentation.
Low level: rare meetings, no demands of reports, management does not include 
the head of the agency in meetings. A few unofficial, general talks, instead of 
formal operational planning. For example: a verbal request from the mayor to 
“Do something to clean the city” .
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iv. In the case of Holon, Arnon Shaul can be regarded as a career executive from 
1996, onwards, as he decided to resign from the union and develop his 
bureaucratic career.
v. In 1996, after the management of Holon detected shirking, it required Shaul 
again to agree to revise services, as a condition for him remaining as head o f the 
agency. The policy agreement reached with management and Shaul’s change of 
career plans can together be regarded as a new process of appointment.
List of interviews conducted in the city of Holon
• Mrs. Hanna Herzman, City Manager, (07/03/01)
• Mr. Mordechai Natanzon, Deputy Mayor, (03/06/02)
• Mr. Arnon Shaul, Head of Sanitation, (09/06/02)
• Mr. Meir Lavi, Deputy City Manager, in charge of Infrastructure (and 
Sanitation), (03/07/02)
• Mrs. Yael Binenstein, Chief Accountant of Sanitation, (03/07/02)
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Notes
\  Central Bureau of Statistics, 1999
2. Mordechai (Motke) Natanzon interview, 3/06/02
3. Amon Shaul interview, 9/02/02
In an interview with deputy city manager Meir Lavi, he confirms that Shaul was a
friend of the mayor... “Moti (the mayor) and Amon had a certain friendship before their
work relationship...” (Meir Lavi interview, 03/07/02).
4. “In mid October, 1994, I was appointed as Deputy City Manager of Infrastmcture 
(includes the sanitation agency). Prior to that, I had worked as a constmction engineer 
in the private sector. I did not serve in any other role in the municipality besides deputy 
City Manager.” (Meir Lavi interview 03/07/02).
5. In an interview with deputy mayor, Mr. Natanzon, on 3/06/02, he claimed that “The
policy of city management was definitely to privatize...The implementation was in the 
hands of the deputy city manager (Meir Lavi) and head of agency (Amon 
Shaul)... management wanted to privatize sanitation as a result of the growing needs of 
the city for sanitation services, otherwise we would have had to increase dramatically 
the amount of municipal personnel...the process of privatization began in the years 
1996-1997” (Deputy Mayor, Mr. Mordechai (Motke) Natanzon interview, 3/06/02).
6. In order to prevent job losses, the negotiating team offered various types of solutions for 
workers:
a) Management would try to allocate sanitation workers to alternative services within 
the municipality. However, new allocation might mean that workers would need to 
adjust to new job descriptions, e.g., workers would extend their shift from a 4 to an 8 
hours schedule.
b) Recruitment of municipal personnel in contractors’ companies: city management 
offered to try to convince private contractors to recruit municipal workers. In this way, 
municipal personnel would not lose their jobs, but change their employer, i.e., to the 
contractors. In addition, city management would give priority to bids by contractors 
offering to recmit municipal workers. Furthermore, management would try to ensure 
that contractors provide workers with decent salaries and social benefits.
c) City management would offer compensation fees for early retirement to sanitation 
workers close to retirement age.
1. According to deputy city manager, Meir Lavi: “ ...Privatization occurred, but not 
instantly - not in the first year, not in the second, but in the years to follow, maybe the 
fourth or the fifth. (Meir Lavi interview, 03/07/02).
160
In an interview with Amon Shaul, he claimed that: “ ...We can say that the hard part of 
the privatization process is behind us”. (Amon Shaul interview, 9/02/02)
8. See Figures 3.1 and 3.2 and Tables 3.13 and 3.14 of percentage of contracted services in 
Holon, in chapter 3.
9. From a presentation given by the incumbent city manager (1993-1998), Mrs. Hanna 
Herzman, on 07/03/01 in a conference on Local Governments, Bar-Ilan University.
10. See Gilligan, Marshall and Weingast 1989; McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987, 1989; 
Peters, 1989; Hammond and Hill, 1993, Aberbach and Rockman 1994, Hammond and 
Knott, 1996.
n . Amon Shaul interview, 9/02/02.
12. Amon Shaul states in his interview: “ ...privatization might be efficient in economic 
terms, but the human-social consequences are problematic...I am not willing to let go of 
my management nor the sanitation inspectors, but the provisional units e.g. garbage 
collectors, truck drivers, and the machinery that comes with them are all in the process 
of contracting-out” (Amon Shaul ,9/02/02).
13. In an interview with deputy city manager Meir Lavi, 03/07/02 he discusses Shaul’s 
attitude towards privatization:
Q: What was Shaul’s stand on privatization, when he took over the sanitation agency?
A: I have no doubt that he was not enthusiastic about it, did not want it... he (Shaul) 
was a union guy, it was encased in him.
Q: When you were both appointed (in charge of the sanitation agency), were you trying 
to change work standards in the agency, deal with short working shifts... instead of 
contracting-out services?
A: Amon, who was experienced with unions, claimed, and still does, that it is 
impossible.
Q: The fact that Amon was the head of the union affected his views on privatization?
A: In the beginning, he was not keen to adopt these types of solution, he arrived with a 
history as a union member, but the job teaches you a few things.
14. In his interview, Amon Shaul refers to his interaction with city management:
Q: With every problem you had an “open door” with management?
A: “Yes, at the mayor’s office”.
“ ... I received whatever I asked for, no questions were asked, there was a feeling of 
“give him space”, in order to please me, you see, at the beginning I did not want this 
job”.
Q: You can say that the City Manager and her deputies manage the organizational 
system here?
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A: Yes, yes, but you are talking about a different agency. The Deputy City Manager 
(Meir Lavi) does not “deal” with me at all, he does not interfere with my everyday 
work.
... For the City Manager the appearance of the city is very important, we don’t get 
along, but she does not get involved with the day-to-day activities of this agency.” 
(Amon Shaul interview, 9/02/02).
When asked about monitoring levels for the sanitation agency, Meir Lavi, deputy 
manager, claimed the following:
Q: There were situations in which the mayor asked, “Let Amon work as he see fit”?
A: “Yes, yes, yes, there are situations like that”.
Q: Would you say that the head of the sanitation agency received more discretion than 
other agencies?
A: “Yes, during the whole term (1993-1998), I was in charge of 4 agencies and 
definitely, yes!” ( Meir Lavi interview, 03/07/02).
15. “The mayor changed his approach, he distanced elected representatives from the work 
of the municipality, the mayor has one deputy and another part time, it is no 
coincidence, because he could have appointed 4 deputies, but it contradicts his concept 
of how the city should operate”. (Amon Shaul interview, 9/02/02).
16. See: Peters. G. 1989:29.
17. See: Moe, 1984, Smith and Polsby, 1981 Peters, 1989, Wilson, 1989.
18. Before his appointment to head of sanitation, Amon Shaul worked as the head of the 
local culture and sport center for youth. He was a deputy manager in the department for 
the community center, later on the manager of the same department, and for many 
years, the head of the municipal workers’ union. (Amon Shaul interview, 9/02/02).
19. Deputy city manager, Meir Lavi, claims:
“The fact that the mayor counts on him I know, the fact that they had a personal 
connection prior to the appointment (of Shaul) I know, it is also fair to say that before 
he took the job as head of the sanitation agency, he had no experience with the work of 
sanitation. I think both he (Shaul) and the mayor were aware of this fact at the time (at 
the appointment stage), it is a profession that you can learn as you go along... but I 
could say that Moti (the mayor) recognized his skills and ability to advance projects, to 
communicate with different types of people, to be practical and a conversation guy.”
Q: What would you consider to be the main contribution of Amon Shaul in his role as 
head of agency?
1 6 2
A: I think he is a very important link, as he is capable of representing the interests of the 
workers to the management and represent the interest of the management to the 
workers... it is rare to find a person who can speak a few ‘languages’... ”
20. The deputy city manager talks about that changes that were instituted in decision­
making processes regarding privatization:
“ ... With regard to privatization, we all sat all together in Moti’s office, there were lots 
of people present, such as the legal advisor, and we finalized plans at the mayor’s office. 
...In the days of the sanitation workers’ strike (1998), we met 5 times a day...we felt 
that it was up to us to operate this agency and at least the streets were kept clean - this 
made the union very upset... ” (Meir Lavi interview,03/07/02).
21. Deputy Mayor, Meir Lavi, refers to the friendship between the mayor and Shaul, after 
the latter had served a few years in office:
“ ...These days it is different, because the mayor is the mayor and Amon is a 
subordinate... I believe that a good interaction between the mayor and the head of the
agency contributed (to the good performance of the sanitation agency)” (Meir Lavi
interview, 03/07/02).
22. From a report written by Amon Shaul for a management course, entitled:
“Organizational Change in the Sanitation Agency of Holon”, July 1998.
2j. Amon Shaul interview, 9/02/02.
24 From a report written by Amon Shaul for a management course, entitled:
“Organizational Change in the Sanitation Agency of Holon”:
“The privatization of part of the sanitation services (garbage collection) was met by a 
strong protest of workers. The head o f the sanitation agency resigned from his role as 
head o f the union before starting to privatize sanitation services. A new management 
for the union was chosen that objected to the changes in the agency. The union was
requesting that the privatization process be stopped and even reversed i.e., fired
employees should be brought back to the municipality. The attempts of the city to 
privatize part of the sanitation services were blocked for a period of approximately a 
year. The city tried to advance changes and make privatization a fact. This led to strikes 
that lasted for a few days. The city was forced to withdraw its actions and negotiate 
further changes with the workers. Following a year of negotiations, that included three 
strikes. A legal debate, held in the labor judicial courts, facilitated an agreement with 
the workers. The agreement was achieved with the assistance of the head of the agency 
(Amon Shaul), who acted as an unofficial arbitrator in the conflict between the workers 
and management. The signed agreement stated that part of the sanitation services would 
be contracted-out and, in exchange, management would compensate workers by
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increasing wages of those workers remaining in city employment. Many of the workers 
in the city protested against the agreement that their representative in the union had 
signed, this eventually lead to a weakening of the power of the union heads, when the 
support of the workers decreased”. (Amon Shaul, July 1998: 23).
25. Meir Lavi interview, (03/07/02).
26. See Dunleavy, 1991:150.
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Chapter 6 
The Case of Beer-Sheva
Introduction
Beer-Sheva is the largest city in southern Israel. In 1999, it had 149,404 residents.1 
The following chapter examines political appointments in the city of Beer-Sheva, 
and explores their aims and achievements. As in the previous cases of Tel-Aviv and 
Holon, the empirical exploration of Beer-Sheva concentrates on the political term of 
1993-1998 in which the mayor, the late Mr. Isaac Rager, appointed non-career heads 
of agencies, in order to advance a contracting-out reform. This chapter looks at why 
the privatization objectives set by the mayor, management, external comptroller, and 
administrative units, were only partially implemented. At the core of the discussion 
is the interaction between political representatives and their uncooperative sanitation 
appointees, as well as the structural conditions that affected the players’ actions.
In the summer of 1994, after one year in office, city management was still 
failing in its attempts to improve its financial situation, as the city had already 
accumulated huge deficits. Therefore, the Ministry of the Interior decided to appoint 
an external comptroller. The comptroller’s main duty was to serve as an external 
auditor and to temporarily assist in managing the city, until its financial situation 
stabilized. Among the plans set for the city by the comptroller, was a step-by-step 
program to contract-out sanitation services and to institute managerial changes in the 
agency.
In 1995, the mayor and comptroller decided to replace the political appointee 
in charge of sanitation with his deputy manager- an active participant in the 
municipal union. However, once in office, he was working under conditions with
165
which he could not comply, but neither could he shift, so he chose to shirk his 
responsibilities. Eventually the mayor asked the comptroller to bypass the sanitation 
manager and undertake the initial steps needed, in order to contract-out services. By 
1998, the city had obtained partial cooperation with the implementation of the 
reform.
This chapter first outlines the structural conditions that led Mayor Rager to 
decide to reform services. It explores the sequence of appointments that took place in 
the sanitation agency, in an attempt to make it responsive. It also examines the 
contracting-out reform and its achievements. Finally, we look at the conditions that 
eventually allowed partial implementation of the reform.
Structural conditions
Public pressure to improve municipal services
In 1993, the city of Beer-Sheva noticed an increase in the complaints of residents, 
neighbourhood representatives and industries, mostly referring to the poor quality of 
sanitation services.2 A few months prior to the municipal election, mayoral 
candidates in Beer-Sheva conducted several public opinion surveys. The purpose of 
the surveys was to determine the level of satisfaction or discontent of citizens with 
municipal services. In the surveys presented below, constituents were required to 
rank what they considered to be the most unsatisfactory local services.
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Table 6.1: Public opinion of Beer-Sheva’s citizens on municipal services.4
Date of 
survey
First unsatisfactory 
service
Second
unsatisfactory
service
Third
unsatisfactory
service
15.07.93 City Appearance and 
sanitation 30%
Education 15% Responsiveness to 
citizens and their 
problems 14%
03.09.93 City Appearance and 
sanitation 35%
Education 13% Responsiveness to 
citizens and their 
problems 10%
28.09.93 City Appearance and 
sanitation 31%
Education 18% Responsiveness to 
citizens and their 
problems 11%
Average 32% 15.3% 11.7%
Table 6.1 shows that City Appearance and Sanitation services were considered by 
participants as the most unsatisfactory services. This clear discontent with sanitation 
services led mayoral candidates to openly declare that, once elected, they would 
make all possible efforts to improve the sanitation services. Soon after the elections, 
Mayor Rager declared his intention to implement a plan to improve service provision 
for the city, by cutting down 400 employees from the City Appearance unit 
(including sanitation) and signing contractual agreements with external suppliers.5
Central government pressure
In 1988, the Ministry of the Interior decided to establish an enquiry committee to 
investigate the financial situation of the Beer-Sheva municipality and suggest a 
recovery plan for the city. Following a four month examination, the committee 
concluded that the city was in a state of financial crisis: its budget deficits were 
severely high, the wages of executive workers exceeded any official ranking set for 
the public sector, and the city was taking no measures to increase tax collection, or 
attract potential industrial entrepreneurs to the area. The committee recommended
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that, under present conditions, the Ministry of the Interior should closely monitor the 
activity of mayor and management and, if needed, relieve the council of its duties 
and assign an external comptroller to manage the city.6
Until 1994, central government continued to pressure Beer-Sheva to improve 
its performance and reduce municipal expenses, but did not formally specify a 
request to privatize services. In an attempt to induce Beer-Sheva to cut expenses, 
central government did not approve Beer-Sheva’s budget requests, until it reduced its 
local deficits.7 It was decided that, since the city was failing to improve its 
performance or reform its services, central government would not compensate it for 
inefficient management. Continued frustration, caused by the ongoing budget deficits 
and frequent requests by the city for financial support, led the Ministry of the 
Interior, in August 1994 to appoint an external comptroller for Beer-Sheva. Among 
the comptroller’s responsibilities was inspection of the activities of management and 
bureaucratic units. Following his inspection, he recommended a new organizational 
plan for the municipality. In November 1995, the comptroller submitted a report 
entitled “Managerial Failure of the Beer-Sheva Municipality”. In his report, he 
summarized his activities in the municipality and recommended changes in the 
provision of municipal services, among which was a privatization plan for local 
services, including sanitation. Based on the comptroller’s report, city management 
began to consider contracting-out sanitation services.
Sequence of events (See Tables 6.2 and 6.3 in Appendix)
Attempts to contract-out sanitation services
Until 1995, the city management was unsuccessful in its attempts to efficiently 
reform sanitation services. The endeavor to contract-out services involved a few key
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players: (1) Mayor Isaac Rager: mayor of Beer-Sheva 1993-1997; (2) Mr. Shlomo 
Kramer: external comptroller; (3) Mrs. Avishag Avtoobi: head of the city strategy 
and planning unit; (4) Mr. Andrei Uzan: head of sanitation (1988-1993), and later 
deputy mayor; (5) Mr. Meir Levi: head of the sanitation agency (1993-1995); (6) 
Mr. Abraham Zabonat: head of the sanitation agency (1995-1997).
In 1993, Mayor Rager decided to appoint Mr. Meir Levi to manage the 
sanitation agency. Rager considered Levi a trustworthy candidate for the position, 
mainly due to their political alliance, as both were active Likud party members. 
Mayor Rager hoped that, by appointing his political associate, he would receive full 
cooperation regarding his plans. Another reason to consider Levi, was that he was 
apparently supportive of the city management’s plans. Levi declared that, once 
appointed as head of agency, he intended to contract-out services. In fact, he did no 
such thing.
Therefore, in 1995, two years later, based on recommendations of the
external comptroller, city management decided to draw up a detailed program to
contract-out sanitation services. The comptroller, Shlomo Kramer, recalls:
Management, mayor, deputies, heads o f agencies were all 
declaring that they supported contracting-out services. This was 
the visible, open approach of “of course it is efficient to 
privatize”8
According to the comptroller, by 1995, the agency had not revised its services 
as expected, either in terms of costs or quality of service provided to constituents. 
The comptroller therefore advised management not to rely on the agency to reform 
its services on its own, but to take action itself, to transfer the provision of sanitation 
services to the private market. In addition, the comptroller advised the city to hire an
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organizational consultant, specializing in privatization, to construct a plan for 
sanitation.9
Before turning to an organizational consultant, the council member in charge
of sanitation asked the head of the sanitation agency to come up with a privatization
plan of his own, but set a deadline of ten days. It was thought that a plan constructed
by the agency itself would lead to better implementation results in the future. First,
since the agency was most familiar with its own performance and with the
requirements needed to increase efficiency. Second, a plan devised by the agency
would facilitate future cooperation, whereas a plan constructed by management and
external consultants might be rejected by the workers, since it would be perceived as
being forced on them.10 Levi, however, did not come up with a formal plan, but set
conditions as to how the privatization plan should be carried out and what would be
its limits. Among his stipulations were demands that contractors be employed only in
some neighbourhoods, that the agency’s budget be maintained at its current level,
even if the contracting out process created savings. The head of the strategic unit,
Mrs. Avishag Avtoobi, states:
Meir Levi supported privatization, but we promised him that 
inspection of workers would continue to be the responsibility of 
the sanitation agency, that we would not reduce the budget 
allocated to the agency - some of the budget would go to pay 
contractors and some would remain in the agency and we also 
compromised by agreeing that we turn only some of the 
neighbourhoods over to the responsibility of contractors.11
Four months later, the sanitation agency’s lack of responsiveness in drawing 
up a privatization program brought the city manager and the external comptroller to
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the decision to set up a team to advance the preparation for privatization of sanitation 
services.12
On July 18, 1995, the team introduced its plan at a meeting with political and 
administrative representatives.13 The contracting-out program for sanitation included 
a few steps: (1) based on earlier plans suggested in 1993, it allowed the agency’s 
sanitation workers to form their own private company (with the help of the Ministry 
of the Interior) to clean the markets (a particular source of complaint regarding dirt 
and lack of hygiene). If this move failed, then the city was to contract-out sanitation 
services to alternative private companies;14 (2) waste collection services, street 
cleaning and maintenance of vehicles; were to be immediately contracted-out; (3) the 
number of permanent personnel in the sanitation agency was to be reduced;15 and, (4) 
in order to advance the reform, the mayor was to replace the incumbent council 
member in charge of sanitation services, as well as the incumbent head of the 
agency. In 1995, Levi resigned from office, having only achieved limited 
privatization and he moved to a job in the private sector.
In October 1995, Shlomo Kramer, the external comptroller, sent a letter of 
approval to the mayor in response to his request to conduct seven personnel changes 
in the municipality. In the sanitation unit, Kramer approved the replacement of its 
manager with his deputy, Mr. Abraham Zabonath. The purpose of the new 
appointment was to promote an agent who would comply with the contracting-out 
program, after the sanitation workers had failed to form their own private sanitation 
company. These attempts failed, mainly due to the union’s protests against the move, 
as it rejected the idea of losing personnel in city employment.
Before his appointment as head of the agency, Zabonath, as most workers in 
the agency, had been a member of the municipal union. Management assumed that it
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could benefit from appointing a manager respected by the union. At the time, city
executives were concerned that there were too many union members in the sanitation
agency.16 Under these conditions, any attempt to privatize services would most likely
fail, due to the workers’ opposition. However, it was argued that Zabonath could
gain union respect and therefore succeed in carrying out the reform. In the
appointment process, Zabonath showed his willingness to adopt the management’s
privatization program. He expressed his support for privatization in his interview:
Every municipality should privatize, contractors are cheaper, 
allow savings, the performance of municipal workers drops over 
time, a process that costs money to the city.17
As sanitation manager, he put the privatization plans among his first
priorities, but soon enough encountered strong opposition to his plans from the
workers in the agency. He realized that the contracting-out plan involves many job
cuts and he became concerned about harming the status of sanitation workers in the
municipality. In addition, he questioned his ability to carry out such a controversial
reform and feared the long-term consequences to his career. Avishag Avtoobi states:
For Zabonath, once appointed as head of agency, it took time to 
accept the concept of privatization, he began to be concerned with 
the workers, he worried what would happen to them if the 
privatization plans were carried out...many workers in the agency
1 o
were members of the union.
The unwillingness, or inability of sanitation managers to contract-out services 
eventually led the mayor of Beer-Sheva to ask the comptroller to take control of the 
sanitation agency and institute the initial steps needed to contract-out services. This 
included negotiation of prices with contractors for the provision of services. City
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management reached an agreement with the comptroller to disregard any potential 
protest o f Zabonath, and try independently to contract-out services. The management 
assumed that Kramer’s past experience with privatization and strong interest in 
pushing forward the reform would lead to the desired results. In order to advance the 
reform, Kramer, with the assistance of city management, negotiated new terms with 
heads of agencies, the city union, and external contractors. Kramer reached a 
compromise with the parties, to contract out only some of the services, while leaving 
some of the workers in the agency to provide others (e.g., to keep some of the 
cleaning workers in the agency). Furthermore, the city agreed to allocate budget to 
contractors and not make any budget cuts to the agency in case of savings. Kramer 
also promised that the service provision inspection unit would remain the 
responsibility of the agency, rather than be transferred to other units in the 
municipality. City management also promised to make serious efforts to allocate 
sanitation workers to other jobs in the city, or to help their recruitment in contracted 
companies.
However, both the union and some elected representative rejected the idea 
that workers would be transferred to contracted companies, arguing that contractors 
could not match their salaries with those paid by the municipality.19 As to sanitation 
employees who could not find work in the city or elsewhere, Kramer assured the 
union that city management would offer decent compensation fees and early 
retirement schemes. Finally, it was agreed with the union leader, that the city would 
compensate the union for job cuts in the sanitation agency, by hiring more workers in 
other units.20
City management continued to push the agency to carry out Kramer’s plans 
but got a negative response from both the agency and the union. This conflict
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escalated when the municipal union decided to strike in September 1996, to protest
the reform.21 Concerned with the protest of workers, Zabonath leaned toward
abandoning Kramer’s plans. Zabonath recalls:
When I was assigned to be the head of the agency I thought that 
contracting out would be a positive thing, privatization would 
allow costs of service provision to be reduced. However, later on,
the workers protested against privatization, so I decided to drop
• 00  the plan to hire contractors.
At the same time, city management, together with the council member in 
charge of sanitation, continued to pressure Zabonath to advance the reform. Unable 
to respond to management pressure, Zabonath left the agency in 1997.23 His 
retirement left the agency in the status quo for another year, due to the mayor’s death 
from cancer that year and a decision by city management not to appoint a sanitation 
executive until a new mayor was elected. As for Kramer, his initiatives had created 
conditions that allowed implementation of the reform, but he did not remain in his 
position as comptroller to carry out his privatization plan. The Ministry o f the 
Interior asked him to leave the city after having audited it for two years.
24Contracting-out achievements
Mrs. Avishag Avtoobi, head of the strategic unit, confirmed that in the sanitation
25agency, the privatization program had not succeeded as planned. Mrs. Avtoobi’s 
claim might seem to contradict the data presented, according to which, by 1996- 
1997, contracting-out of sanitation had reached up to 34-35% of the total sanitation 
budget. However, as mentioned in chapter 3, the data does not fully reflect the extent 
of privatization reached in Beer-Sheva. In 1993 and 1996, the city twice renewed its 
contracts with the same external supplier, following a tendering process. However, in
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the renewed contract of 1996, the private company received a higher payment than in 
previous years, a payment inconsistent with the level of additional work that it was 
required to provide. Thus, the city managed to increase the extent of privatization of
sanitation between 1993 and 1996 but for a higher price, in 1996, the agency spent
26much more on contractors. Another proof of this suspect situation is revealed when 
we examine the latest sanitation contract that was offered in 2003, to the same 
private company, in which the city reduced nearly 15% of its expenditures for the
97same terms that had been set in 1993.
Discussion
In 1993, the mayor of Beer-Sheva appointed Meir Levi, who agreed to contract out 
services at the appointment stage. However, soon after, he began to shift policy, by 
demanding different conditions than those set by management, regarding how and 
where the contracting-out reform should take place. Later on, he moved to manage 
the biggest private sanitation company that he had hired the previous year to deliver 
services to the city. At time of writing, Meir Levi’s contracting company continues to 
work for the city. His successor, Abraham Zabonat, intended to contract-out services 
at the appointment stage. However, once in office, he shirked from revising services. 
Feeling obligated towards the municipal union, he was reluctant to advance a 
privatization program that the members of the union rejected. However, frequent 
interventions by council members in the work of agencies, made shirking difficult for 
Zabonath. Information regarding the activities of the sanitation agency was also 
transmitted at the time to management, via the external comptroller who monitored 
its performance.
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Contrary to the case of Holon, elected representatives in Beer-Sheva pushed 
agencies to privatize services and set conditions under which heads of agencies were 
constantly monitored, allowing uncooperative behavior to be easily detected.28 
Zabonath found himself in a situation in which he could neither shift policy, nor 
cooperate with the implementation of the reform. The opposition of union members 
did not allow him to comply with management in contracting-out services, and the 
structured privatization plan, formed by management, did not allow shifting to 
implement alternative policies. Even shirking became impossible, due to active 
involvement of council members and the comptroller. Left with no option, Zabonath 
resigned after only two years in office as head of the agency.
As mentioned earlier, during his two years, the city management reached an 
agreement with the comptroller to bypass Zabonath’s authority and institute 
sanitation reform. The comptroller, Shlomo Kramer, succeeded in contracting-out 
some sanitation services under certain constraints that Zabonath, the union and 
contractors set. In the process of reform, Kramer conducted a thorough performance 
measurement of the city, including a financial and organizational examination and, in 
1995, submitted his findings to management and to the Ministry of the Interior. He 
concluded that in the city of Beer-Sheva there were several inefficient processes.
Kramer’s report, as well as interviews conducted in the municipality, indicate 
two structural constraints as the main cause of failure to fully adopt the contracting- 
out plan: (1) sanitation executives were subjected to pressure from a strong union not 
to reform services; and, (2) there were inefficient monitoring procedures over 
contractors. According to interviewees, inefficient inspection of contractors did not 
allow detection of poor service delivery. The city inspectors unit was not qualified to 
monitor the performance of contractors. The unit consisted mainly of workers who
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did not fit to any other job in the municipality, but whose contracts could not be 
terminated. As a result, contractors “cut corners” and provided a low level of 
sanitation and gardening services. In the “city appearance” inspection division, for 
instance, a conflict of interest occurred, since most of the inspectors were also union 
members. The inspectors were required to ensure an efficient contracting-out process 
and at the same time, oppose the reform in their union activities.29 According to Mrs. 
Avtoobi, both poor inspection of contractors and a strong union rejecting the reform 
weakened city management, when negotiating changes with city personnel. As 
monitoring of contracted services was inefficient, management could not 
convincingly demonstrate that a contracting-out process would create savings for the 
city or improve the quality of services.30
As for the union, most executives considered it to be too powerful and too 
involved in the decision-making processes of the city management. Avtoobi, 
considered the membership of the sanitation workers in the union to be the main 
obstacle to implementing the contracting-out reform.31 The union was involved in 
decisions regarding personnel promotions, formation of policies and implementation. 
The union offered political support to the mayor and council while, in return, they 
had to accept its demands. Whenever the mayor and city management sought to 
implement a certain policy, they were aware that it first needed the approval of the 
union. Decisions made by management, without the involvement of union, often led
T9to objections by the workers and lack of cooperation in the implementation. The 
union was involved in all stages of decision-making, planning stages and execution 
of plans regarding the contracting-out reform.
In this thesis, however, it is argued that the opposition by unions and poor 
inspection units, might cause part o f the problems but do not provide a sufficiently
177
convincing explanation for the inefficient contracting-out results. Even though most 
executives considered the union as the main obstacle to privatization of services, in 
practice, they found fairly simple ways to gain its support.33 In order to reduce the 
staff in sanitation, as part of the contracting-out steps, management offered the head 
o f the union some alternative ways to maintain the power of his organization, for 
instance, by promising the union that in parallel to the cuts in sanitation, management 
would hire additional workers in services such as Education and Welfare - an 
increase in personnel that central government allowed. Under this arrangement, the 
union was able to keep its quota when new staff was hired, while sanitation staff was 
cut.34 In addition, when the privatization plan was initially discussed in 1993, Mayor 
Rager formed new external municipal corporations, in order to recruit some of the 
workers that the city was planning to fire from sanitation.35 Deputy mayor, Andrei 
Uzan claims:
Throughout the contracting-out process there was no need to fire 
sanitation workers but rather allocate them to alternative tasks, as 
the responsibilities of the city grew, due to the Russian 
immigration.36
Overall, it seems that management, with the assistance of Kramer, was able to 
reach an agreement with the union and negotiate terms that both sides were able to 
accept as reasonable. In addition, city management constructed a detailed 
privatization plan and continually monitored its agencies. However, between 1993- 
1998, management felt that it did not reach satisfying results. The main question in 
this case is why, under such conditions, did the sanitation managers, Levi and 
Zabonath, fail to meet expectations. At the core of the explanation offered here, is the 
choice by management to appoint unqualified and undedicated appointees to manage
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bureaucratic agencies. The appointees did not have the experience to motivate 
workers to comply with new programs, or when these appointees did not know how 
to negotiate new employment terms. Unconcerned with changes in their agencies, the 
appointees were promoting their own political careers.
In his report, Kramer addressed this issue, when he claimed that in the city of 
Beer-Sheva, recruitment o f workers, at all ranks, was based on irrelevant criteria. 
The bids committee did not rely on objective professional tools to evaluate nominees, 
who were not required to undergo any professional compatibility exams. Often, in 
the appointment process, there was suspicion of “tailored bids” i.e., the committee 
had already decided whom to appoint, prior to any conduct of actual interviewing of 
nominees.
Furthermore, there was frequent interference by council members and deputy 
mayors seeking to promote their political allies, in the appointment processes. The 
delay of such appointments as city treasurer, city manager, head of the sanitation 
agency, and city accountant, was due to the involvement of politicians in the 
appointment process. Elected representatives allocated staff and determined the level 
o f salaries, without the approval of the Ministry of the Interior, as required by law. 
Overall, such involvement discouraged qualified potential candidates, within or 
outside the municipality, to apply for key roles that were offered.37 The municipality 
ended up functioning without a professional city manager. The city manager was a 
political activist without any formal authority.38
Summary
By politically appointing its heads, the city of Beer-Sheva failed to create a 
responsive sanitation agency. Empirical measurement of privatization and interviews
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conducted with city’s executives, show that, despite major political appointments, 
meant to facilitate improvements in sanitation services, the city management was 
incapable of reforming services. Furthermore, it is argued that political appointments 
in the sanitation agency hindered the implementation of the reforms. While the first 
political appointee, shifted policy, the second, shirked. For five years, the only 
successful advancements in privatization were due to the structured programs 
constructed by a professional comptroller, the negotiations he conducted with 
workers and the union, and his monitoring of implementation.
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Appendix
Table 6.2: Timetable of events and outcomes in the sanitation agency of Beer- 
Sheva (1993-1997)
Year Events Outcomes
1993 *lsaac Rager is elected for 
mayor.
* Rager fires Andrei Uzan and 
appoints Meir Levi to manage the 
sanitation agency.
* Rager, together with city 
management, declare intentions to 
contract-out municipal services.
Levi refuses to contract-out services and 
shifts policy by recruiting more workers and 
purchasing new equipment.
1995 *The mayor appoints Abraham 
Zabonath as head of sanitation. 
*Ministry of Interior appoints an 
external comptroller for the city.
The external comptroller forms a structured 
plan for privatizing sanitation services. 
Policv remains at status quo in the 
sanitation agency.
1996-
1997
City management asks the 
comptroller to monitor closely the 
activities of sanitation
Unable to reach cooperation with Zabonath, 
the comptroller takes independent steps to 
contract-out services.
1997 Zabonath resigns. contracting out reform partially advances.
Table 6.3: Profiles of sanitation managers in Beer-Sheva (1993-1997)
city Agents Type of appoint.1
Skills and 
experience"
Policy 
agreement 
reached at the 
appointment 
stage
Level of 
monitoring1" Outcomes
Beer-
Sheva
A. Uzan C.E. high no high shifting
M. Levi P.A. medium yes high shifting
A.
Zabonath P.A. medium yes high shirking
S. Kramer C.E. high yes high cooperate
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i. C.E - Career Executive, P.A- Political Appointee
ii. Levels of skills and experience were mainly determined on the basis of 
interviews with key players, who provided information regarding players’ 
professions, managerial skills, experience in the municipality or in the public, 
private sector.
iii. Level of monitoring is determined as follow:
High level: frequent meetings with management and council members - at least 
twice a week and often even daily. Frequent review of reports and plans of the 
agency.
Medium level: meetings are less frequent - once or twice a week, a few requests 
for reports (annual report, quarterly report). Reports and plans are usually 
presented to management when/if the head of the agency initiates their 
presentation.
Low level: rare meetings, no demands of reports, management does not include 
the head of the agency in meetings. A few unofficial, general talks instead of 
formal operational planning. For example: a verbal request from the mayor to 
“Do something to clean the city” .
Lists of interviews conducted in the city of Beer-Sheva
• Mr. Off Kadoori: Head of Municipal Union, (20/02/98)
• Mr. Shlomo Kramer: External Comptroller, (March, 1998)
• Mrs. Biniamina Morik: City Internal Comptroller
• Mrs. Avishag Avtoobi: Head of Strategic Unit, (30/06/98)
• Mrs. Rachel Levi: Deputy Mayor, (16/03/98)
• Mr. Abraham Zabonath: Head of Sanitation, (1995-1997) (April,
1998)
• Mr. David Rubin: City Treasurer (1994), (17/04/01)
• Mr. Andrei Uzan: Head of Sanitation, (1988-1993), (March, 1998)
• Mr. Arie Bar: Council Member, Head of the Opposition Party, (May,
1998)
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Notes
Central Bureau of Statistics, 1999.
2. “Sanitation and gardening were partially contracted out, due to the complaints from 
neighbourhood representatives and businesses of poor services supplied by the city 
...the contractors themselves, who acted as an interest group, created public relations 
pressure against the city, requesting that it improve the provision of services, hoping 
that this would lead to signing contracts with the city...” (Deputy mayor, Mr. Andrei 
Uzan interview).
3. Horkin, Katz, and Mevorach, 1998:100.
4 The table lists only the three highest ranked services in the scale. The survey was
conducted by the “Ma’agar Mochot” research institute and multidisciplinary
consultancy. Surveys July-October 1993.
5. From “Sheva” local newspaper, November 18, 1993, pg.18.
6. Kramer, S. (1995) Managerial Failure in the Municipality o f Beer-Sheva. A report
submitted to the Ministry of the Interior.pg.2 (Hebrew)
7. Shlomo Kramer, interview, and “Kol HaNegev” Local Newspaper, 12/11/1993.
8. Shlomo Kramer, external comptroller, interview 1998.
“Public organizations are too big and complex. These days, we tend to stop this growth 
and not add permanent tenure track contracts to the city. Privatization is a good method 
to increase efficiency “. (Mrs. Rachel Levi, Head of city personnel and Deputy mayor, 
interview 16.03.98).
9. In a meeting of the city financial committee (members included: deputy mayors, head of 
the financial committee, head of the strategic unit, external comptroller), the committee 
decided to instruct the administration to prepare a privatization program for local
services, with the assistance of the external comptroller and an organizational
consultant, who was hired for that specific purpose. (Minutes from the financial 
committee meeting, 12.01.95).
10. From a summary of a meeting conducted with the head of the sanitation agency and the 
council member in charge on sanitation services, 20.02.95.
11. Avishag Avtoobi, head of strategic unit, interview 30.6.98.
12. The team formed on 08.05.95, included: deputy mayor (Andrei Uzan), vice treasurer 
and an organizational consultant.
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13. Political and administrative representatives included: deputy mayor, city manager, head 
of the strategic unit, head of the sanitation agency, vice-treasurer, head of the personnel 
unit, external comptroller assistants, and organizational consultant.
14 From “Kol HaNegev” local newspaper, 10/12/1993, and the minutes of a city
management meeting on July 18, 1995.
15. From the minutes of a city management meeting on July 18, 1995: The objective that
was set was to leave only 188 workers instead of 335 in the sanitation agency and 
overall reduce 44% of internal sanitation workers. 150 workers would continue to
deliver services in some neighbourhoods, while the rest would inspect the work of
contractors rather than deliver services themselves.
16. “ ...The membership of sanitation workers in the union was the main obstacle to 
implementing the contracting-out reform. Workers’ resistance to the reform stemmed 
from their worry about job losses”. (Mrs. Avishag Avtoobi, the head of the strategic 
unit, interview on 30.06.1998).
17. Zabonath interview, 1998.
18. Avishag Avtoobi, head of strategic unit, interview 30.6.98.
19. “ ...The concept of transferring municipal workers to contracted companies is 
inefficient, because contractors do not offer decent working conditions or decent 
salaries.” (Deputy mayor, Mr. Andrei Uzan interview).
20. “ ...The mayor was planning to hire more workers for the Education agency, since the
municipality was entitled to increase the employee quota in that unit. The union agreed
to this arrangement, since it enabled it to maintain the number of workers in the
municipality and therefore maintain the power of the union. The union did not care if 
workers’ support came from members in the Sanitation or Education”. (Mrs. Rachel 
Levi, Head of city personnel and Deputy mayor, interview 16.03.98).
21. From “Kol HaNegev” local newspaper 06.09.1996, pg.30.
22. Zabonath interview, 1998.
23. “Usually city management pushes for efficiency and pressures agencies to privatize 
services, while the municipal union rejects the idea, as it fears to lose its power...” 
(Zabonath interview 1998).
24. See Figure 3.11 and Table 3.23 of percentage of contracted sanitation services in Beer- 
Sheva, in chapter 3.
25. Avishag Avtoobi, head of strategic unit, interview 30.6.98.
26. From: The Sanitation (Waste Collection) Expenditures Report (1996-1999), prepared by 
the sanitation agency chief accountant, December 15, 1999, and from “Sheva” Local 
Newspaper, January 20, 1994.
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21. From: Public Tender no. 25/2003- Waste Collection in the City of Beer-Sheva.
28. “I left City Appearance services (include sanitation), because of the council member in 
charge of the agency. He was not professional and constantly interfered with my work, 
the previous council member did not interfere”. (Zabonath interviewl998).
29. Kramer 1995:4 and the internal audit commission report 92-95.
“ ...City inspectors, who are meant to monitor the performance of contractors, are not 
qualified for the job... workers were placed in the inspection unit who did not fit any 
other role in the municipality but management was not able to fire. In “city appearance”, 
all the inspectors were union members, which created a conflict of interest: they were 
required to supervise a contracting-out process they rejected”. (Zabonath 
interview 1998).
30. “Sanitation workers tried to convince us that they knew better than contractors how to 
supply sanitation services; we, on the other hand, could not prove that contracting-out 
sanitation would lead to budget savings, we just argued that, with contractors, the streets 
would be cleaner.” (Avishag Avtoobi, head of strategic unit, interview 30.6.98).
jl. Avishag Avtoobi, head of strategic unit, interview 30.6.98.
32. “With the city management’s support of a declaration of privatization, strong pressure 
by the municipal union emerged, directed at management, to prevent the process”... 
(Shlomo Kramer interview).
33. “ ...the union rejects the idea of privatization, but the city can try to come up with 
reasonable solutions that would make the transition to private companies easier, for 
example, with high compensation fees for early retirement.” (Deputy mayor, Mr. Andrei 
Uzan interview)
34. “ ...It is possible to get union cooperation. It is all a matter of bargaining. For example, 
we would not approve the hiring of new workers by the sanitation and gardening 
agencies, thus expanding them. Eventually, we reached an understanding with the head 
of the union, in which sanitation and gardening would hire external contractors and in 
return, city management would allow more workers to be recruited in the education and 
social services agencies, recruitment that the central government allows. In this way, the 
municipal union would maintain its power, even with a reduction in the number of 
sanitation workers”(Mrs. Rachel Levi, Head of city personnel and Deputy mayor, 
interview 16.03.98).
35. From “Sheva” Local Newspaper, 9/12/1993.
36. Deputy mayor, Mr. Andrei Uzan interview.
37 Kramer 1995:16
38. Kramer 1995:15
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions
This thesis has examined why the mechanism of political appointment does not 
always serve as an efficient mechanism to overcome principal-agent problems. Much 
o f the Public Policy and Administration literature considers political appointments as 
a useful tool to control bureaucracies and create responsive agencies. Frequently, 
scholars assume that responsiveness is reached when politicians resolve a conflict of 
interest with bureaucratic agents, by appointing political allies willing to cooperate 
and reveal information to their principals. However, this study explains why political 
appointments often do not solve agency problems and even obstruct control over 
bureaucracies.
In order to evaluate the efficiency of political appointments, this thesis first 
explored two basic types of uncooperative behaviour by administrative agents. A 
distinction was made between shifting policy and shirking. As elaborated in the 
opening chapters, these uncooperative acts stem from different motivations and 
therefore require different incentives to be overcome. Chapter 2 discussed how both 
political and career agents could potentially shift or shirk from their commitment to 
implement policies. With political nominees, reaching policy agreement at the 
appointment stage may prevent agents shifting to alternative policies once in office. 
Yet, solving the problem of shifting does not necessarily create responsive agencies. 
It is argued that, although, by appointing political associates, politicians may be able 
to prevent shifting, they increase the likelihood of shirking.
Just because politicians appoint those who share their ideological views, does 
not necessarily reduce the need for monitoring. With career agents, politicians
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attempt to counter the possibility of uncooperative acts, by continually monitoring 
their agencies to ensure compliance. However, with political appointees, the 
politicians, trusting in policy agreement at the appointment stage, assume that most 
of their conflicts with agencies have been resolved. Presuming cooperation, they seek 
to reduce monitoring costs once their political allies enter office. These relaxed 
conditions grant political agents higher discretion than career agents, increasing their 
freedom to shirk from their duties. Chapter 2 posits that the more politicians reach 
mutual understanding on policy with their nominees at the appointment process, the 
more they are prepared to relax monitoring. This in return, may increase the 
likelihood of shirking.
The theoretical chapters highlight core ideas, offered in public administration 
literature, as to why career agents tend to shift policy, while political agents are more 
likely to shirk. Career agents exhibit interests such as budget maximization, or a 
desire for a stable working environment, which often contradict politicians’ demands 
for extensive and controversial change. Political nominees for executive roles shirk 
when they find it difficult to implement policies. This often results from their 
unfamiliarity with administrative tasks, including interaction with subordinates, who 
may be hiding information from them. Moreover, their eagerness to invest time in 
political activities does not leave much time for bureaucratic tasks. In some of our 
empirical cases, it was shown that union membership could place appointees under 
pressure to avoid implementing policies that the union rejected.
In this thesis, the theory of political appointments is examined in three Israeli 
cities: Tel-Aviv, Holon, and Beer-Sheva. More than a decade ago, most Israeli cities 
had attempted to undergo structural reforms in service delivery, mainly by 
contracting-out municipal services. As elaborated in Chapter 3, privatization was
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undertaken, due to the financial constraints faced by most cities. Central government 
was reluctant to assist municipalities with budgetary transfers, while, at the same 
time, pressuring local authorities to deal with financial constraints on their own. The 
three cities chosen for this study all attempted to contract-out services at 
approximately the same time. The case studies concentrate on sanitation agencies for 
the political term of 1993-1998. An empirical testing of privatization outcomes in 6 
major cities, between 1992-1999, as presented in Chapter 3, reveals that Tel-Aviv 
had the greatest failure in the implementation process, Holon was the most 
successful, while Beer-Sheva achieved a medium level of privatization.
In an effort to privatize services, mayors in all three cities politically 
appointed sanitation managers, whom they believed would comply in advancing the 
reform. The replacement of political and/or career sanitation managers, between 
1993-1997, included: four in Tel-Aviv, four in Beer-Sheva and two in Holon. The 
empirical study conducted in this thesis incorporates interviews with appointees, 
their managers, subordinates and additional key players, such as union leaders, 
council representatives and members of city management. Reviews of documents 
were helpful to determine sequences of events and outcomes achieved, including 
summaries and schedules of meetings, budget reports, and minutes of monthly 
council assemblies. The empirical study enabled us to achieve some insights into the 
nature of the political appointment mechanism and its consequences (see Table 7.1 in 
Appendix).
Shifts of policies
In all three cities, management replaced career bureaucrats with political appointees, 
in order to stop policy shifts in agencies. Tel-Aviv and Beer-Sheva both demonstrate
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how incumbent heads of sanitation agencies, prior to 1993, were considered 
professional civil servants and very familiar with sanitation management. However, 
in their attempts to reform services, the mayors of both cities encountered non- 
responsive agencies. In Tel-Aviv, the incumbent head of agency was a “conserver“, 
getting close to retirement age, ignoring management and shifting policy by 
recruiting workers and purchasing vehicles. As a conserver, he was avoiding conflict 
with workers over wages and work schedules. In Beer-Sheva, the incumbent 
sanitation manager openly rejected privatization, claiming that it would not succeed, 
as long as there was no real competition between private suppliers in the district. For 
a while, he was able to block attempts by city management to privatize services, 
while promoting his own plans for sanitation. Consequently, the new mayor, elected 
in 1993, who insisted on contracting-out services, required the incumbent sanitation 
manager to resign.
In Holon, prior to 1993, management was unhappy, both with the 
performance of its sanitation manager and the council member in charge of 
overseeing sanitation. Shifting of policy occurred, due to a conflict o f interests 
between the council member and management, each pushing the agency to advance 
different plans. In this situation, the sanitation manager was often criticized for his 
performance, being pressured to comply with contradicting demands from 
management and the council member. In 1993, the new mayor expressed his 
intention to reform sanitation services. Realizing the conflict of interest that existed 
in sanitation, he decided to conduct personnel changes, by replacing the incumbent 
manager and, a year later, by means of a major organizational reform, to eliminate 
the service “portfolios” of council members.
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Policy agreements at the appointment stage
In an attempt to avoid potential shifting of policy, politicians, during the appointment 
process, tried to reach agreements with nominees to reform services. Empirical 
examination of the appointment process confirms that most political appointees 
reached an understanding with management over policy at that stage. In the cases of 
Tel-Aviv and Beer-Sheva, all political appointees agreed to reform services during 
the appointment stage. In the case of Holon, the management and its nominee both 
recognized that workers’ performance was low, and that changes, such as 
privatization, were therefore needed. Although the nominee for sanitation expressed 
his lack of enthusiasm for any system that would lead to job losses, he clearly 
understood what management expected of him i.e., to contract-out sanitation 
services. Furthermore, the mayor of Holon insisted on reaching an agreement with 
him, in which the latter promised to reform services, while, in return, the former 
granted him discretion to manage his agency as he saw fit.
Shirking by political appointees
Although, at the appointment stage, most political appointees agreed with 
management to revise services, these agreements played little part in creating 
responsive agencies. Once in office, the agreements were not significantly adhered 
to. While, as intended by management, most political appointees did not shift policy, 
they resorted to shirking for various reasons. It is evident that shirking occurs when 
appointees lack the knowledge and experience to manage administrative agencies. In 
addition, political obligations to interest groups or unions, places them under 
pressure to avoid undesired reforms.
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In Tel-Aviv, the first political appointee tried not to jeopardize his 
relationship with union members and therefore avoided reforming his agency. The 
second appointee soon found that he was too inexperienced to reform services 
without a serious conflict with the workers. He therefore tried unsuccessfully to shift 
policy to expanding the agency, instead of cutting it.
In Holon, once appointed, the new head of sanitation was reluctant to take the 
necessary steps toward contracting-out services in his first years. As a union leader, 
he was not ready to lose his political support. In Beer-Sheva, the first appointee 
agreed to contract-out services and may have had the skills to respond to 
management, but he chose to set different privatization conditions and demanding to 
know how and with whom contracts would be signed. He then moved to manage one 
o f the private contracting companies. The political appointee who replaced him in 
1995, loyal to the union, shirked from reforming services.
Monitoring
The examination of the three cities also allowed an exploration of the importance of 
monitoring by management. In this study, the level of monitoring was determined by 
registering the degree of ongoing inspection of bureaucratic units, such as frequency 
o f meetings with heads of agencies, progress achieved with structured plans - in this 
case detailed privatization programs - and oversight mechanisms, such as periodic 
reviews of agencies, meant to ensure that agents followed plans correctly and on 
schedule. It appears that at any stage, when management chose to grant agencies 
discretion and relaxed monitoring over its political appointees, inefficiency resulted. 
Correspondingly, it is evident that when management closely monitored the 
implementation stages of privatization, the outcomes improved. This is not to say
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that, with monitoring, management can solve all agency problems and efficiently 
control the activities in the city. However, when management monitors agencies, it 
increases its ability to detect non-responsive political agents, and then, either take 
steps to obtain a change in their behaviour, or take steps to replace them.
In the case of Tel-Aviv, city management trusted its political appointees and 
thus relaxed monitoring over the sanitation agency, something it had not done 
regarding its former career agents, due to lack of trust. For agencies managed by 
political appointees, the mayor offered an “open door” for discussions, but did not 
require any formal timetables of progress. As a result, political appointees worked 
under conditions that allowed them freely to pursue alternative goals. In 1997, when 
management realized that there had been no significant reform of sanitation services, 
it replaced the incumbent sanitation manager, going back to the policy of installing a 
careerist. Furthermore, management increased monitoring utilizing certain methods: 
(1) it continued to offer a direct line of communication without the need to address 
middle level managers for that purpose; and, (2) it appointed a deputy city manager 
to assist and supervise the new agent, regarding the construction of a detailed 
privatization program. This set up the initial conditions needed to advance the 
contracting-out of services.
In Holon, the organizational reform, instituted in 1994, created conditions 
under which non-compliant behaviour became easier. As council members were no 
longer permitted to approach administrative executives directly and criticize their 
work, the mayor’s office became a buffer between elected and appointed 
(administrative) officials. At the same time, the mayor granted discretion to political 
appointees to manage their agencies as they saw fit. Consequently, sanitation 
managers were free from inspection and scrutiny from council representatives and
192
gained increased control over the provision of services. These relaxed monitoring 
procedures allowed agencies to remain at status quo for a couple of years without 
detection.
As, by 1996, changes in the sanitation agency had not occurred as expected, 
management concluded that its sanitation agent was shirking and thus pressurized 
him to contract-out services. Management began monitoring the performance of the 
agency closely, demanding structured privatization plans. Second, the mayor decided 
to adopt a more formal approach towards his sanitation agent, despite their 
friendship. The change of attitude forced the manager to decide, either to comply, or 
to leave.
Contrary to the situation in of Tel-Aviv and Holon, in Beer-Sheva, the 
ongoing involvement of elected representatives, pushing agencies to revise services, 
set conditions under which heads of agencies were constantly monitored, allowing 
uncooperative behaviour to be easily detected. This does not mean that management 
was able to prevent non-response in the agency, but at least it allowed it to replace 
the manager more promptly. This is especially evident during the period when the 
second political appointee managed the sanitation agency. A major factor for change 
was also the appointment by central government of an external comptroller for Beer- 
Sheva. The involvement of council members in the agency head’s work, together 
with the formal programs that were set up by the external comptroller, created a 
situation in which the appointee could neither shift nor shirk for a long period of 
time. Left with no options, the appointee chose to resign.
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When agents cooperate
Two of the cities, Tel-Aviv and Holon, demonstrate that cooperation with 
management can be reached, when appointees begin to view their position as a long­
term bureaucratic career. In other words, they abandon their political ambitions and 
center their attention on succeeding in public management. In the three cities under 
review, this was only true in cases in which appointees were able to adjust to their 
bureaucratic, managerial tasks. Once they were motivated as “climbers” or “zealots”, 
they dedicated themselves to adopting programs that could promote their future 
bureaucratic careers. Embracing such reforms as privatization, meant gaining the 
support of management, financial rewards, and potential future promotions within 
the municipality.
In the case of Tel-Aviv, in 1997, management created a responsive agency 
when it appointed a new agent, a “climber”, who immediately resigned from the 
union. The new agent was highly motivated to advance his career by successfully 
privatizing sanitation services. The new careerist manager was familiar with the 
activities of sanitation, as an experienced worker in the agency. His qualifications 
differed dramatically from those of the previous political appointees and he was able 
to skilfully avoid confrontation with workers, which had caused problems for the 
previous sanitation appointees. He gained the trust of the agency’s workers, when he 
introduced the term “gradual privatization”, while working hard to ensure that 
redundant workers found alternative jobs.
In the case of Holon, after three years in office, The sanitation manager had 
to decide whether to pursue his political career, or invest in his bureaucratic one. He 
decided to consider his role as head of agency as a long-term career and chose his 
bureaucratic interests over his political agenda. He resigned from the union and made
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initial steps to advance privatization in his agency. Thus, the politically appointed 
head of agency decided, as a “zealot”, to pursue a bureaucratic career and reform 
services. This is still the case at time of writing, when he is still the incumbent head 
of the sanitation agency (1994-2004).
The case of Beer-Sheva differs from the other cases, since both appointees 
were reluctant to abandon their political associations. The appointees were forced to 
resign, when they tried to avoid upsetting interests groups which they believed would 
take care of their long-term interests in the city. Before the second appointee left, 
management achieved partial privatization, when the external comptroller almost 
took over the agency, forcing its manager and workers to cooperate.
In the empirical exploration of three cities, some of the findings seem to 
contradict one another. Political appointees replaced career bureaucrats, because the 
latter shifted policies, while, in all the studied cases, it was a career bureaucrat or 
political agent, who had chosen to develop his bureaucratic career interests, who 
finally facilitated the advance of privatization. The explanation of this paradox lies in 
the assumption that, like political appointees, career executives adjust to conditions 
that either facilitate or hinder cooperation. Levels of monitoring and the extent of 
planning by management can influence the performance of career agents.
In addition, not all career bureaucrats are dedicated to their principals, just as 
not all political appointees lack dedication. For instance, in Tel-Aviv, the incumbent 
sanitation manager was replaced in 1993 for uncooperative behaviour as he was 
acting as a “conserver” . On the other hand, the new careerist appointed in 1997, was 
o f the “climber” type - highly ambitious to advance his career in the municipality and 
therefore choosing to respond to management demands. Mrs. Rachel Levi, Head of
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Personnel in the city of Beer-Sheva claims: “From my experience, ambitious 
careerists feel less intimidated over losing budget and confronting workers, do not 
consider privatization as a threat, tend to consult more with external advisors, and do 
not associate personal rewards with the budget allocated to their agencies” .1
In sum, this research has not attempted to explore all the problems of 
bureaucracies, not even all those concerned with the conflicts of interest that often 
exist between political and administrative actors. The theoretical arguments and 
empirical observations, presented in this thesis, neither completely dismiss the 
mechanism of political appointments, nor do they strongly support the classic 
“Weberian” type administration, built on “careerist” civil servants. This study shows 
that each mechanism has its limits.
As in the British system, in the last decades, politicians have tended to take 
ideological-political attitudes into consideration and not just the expertise of 
candidates, when appointing top executives.2 In their latest book, Aberbach and 
Rockman assert that, under the American system, the bureaucracy has become much
• 3 • • • •more flexible and responsive than m past decades. This is an interesting observation, 
given that the extent of political appointments has declined. These days, political and 
bureaucratic roles are much more defined and separated.4 A considerably increased 
number o f middle and low ranked bureaucrats are kept in office when a new 
government enters. This is despite the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 that gave 
greater control to the presidential administration, to determine which top career 
executive should continue to serve and in which department or agency.5
This research has tried to identify some of the main strengths and weaknesses 
o f types o f bureaucratic agents, when interacting with elected representatives, who 
are trying to promote their policies, mainly focusing on political agents, hired to limit
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agency problems. In the process of evaluating the mechanism of political 
appointments and its constraints, this study has tested core theoretical arguments, 
presented in the literature, and sheds considerable doubt upon some of the claims. 
The study indicates that politicians place too much emphasis on ideological views 
and policy agreements reached with their allies, but in the process, disregard other 
interests which their allies are seeking to promote. Under this presumed notion of 
mutual trust, politicians create conditions that facilitate non-responsiveness. 
Appointing political allies might seem to mitigate potential shifting activities by 
career bureaucrats, but, as shown, it can create greater shirking. Furthermore, 
politicians may assume that they can save monitoring costs, once they have 
appointed their political allies, but as demonstrated in this study, this can be a big 
mistake.
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Appendix
Table 7.1: Profiles of all sanitation managers in Tel-Aviv, Holon, and Beer- 
Sheva (1993-1998):
city Agents Type of appoint.1
Skills and 
experience"
Policy 
agreement 
reached at the 
appointment 
stage
Level of 
monitoring"1 Outcomes
Tel-
Aviv
M. Paz C.E. high no medium shifting
A.
Steinmitch P.A. low yes low shirking
A. Shpiegel P.A. medium yes medium 0 shifting,v
A. Yefet C.E. high yes high cooperate
Holon N. Peled C.E. low no high shifting
A. Shaul P.A. medium yes low shirking
A. Shaul 
1996
(incumbent)
C.E.V high viyes high cooperate
Beer-
Sheva
A. Uzan C.E. high no high shifting
M. Levi P.A. medium yes high shifting
A.
Zabonath P.A. medium yes high shirking
S. Kramer C.E. high yes high cooperate
i. C.E - Career Executive, P. A- Political Appointee
ii. Levels of skills and experience were mainly determined on the basis of
interviews with key players who provided information regarding players’
professional and managerial skills, experience in the municipality, or in the
public, or private sector.
iii. Level of monitoring is determined as follow:
High level: frequent meetings with management and council members - at least 
twice a week and often even daily. Frequent review of reports and plans of the 
agency.
Medium level: meetings are less frequent - once or twice a week, a few requests 
for reports (annual report, quarterly report). Reports and plans are usually 
presented to management when/if the head of the agency initiates their 
presentation.
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Low level: rare meetings, no demands of reports, management does not include 
the head of the agency in meetings. A few unofficial, general talks instead of 
formal operational planning. For example: a verbal request from the mayor to 
“Do something to clean up the city” .
iv. “0” (zero) shifting means policy remains at status quo, because the agent is 
unsuccessful in forwarding the plans for the agency, it does not mean that he is 
shirking.
v. In the case of Holon, Arnon Shaul can be regarded as a career executive from 
1996, onwards, as he then decided to resign from the union and develop his 
bureaucratic career.
vi. In 1996, after the Holon management detected shirking, it required Shaul to 
again agree to revise services, as a condition for him to remain as head of the 
agency. The policy agreement reached with management and change of career 
plans for Shaul can both be regarded as a new process of appointment.
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Notes
Rachel Levi, Deputy mayor of Beer-Sheva, interview, 16.03.98.
2. Dery, 1993:13.
3 . Aberbach and Rockman,2000:132
4. Aberbach & Rockman, 1997:335-336.
5 . Aberbach and Rockman,2000:132
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